Introduction
Although attention to terrorism has increased sharply in recent years, it is by no means a new phenomenon. For decades terrorists have carried out attacks against non-combatant targets causing massive destruction by means of visious assaults. While the objectives and modus operandi have changed, there is no reason to believe that terrorism will completely cease to exist in the near future. In fact, because terrorism is a tactic used by a wide variety of organizations1 it can be argued that terrorism cannot be defeated at all. While individual groups that use terrorist means to further their political objectives can be curbed, the vicious cycle has thus far not been broken. Some argue that the key to successfully dealing with terrorism lies in understanding its root and trigger causes. Others contend that it is equally important to consider factors of decline. Two years after the events of 9/11, former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan delivered a speech to heads of state at a conference on “Fighting Terrorism for Humanity: A Conference on Roots of Evil”. In it, Annan stressed the need to address the root causes of terrorism in order to be able to fight it. He warned that “[i]f we are to defeat terrorism, it is our duty, and indeed our interest, to try to understand this deadly phenomenon, and carefully to examine what works, and what does not, in fighting it.” (United Nations Secretary General, 2003). The former Secretary General also emphasized that it was just as erroneous to believe that terrorism is unrelated to political and social factors, as it is to assume that terrorists are merely products of their environment. “Terrorism will only be defeated if we act to solve the political disputes or longstanding conflicts that generate support for it,” stated Annan, adding that “[i]f we do not, we should find ourselves acting as recruiting sergeants for the very terrorists we seek to suppress.”2 This report aims to place concepts of terrorism in perspective by analysing the root and trigger causes of terrorism, its decline as well as the affect of current trends on the risk that terrorist organizations pose to European societies. This is a highly ambitious yet very relevant to framing the current nature of the threat. 1 The term “terrorist organization” will be used regularly throughout this study. In many cases this can also refer to small groups or cells. For the sake of consistency this distinction will not be made each time the term “organization” is used. 5 Questions central to this study include: what are the ways to counter terrorism and how can the threat of the phenomenon be reduced? Have changes in terrorist trends led to changes in the risk that terrorists pose to our society? If so, what trends have been witnessed in recent years? In addition to in-depth analysis of the prevailing literature, several models are introduced to help explain the concepts at hand. It is important to emphasize, however, that the complexity of terrorism combined with the unique attributes of individual groups make it nearly impossible to capture the explanatory characteristics of the phenomenon in a single model. As such several models are used to depict the ways in which root and trigger causes can affect the decline of terrorism (and vice versa) and the affect of observed trends in terrorism on changes in the risk terrorist organizations pose. The study is concluded with analysis of selected case studies that illustrate the diversity of terrorism in Europe and cover a spectrum of categories. These include ethnonationalist and separatist terrorism, left-wing and anarchist terrorism, right-wing terrorism and religious terrorism. Finally, given the scope and breadth of this study, individual conclusions are drawn following the thematic discussions of the individual chapters. PART A. 1. TERRORISM RISE AND FALL: ROOT AND TRIGGER CAUSES AND CAUSES FOR DECLINE The search for causes and causality is a central theme in all social sciences, deriving from the inherent need to understand the occurrence of particular phenomena. Moreover, in dealing with undesirable occurrences, we seek to understand the “why” and “how” in order to develop appropriate counter measures. Unfortunately, these questions seldom lend themselves to clear answers. One can, however, often distinguish different sets or levels of causes. With regard to the latter category, a typical distinction is that between deep, 2 The speech in its entirety can be accessed online - http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sgsm8885.doc.htm. 6 intermediate and direct causes. In this section we draw a distinction between “root causes” and “trigger causes”, which are also often described as “preconditions” and “precipitants,” and for the purposes of this study, define the terms, based on the work of Martha Crenshaw (1981), as follows: root causes (or preconditions) are those factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run, trigger causes (or precipitants) are specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism. Specific examples of each will be provided below, and will serve as a basis for distilling a list of the causes most commonly agreed upon. 1.1 Scholarly Research Overview The study of terrorism is multidisciplinary, spanning a number of fields including political science, psychology, criminology, sociology, history and many others. Researchers from these fields have contributed to further developing our understanding of the phenomenon, yet it has generally raised more questions than provided answers. The following sections present a general overview of the scholarly research, highlighting the range of approaches and examining the progress that has been made thus far. Since the 1960s a plethora of studies have been published on the topic of terrorism, however, the number of publications that directly address the root causes has been surprisingly limited. Following the explosion of publications on the subject in the 1970s, terrorism research has produced steady growth in the number of publications, but according to some the quantity has not reflected improvements in quality (Silke, 2003). It is true that various aspects of terrorism have been tackled in recent years, including radical group affiliation, civil violence and suicide terrorism. However, despite the proliferation of academic studies and political discussions calling for a closer look at the root causes, there has been no real improvement in this area. As Andrew Silke points outs “[a] review of recent research work found that only about 20 percent of published articles on terrorism are providing substantially new knowledge on the subject” (2003: xvii). As such, ongoing research continues to be based on the findings from years past. 7 General Qualitative Analyses of Causes of Terrorism Among the most often quoted publications on the causes of terrorism is Martha Crenshaw’s renowned article, “The causes of terrorism” (1981). In this article Crenshaw highlights the difficulty of finding general explanations for terrorism and contends that it is possible to distinguish different types of variables, as a starting point for further research on causal relations. Crenshaw’s objective to outline an approach conducive to analysis of the causes of terrorism in order to distinguish “a common pattern of causation from the historically unique” (1981: 379), is predicated on a comparison of different cases of terrorism. Differentiating between three groups of variables: strategic, structural and psychological, Crenshaw emphasizes the idea that terrorism is a product of rational political choice. A conceptual distinction is drawn with the division of the structural variables into preconditions (root causes) and precipitants (trigger causes). Preconditions are further divided and classified into enabling (or permissive) factors that provide opportunities for terrorism to occur, and situations that serve as direct motivations for terrorist campaigns (1981: 381). Although Crenshaw’s article offers ample ideas for further research and has often been quoted by others, few scholars have picked up the challenge to bring our understanding of causes of terrorism to a higher level. Another influential article, published twelve years after Crenshaw’s and dealing with the subject, is that of Jeffrey Ian Ross. In “Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model” (1993), Ross identifies three prominent categories of causes of terrorism, comparable to those of Crenshaw, namely structural and psychological causes, as well as those related to the concept of “rational choice.” Ross concludes that the first generation of causal models, including his own work, can be considered valuable in describing terrorism, but lack the necessary tools for in-depth analysis of the phenomenon. Addressing terrorism’s nature as a collective action, Dipak Gupta (2005) seeks to understand why people engage in such action in the name of a group based on ethnicity, religion, nationalism or ideology. Gupta presents arguments that are rooted in economic and socio-psychological dimensions of human motivations. Drawing a distinction between constructs that represent grievances and those that lead to violence, Gupta points out that “[p]olitical violence takes place when a leader gives voice to the frustration by formulating a well-defined social 8 construction of collective identity and paints in vivid colour the images of ‘us’ and ‘them’” (2005: 19). In other words, political, economic and religious grievances are not in and of themselves factors which lead to terrorism. The root causes can thus stay dormant until a trigger mechanism is activated, leading to an outbreak of violence. Further building on Crenshaw’s findings, Rakesh Gupta (1998) and Charles Kegley (2003) present recommendations and case-specific conclusions for explaining causes of terrorism. Gupta’s research tries to identify relevant leads for an organizational theory of causation using India as a case study. With a general overview of existing literature, Gupta’s work does not produce new insights into specific causes of terrorism, but nonetheless expands on elements of socio-economic causation, legitimation process and identity movements. The edited volume of Kegley divides the subject of terrorism into three categories of analysis. The author places specific emphasis on the importance of initial characterization of terrorism, pointing out that how it is defined will consequently shape the resulting conclusions of its causes. Two of the book’s chapters are by Crenshaw herself in which she focuses on the causes of terrorism and terrorism as a globalized civil war. Crenshaw’s findings include that patterns of terrorism may be a consequence of strategic conceptions rather than a set of common circumstances or conditions. Additional authors and scholars who have focused on terrorism and political violence and subsequently shed light on its causes include the books of Paul Wilkinson Terrorism and the Liberal State (1986), Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response (2000) Walter Laqueur The Age of Terrorism (1987), A History of Terrorism (2001), Ted Robert Gurr Why Men Rebel (1970) and Tore Bjørgo, Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality And Ways Forward (2005). While all have attempted to explain the occurrence of modern terrorism, none have produced specific set(s) of causes. In addition to published books and articles, numerous conferences have been held throughout the world in an effort to bring together experts and further the knowledge on the subject. Producing working paper series and furthering the debate on the subject, notable conferences in recent years include “Fighting 9 Terrorism for Humanity: A Conference on Roots of Evil” held in Oslo in 20033 and “Democracies Confronting Terrorism” summit in Madrid in 20054. The meetings produced insightful results and have contributed to our development of a comprehensive list of root and trigger causes presented further in this report. Psychological Research on Causes of Terrorism A number of scholars have tried to distinguish different causes of terrorist activities by focusing primarily on the psychology of individual terrorists or group processes. However, many of these studies only discuss the causes and motivations of individual cases or groups, lacking arguments and explanations of activities at the aggregate level. Among the exceptions, is the work of Jerrold Post entitled “The Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk of Terrorism” (2002) which investigates the psycho-logic thinking of individuals involved in terrorism, and builds a framework for analysis with regard to the extent of conditions and characteristics that can increase the risk that a radical group will shift to terrorism. The author criticizes those who regard terrorism as a course of action and a deliberate choice among different alternatives. Post argues that “… political terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces, and that their psycho-logic is constructed to rationalize acts they are psychologically compelled to commit” (1990: 25). While Post does not provide a specific list of root and trigger causes for terrorism, his research of critical internal and external variables of radicalization provides fertile grounds for assessing the causes of terrorism. Another scholar that stresses the importance of psychological research of the causes of terrorism is Bruce Hoffman, professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University. In his studies, Hoffman analyzes the changing face of terrorism, pointing to the fact that it is often viewed as a means of 3 With the objective of debunking myths about the root causes of terrorism, a panel of leading experts in the field met to provide input from the research community and included such luminaries as Dr. Michael Stohl and Jerrold Post, among others. 4 Held on the first anniversary of the Madrid bombings, the Madrid Summit was the largest gathering of terrorism and security experts. Aiming to launch a strategic dialogue between scholars, practitioners and policymakers, the gathering was also intended to come up practical suggestions. Following the Summit, a series of three working papers were produced for Club de Madrid outlining the elements of a comprehensive response to terrorism. Members of the working groups included notable researchers like Marc Sageman, Dipak Gupta, Martha Crenshaw, Jerrold Post, T.R. Gurr and many others. 10 communicating a message and using violence as a way to further solidify the triumph of their cause. Furthermore, Hoffman (1999) establishes several common traits, including strategic targeting and the undeniable belief in the ultimate triumph over their enemies. According to Hoffman terrorists live in the divinely decreed future, a point in time where the ultimate realization of their political destiny can be attained. Additional insight into the psychology of terrorists, as well as a deeper analysis of their actions could result in a number of causal variables that bring them to commit terrorist crimes. In part, such insight can be observed in the recent work of Marc Sageman who in his book Understanding Terror Networks (2004), challenges conventional thinking about terrorism as a phenomenon and discusses the impetus behind the proliferation of terrorist networks. Sageman’s study is based on comprehensive biographical data of over one hundred participants in terrorist activities, detailing their accounts of affiliation with terrorist cells. Similarly to Post, while Sageman does not produce a list of concrete root or trigger causes, his work does contribute to the understanding of individuals involved in terrorism. Empirical Analyses of Causes of Terrorism In addition to qualitative studies, of which the above-mentioned studies are examples, the method of quantitative – here called empirical – analysis is employed by a number of scholars investigating causes of terrorism. Many of these studies focus on the falsification of causal links between variables and different forms of terrorism. A recent example is the research work of Sean P. O’Brien on the possible connections between the foreign policy of superpowers in times of international crises and (state-sponsored) international terrorism. For a long time, especially in the United States, state support for terrorism was regarded as one of the important causes of terrorism. Following a time series analysis of three alternative hypotheses based on terrorism data sets for the period of 1968-1986, one of the conclusions O’Brien derives is that terrorism increases after one party feels victimized by an intervention by the United States (O’Brien 1996). These and other empirically based conclusions, however, do not go further than simply “proving” common sense conclusions. While vehement 11 debates on the subject prevail, our understanding of the causes of terrorism remains limited. Ultimately, even without these kinds of studies, logical reasoning can be used to argue that, following their intervention in Iraq, it is not surprising that troops from the United States and its allies are facing attacks. A more interesting and definitely more surprising study is the often-quoted work of Alan Krueger and Jitka Malečková entitled “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” (2003). Based on, among other factors, public opinion polls, Krueger and Malečková refute the existence of a causal link between low education or poverty and terrorism in Israel/Palestine and Lebanon, discovering that “any connection between poverty, education and terrorism is indirect, complicated and probably quite weak” (2003: 120). Moreover, the study ascertains that the level of education of individuals involved in terrorism in these areas is somewhat higher than average. Additionally, the background of suicide terrorists covers all socio-economic layers of society, further reiterating that “economic theory is unlikely to give a very convincing answer … as to whether poverty or low education are important root causes of terrorism” (2003: 123). Undoubtedly, there are a number of scholars and studies that may disagree with this line of reasoning, however additional empirical evidence has thus far not been contradictory. 1.2 Theoretical Framework Apart from the publications by the above-mentioned authors, specific studies addressing the root causes of terrorism are scarce. Moreover, the relatively limited body of literature has not led to generally accepted paradigms of causal relationships. Numerous books and articles repeat the specifics on certain terrorist attacks and terrorist groups cited in previous publications and detailed studies. These readings may be interesting, however they do not contribute to new insights in the quagmire of actually explaining specific root causes. Disagreement between scholars studying terrorism seems to suggest that it may be too simplistic and erroneous to explain an act of terrorism by a single cause (Hudson, 1999: 15). An inventory of scholarly publications with titles that include the words “theory” or “model” in combination with “terrorism” does not produce an 12 extensive list. Moreover, many of these studies can hardly be considered theoretical as they contain superficial descriptions or future scenarios. Some of the more interesting studies focus on possible psychological causes of terrorist behavior, including that of Jerrold Post (1985) and Jeffrey Ross (1996). In this particular field of study, progress has been made over the past few decades. Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s the general assumption was that terrorists were mentally disturbed, thanks to much empirical research, today there is a much more diverse picture of “the terrorist”. In fact, the outstanding common characteristic of individuals involved in terrorism is their normality (Crenshaw, 1981: 390). Terrorism is often the connecting link among varying personalities and apart from the results of socio-psychological studies of terrorism, the general situation remains one in which too little is known about causality (von Hippel, 2003). Additional comparative research is thus needed to further understand causality. Conclusive comparable studies employing a set of fixed variables to describe and analyze terrorism would be an asset in further developing the theoretical framework. In contrast to the 1960s and 1970s when theoretical thinking on the cause of terrorism was dominated almost exclusively by political scientists and sociologists, today a much broader range of scholars emerged. From theological scientists to economists and psychologists, academics have pushed the construction of terrorism theories into new directions. The increase of groups interested in the phenomenon, however, has not resulted in many publications that contain (elements) of a comprehensive theoretical framework. Studies focused on identifying the root causes of transnational terrorism are even less prevalent. A short list of authors and institutes that have conducted thorough longterm research on the subject includes: Rohan Gunaratna, head of International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at Nanyang Technological University; Bruce Hoffman, professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University; Brian Jenkins, senior advisor at the RAND Corporation; Yonah Alexander of the International Center for Terrorism Studies, Washington; Walter Laqueur of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington; and Yoram Schweitzer, Solly Ganor and Reuven Paz of The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya. (Muller, 2003: 207- 208). 13 Approaches to Terrorism Analysis As it has already been illustrated, terrorism is a phenomenon of multi-causal factors. However, thus far a concrete theory is yet to be developed. Notwithstanding the divergence of considerations on the root causes of terrorism, it is possible to categorize some of the more generally accepted views. Roughly speaking there are four categories of approaches to terrorism analysis: 1) the multi-causal approach; 2) the political or structural approach; 3) the organizational approach; and 4) the psychological approach. Multi-Causal Approach Emphasizing the presence of multiple causal variables, this approach incorporates psychological considerations, economic, political, religious and sociological factors as contributors to understanding the causes of terrorism. Some scholars, Paul Wilkinson (1977) for example, view the causes of political violence including ethnic, religious and ideological conflicts as causes of terrorism. Of the four categories, the multi-causal approach provides the least insight into the root causes of terrorism, contending that terrorism is the result of a combination of factors. The authors who fall within this category, such as Alan Krueger and Jitka Malečková, combine factors of previous approaches to explain the root causes of terrorism, or introduce new factors in combination with some of the aforementioned ones. Political or Structural Approach A political approach presupposes that the causes of terrorism can be found in environmental factors. For example, national or international arenas, as well as sub-national spheres like universities can be conducive to the rise of terrorism (Hudson, 1999: 16). This approach, which was mostly adhered to by left-wing researchers in the sixties and the seventies, including Ross (1996) and Ted Robert Gurr (1970; 2006) indicate poverty, oppression and inequality as causes 14 of terrorism. Central to Gurr’s research is the notion of relative deprivation, a term often used to describe feelings of economic, political, or social deprivation that are relative rather than absolute. Gurr suggests that the inability to obtain what is felt to be justified triggers feelings of frustration that ultimately facilitates the emergence of collective violence. In addition to environmental factors, scholars have sought to identify preconditions – issues that set the stage for terrorism in the long term, and precipitants – mechanisms that activate the occurrence of terrorism. In a similar vein, preconditions are further subdivided into permissive factors which provide opportunities for terrorism to happen, and situations or reasons that directly inspire terrorist campaigns (Crenshaw, 1981: 381). This use of preconditions implies a political approach, as it seeks to distinguish what in the surrounding atmosphere can contribute to an individual’s involvement in terrorism. Rational or Organizational Approach With a focus on terrorism as a rational strategic choice, this approach rests on the idea that organizations consciously make the decision to use the instrument of terrorism as the best option to attain certain political goals. Adherents to the rational approach, including Martha Crenshaw, would argue that terrorism is most definitely not the product of individual decisions or personal developments, but rather the result of a group process and its collective, rational decisions. This is highly speculative since hardly any empirical studies have provided evidence of how decisions are reached collectively in terrorist groups. However, as Hudson rightfully points out, the organizational approach may be more relevant for groups that exhibit more traditional structures with clear chains of command rather than loose terrorist networks (1999: 17). Psychological Approach The psychological approach takes into account the motivation of individuals that resort to terrorism. Concerned with the personalities, beliefs and attitudes of terrorists and employed by scholars like Marc Sageman (2004) and Bruce Hoffman (1999), this approach focuses primarily on the features and 15 characteristics of the individual perpetrator or terrorist group; examining the behavior, recruitment methods, individual profiles, and “careers” of terrorists. Another study using the psychological approach was conducted by Robert Pape (2003) in an effort to understand the impetus behind suicide terrorism. Through an analysis of 188 cases, Pape refuted traditional thinking that modern suicide terrorism is religiously motivated. In concord with the findings of others, Pape was unable to establish a common profile for suicide terrorists. Based on the results of these studies one could conclude that resolving the so-called sociopolitical causes of terrorism would be futile, since terrorism, as a means of expression of specific ideas and needs, is part of the human disposition. In sum, it is clear that none of the four approaches provide us with all the answers on the root and trigger causes of terrorism. Thus, a lack of consensus on the interrelation of the different factors perseveres. 1.3 List of Root and Trigger Causes of Terrorism With an overview of the theoretical approaches and conclusions drawn from scholarly literature, this section distils a number of concrete root and trigger causes of terrorism. It should be stressed that the following list is not allinclusive and does not aim to present a comprehensive set of all causes of terrorism. Rather it is meant to illustrate the multiplicity of causal factors that often contribute to terrorism and are generally agreed upon in the academic community. The list is divided into two sets of causes in an effort to distinguish the sometimes overlapping factors and provide additional clarity and structure and is drawn from a comprehensive inventory of terrorism publications in Randy Borum’s (2003) Psychology of Terrorism. Root Causes The relationship between terrorism and democracy continues to challenge scholars in their search for causes of terrorism. It is generally agreed that a lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law are preconditions for many forms of domestic terrorism. Generally, the most democratic and the most totalitarian 16 societies have the lowest levels of oppositional violence. Failed or weak states on the other hand, lack the capacity – or sometimes the will – to exercise territorial control. This often leaves a power vacuum that can be exploited by terrorist organizations to maintain safe havens and training facilities or serve as bases for launching terrorist campaigns. However, this should not be perceived as simply a lack of democracy or democratic processes. Long standing liberal democracies with established traditions of free speech and tolerance have been the targets of both domestic and foreign terrorism. As Crenshaw contends “[d]emocracy and terrorism are not polar opposites: saying ‘yes’ to democracy, unfortunately, does not mean saying ‘no’ to terrorism” (Club de Madrid, 2005: 14). Rapid modernization and urbanization in the form of high economic growth has also been found to correlate strongly with the emergence of ideological terrorism, but not with ethno-nationalist terrorism (Crenshaw 1981). This may be particularly important in countries where sudden wealth (e.g. from oil) has precipitated a change from tribal to high-tech societies in one generation or less. When traditional norms and social patterns crumble or are made to seem irrelevant, new radical ideologies that are sometimes based on religion or perhaps nostalgia for a glorious past, may become attractive to certain segments of society. Extremist ideologies of a secular or religious nature are at least an intermediate cause of terrorism, although people usually adopt such extremist ideologies as a consequence of more fundamental political or personal reasons. When these worldviews are adopted and applied in order to interpret situations and guide action, they tend to take on a dynamics of their own, and may serve to dehumanize the enemy and justify atrocities. Historical antecedents of political violence, civil wars, revolutions, dictatorships or occupation may lower the threshold for acceptance of political violence and terrorism, and impede the development of non-violent norms among all segments of society. The victim role as well as longstanding historical injustices and grievances may be constructed to serve as justifications for terrorism. When young children are socialized into cultural value systems that celebrate martyrdom, revenge and hatred of other ethnic or national groups, this is likely to increase their readiness to support or commit violent atrocities when they grow up. 17 Hegemony and inequality of power. When local or international powers possess an overwhelming power compared to oppositional groups, and the latter see no other realistic ways to forward their cause by normal political or military means, “asymmetrical warfare” can represent a tempting option. Terrorism offers the possibility of achieving high political impact with limited means. Illegitimate or corrupt governments frequently give rise to opposition that may turn to terrorist means if other avenues are not seen as realistic options for replacing these regimes with a more credible and legitimate government or a regime which represents the values and interests of the opposition movement. Powerful external actors upholding illegitimate governments may be seen as an insurmountable obstacle to needed regime change. Such external support to illegitimate governments is frequently seen as foreign domination through puppet regimes serving the political and economic interests of foreign sponsors. Repression by foreign occupation or by colonial powers has given rise to a great many national liberation movements that have sought recourse in terrorist tactics and other political means. Despite their use of terrorist methods, some liberation movements enjoy considerable support and legitimacy among their own constituencies, and sometimes also from segments of international public opinion. The experience of discrimination on the basis of ethnic or religious origin is the chief root cause of ethno-nationalist terrorism. When sizeable minorities are systematically deprived of their rights to equal social and economic opportunities, obstructed from expressing their cultural identities (e.g. forbidden to use their language or practice their religion), or excluded from political influence, this can give rise to secessionist movements that may turn to terrorism or other forms of violent struggle. Ethnic nationalisms are more likely to give rise to (and justify) terrorism than are moderate and inclusive civic nationalisms. Failure or unwillingness by the state to integrate dissident groups or emerging social classes may lead to their alienation from the political system. Some groups are excluded because they hold views or represent political traditions considered irreconcilable with the basic values of the state. Large groups of highly educated young people with few prospects of meaningful careers within a blocked system will tend to feel alienated and frustrated. Excluded groups are likely to search for alternative channels through which to express and 18 promote political influence and change. To some, terrorism can seem the most effective and tempting option. The experience of social injustice is a main motivating cause behind social revolutionary terrorism. Relative deprivation or great differences in income distribution (rather than absolute deprivation or poverty) in a society have in some studies been found to correlate rather strongly with the emergence of social revolutionary political violence and ideological terrorism, but less with ethno-nationalist terrorism. The presence of charismatic ideological leaders able to transform widespread grievances and frustrations into a political agenda for violent struggle is a decisive factor behind the emergence of a terrorist movement or group. The existence of grievances alone is only a precondition: someone is needed who can translate that into a program for violent action. Trigger Causes The first condition that can be considered a direct cause of terrorism is the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority. This is not to say, however, that the existence of a dissatisfied minority or majority is a necessary or even a sufficient cause for terrorism; for not all those who are discriminated against turn to terrorism. The second condition that can create motivations for terrorism is the lack of opportunity for political participation. The last category of situational factors involves the concept of a precipitated event that immediately precedes outbreaks of terrorism. While general consensus points to the fact that precipitants (trigger causes) are usually unpredictable, a common pattern has emerged that highlights particular government actions as catalysts for terrorism. Terrorist retaliations can thus occur as a result of unusual and unexpected use of force by the government, a so-called “action-reaction syndrome” (Crenshaw 1981, 385). In general, provocative events that call for revenge or action, may trigger terrorist action by spoilers on both sides. Contested elections, police brutality and even peace talks are all examples of triggering causes. 19 1.4 Most Relevant Root and Trigger Causes Based on the prevailing scholarly literature and the above-mentioned list of concrete examples of identified root and trigger causes of terrorism, we have identified the top five reasons for each. The specific causes within each category – root and trigger causes – have been ranked from the most general or broad aspects to the more specific underlying factors. No. Root causes Trigger causes 1 Rapid modernization and urbanization are strongly correlated with the emergence of ideological terrorism Events that call for revenge or action (i.e. contested elections, police brutality, etc.) 2 Lack of Democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law is a precondition to many forms of domestic terrorism Lack of opportunity for political participation 3 Historical antecedents of political violence Concrete grievances among a subgroup of a larger population (articulated clearly by a leader figure) 4 Repression by foreign occupation or colonial powers Importance of belonging to a strong group for development of personal identity 5 Perceived feelings of discrimination based on ethnic or religious origins Peace talks 1.5 Concluding Remarks 20 Given the multifaceted and diverse scope of terrorism, distinguishing the root and trigger causes of the phenomenon has proven to be an equally complex undertaking. Bearing in mind the limited range of scholarly literature that directly address the causes, we can conclude that the question of “why” and “how” are still not crystal clear. Additional research is needed not only to serve as a fundamental theoretical framework on the topic, but also to bring us closer to understanding those aspects of causes that can eventually be isolated as specific root and trigger causes of terrorism and thus be sufficiently dealt with. While the aforementioned authors and scholars have made significant contributions to the field, many have raised more questions than they have provided answers. Thus, while we continue to search for the answers, it is imperative that we do not perpetuate unfounded ideas as the basis for understanding the causes of terrorism. This rings especially true today when the temptation to focus solely on certain forms of religious-inspired terrorism are immense. Investigating the balance between different sets of factors may also contribute to a better understanding of the nature of the phenomenon. Perhaps Kofi Annan said it best - “[w]e should not pretend that […] the decision to resort to terrorism is unrelated to the political, social and economic situation in which people find themselves. But we are also mistaken if we assume, equally, that terrorists are mere products of their environment. The phenomenon is more complex than that.” (United Nations Secretary General, 2003). 21 2. DECLINE IN TERRORISM: LESSONS FROM THE PAST Having discussed in the previous chapter how terrorism could rise, describing the root and trigger causes, this chapter will examine whether any lessons can be derived from past experiences with declining terrorism. It might seem puzzling that the decline or demise of terrorism has received relatively little attention in academic literature. After all, reducing or eradicating terrorism is the goal of all counterterrorism measures, and it may be expected to be of interest to most policymakers involved, as well as to academics occupied with the field of terrorism or counterterrorism. However, this lack of attention given to the subject must be seen in the light of the event-driven nature of most terrorism research. In general, attention and funding is primarily given to research on the illusive subject of terrorism when an immediate sense of urgency is present. This sense of urgency is mainly found when a state or region finds or perceives itself to be face to face with the threat of terrorism. In such a situation the object of attention tends to be the present threat and not the history of terrorism or past time experiences although important lessons might be available. Correspondingly, attention given to the subject of terrorism tends to decline when the sense of urgency declines. A point in time when the immediate threat has been averted might be suitable for scrutiny and drawing conclusions on the lessons learned for future reference, but such reflections seem to have been scarce. The reasons for this appear to be quite pragmatic “[g]iven the close ties between terrorism analysis and government support, when the perception of imminent attacks subsides, support for solid research declines. Work on a declining or defunct terrorist group is therefore typically sparser than is the tackling of its origins and evolution” (Cronin, 2006:10). The event-driven nature of terrorism research is well illustrated by the volume of writings within the field produced since 2001, especially focusing on the “al-Qaida inspired” terrorism and on the differences between this specific type of terrorism and earlier types. The assumption that this terrorist threat is fundamentally different from threats faced in the past holds the risk that relevant lessons learned in the past are overlooked. 22 Although this point in time is definitely not characterized by the sense of urgency as declining, it may be a point in time in which it is relevant to reflect on experiences of the past. There is no need to make the same mistakes twice or start from scratch, when hard-earned lessons can be learned from past events. The study will with a literature study overview of the general studies into the decline in field of terrorism. This section is followed by an overview of concrete, practical and empirical studies from various continents and regions. The third part will then lay bear the difficulties in defining and conceptualizing decline based on the aforementioned material and supplemented by interviews with academic experts on decline. After this, a final list of most often mentioned factors, internal as well as external, will be given and employed for the final analysis between root and trigger causes and factors of decline. 2.1 Comparative Literature on Decline and Demise Although academic literature specifically on the decline or demise of terrorism is scarce, some scholars have attempted to create comprehensive overviews of lessons learned from the past on the subject. This chapter will introduce: Ross and Gurr’s Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States (1989), Martha Crenshaw’s How Terrorism Declines (1991), John B. Alterman’s How Terrorism Ends (1999) and Audrey Kurth Cronin’s How al- Qaida Ends. The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups (2006). Each of these articles sets out to identify variables that have, in the past, contributed to the decline or demise of terrorism. Qualitative Explanations of Decline or Demise of Terrorism Initially the decline or demise of terrorism can be viewed in terms of the role played by factors external to the terrorist group or by factors internal to the terrorist group. They offer a holistic approach, taking into account various case studies and theories, attempting to generalize their findings. 23 Ross and Gurr Ross and Gurr (1989) focus on the role of four factors in the decline of terrorism. Two of those factors are external to the group: preemption and deterrence. Preemption includes capturing or killing active terrorists and making their potential targets harder to hit. Deterrence includes elevating the potential costs and lowering the potential rewards for active terrorists as well as potential supporters. The remaining two factors are internal to the group in question: burnout and backlash. Burnout implies that members or active supporters of a group lose commitment to the cause whereas backlash implies that public support or sympathy for the group declines. The authors argue that the internal factors play a far greater role in the decline of terrorism than the external factors. They can create a context which may lend legitimacy to external factors brought about by governments. The internal factors can, however, also be accelerated by external actions, e.g. if alternative, non-violent, ways of addressing of the root-causes are provided or if the root-causes are removed. “In Quebec a legitimate separatist party, the Parti Québécois (PQ), made electoral gains and eventually attracted the support of most ex-Front de libération du Quebec (ex-FLQ) activists. In the United States the parallel development was the end of the draft and of American involvement in the Vietnam War” (Ross and Gurr, 1989:422). However, as Ross and Gurr further write “Nothing in our analysis suggests that either society has been immunized against future campaigns of domestic terrorism” (Ross and Gurr, 1989:422). To some extent, Ross and Gurr’s conclusions point in the same direction as those of well-known terrorism expert David Rapoport, who expressed the theory of terrorist “waves”.5 Much like Ross and Gurr, Rapoport says that past declines in terrorism have merely been declines of single terrorist organizations or waves and not a general decline in terrorism (Rapoport, 2001/2003). Martha Crenshaw Crenshaw (1991) starts out noting the lack of focus on the decline of terrorism and attributes it to the general focus in terrorism research on causes rather than 5 Rapoport’s views are discussed in much more detail in TTSRL Deliverables 4 and 5b 24 outcomes. At the same time Crenshaw directs the attention of the reader to the relationship between researchers and policymakers, the latter being the ones with access to the funding for the first. “The researcher attempts to discover the determinants of terrorism’s decline, and the official wishes to bring about that decline at the lowest possible cost to the nation’s interest” (Crenshaw, 1991:72). Crenshaw quickly identifies three factors each playing a role in the decline of terrorism, namely: “physical defeat of the extremist organization by the government, the group’s decision to abandon the terrorist strategy, and organizational disintegration” (Crenshaw, 1991:70). Crenshaw concludes that no theories explicitly attempt to explain decline or demise of terrorism, but “several competing hypothesis about the outcomes of terrorism can be inferred from conceptions of the origins of terrorism” (Crenshaw, 1991:73). This linking of decline to origins of terrorism is criticized by among others Cronin (2006) as being too simplistic. Crenshaw does also conclude that these hypotheses may seem plausible but have either not been proven to be effective or have turned out to be invalid when viewed in reality. The assumption that media attention plays a crucial role for terrorists has led to two competing ideas on how the media could contribute to the decline of terrorism. Either by providing every movement or organization competing with the government better access to the media so that they are not tempted to use radical means to achieve this access or by preventing the media from reporting on terrorism, so that this is not a reward for unwanted actions. None of these ideas have been proven to be effective in reality.6 The next assumption treated, is the assumption that hard-line policies are the answer. This has not been proven to be effective either. Others have focused on addressing the root-causes as the only way to bring terrorism to a decline, or on providing non-violent alternative ways of addressing those root-causes – as mentioned in 2.1.2. The problem with this assumption is, according to Crenshaw, that Germany and Italy have witnessed declines in terrorism without such fundamental changes preceding them. Crenshaw draws attention to the problems in actually assessing when terrorism has declined. One organization may end the use of terrorism but individuals from that organization may continue in either new organizations or already existing 6 See Deliverable 6 of Workpackage 4 for more information on the link between terrorism and the media. 25 ones. Much in the same manner, an organization may apparently abandon terrorism, but there is no way of telling whether it will be resumed. Crenshaw argues that “conventional assumptions” (Crenshaw, 1991:78) need to be reassessed. The decline of terrorism is linked to interplay between several factors internal and external to the group alike. The case of Italy is given as an example of this in the sense that government decisions to create a law under which accused members of the group the Red Brigades were offered leniency or even asylum if they informed on the group. This decision coincided with a loss of popular support for the group and in interplay with poor strategic choices made internally in the Red Brigades and the combinations contributed to legitimating harsher government responses and ultimately contributed to the decline of the group. Crenshaw concludes that “[t]he assumption that the decline of terrorism is due simply to the physical defeat of extremist organizations is too simple a conception of the process” (Crenshaw, 1991:87). The physical defeat must be preceded by the organization being discredited and losing popular support as well as a loss of internal support. John B. Alterman John B. Alterman’s (1999) work is a summary of the conclusions drawn from a meeting on the subject and includes four short chapters by: Martha Crenshaw on how terrorism ends, Paul Wilkinson on the Irish Republican Army (IRA), John Alterman on the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Teresita Schaffer on the Liberation Tigers of Talim Eelam (LTTE). The main conclusions of the report include that: the nature of the grievances tended to play an important role because ethnically based grievances tend to enjoy broader support than politically based grievances. The subject of public or popular support is crucial in the conclusions of this report as well as it was in the abovementioned article by Crenshaw. Another conclusion is that the strategy “to split off pragmatists from radical rejectionists” is effective (Alterman, 1999:1). Alterman’s last conclusion is that because government concessions to terrorists can be perceived as signs of weakness such concessions must be carefully timed to occur at a point in time when the legitimacy of the state is high and the “terrorist organization is undergoing a period of introspection” (Alterman, 1999:1). 26 Audrey Kurth Cronin Audrey Kurth Cronin (2006) goes through previous research on the subject and critically assesses the value of this. Firstly, Cronin argues that the connection of hypotheses on the end or decline of terrorism to hypotheses on the causes of terrorism is a simplification. This critique is based on the argument that the decline of terrorism is brought about by an interplay between external and internal factors, which may be accidental or opportunistic and that “the process by which a terrorist group declines may be as much determined by innate factors as by external policies or actors” (Cronin, 2006:11) The focus on the role of external factors is argued to be brought about by government support for research that looks into how a government can affect a specific group and cause it to end the use of terrorism combined with much better access to empirical data on this subject than to data on other subjects, such as the internal dynamics of a group. (Cronin, 2006:14) The usefulness of analyses of the organizational dynamics of groups, which has been popular for many years in terrorism research is questioned on the basis of the development in means of communications and globalization leading to “decentralized, non-hierarchical cell structures” (Cronin, 2006:12) which may not be analyzable through established models on organizations. Cronin also focuses on grievances. In her eyes, the nature of the grievances driving the terrorist group appears to have some influence on the space of time in which the group is capable of existing. Earlier studies have indicated that ethnonationalist/separatist groups have a longer life span than groups based on other causes and Cronin argues that religiously motivated groups may be comparable to the ethnonationalist/separatist groups, however, it is too soon to draw conclusions. According to Cronin, previous research into identifiable cycles is of limited use with regard to decline in terrorism as well as statistical and mathematical analyses. Conflict theory framework is mentioned as a promising theoretical approach but yet untested in the area of decline. Studying terrorist groups in the context of social movements, as “intellectual descendants of Ted Robert Gurr” (Cronin, 2006:15) do, may lead to rewarding insights with regard to the origins and development of groups but is deemed to have little to contribute with to the understanding of how they decline or end. 27 After going through previous research on decline of terrorism, Cronin sets out to identify “critical elements in, the decline and ending of terrorist groups in the modern era” (Cronin, 2006:17). Cronin identifies seven elements which may have influence on the decline or end of terrorism, all of which may occur alone or in combination, the latter being the more plausible. These are: capture or kill the leader, an unsuccessful generational transition, achievement of the cause, transition to legitimate political process, loss of popular support, repression, or transition out of terrorism into crime or insurgency (Cronin, 2006:19). Cronin provides a list of examples where each factor has played a role. Whereas some of these factors are most likely to be brought about by government measures, such as capturing or killing the leader or repression, others may be brought on by government measures or other factors external or internal to the group in question. Yet others are mainly brought on by factors internally in the group or at least require that some role is played by those. Examples of this would be an unsuccessful generational transition, a transition to legitimate political process or a transition out of terrorism. Cronin then goes on to look into the usefulness of those factors in predicting when al-Qaida’s terrorism may decline. Capturing or killing the leader is quickly discarded as a factor that will have little relevance in the case of al- Qaida. Unsuccessful generational transition is discarded as a factor that may have been an opportunity some years ago but “that time is long past” (Cronin, 2006:40). Achievement of the cause and a transition to legitimate political process are also discarded as bearing little relevance in the case of al-Qaida as this is unrealistic. Loss of popular support has received attention especially among critics of George W. Bush but, according to Cronin, it is unrealistic that this factor will have any influence in the short run but it may be relevant in the long run. Repression has been vigorously applied in the case of al-Qaida, but Cronin argues that the effects of it are minimal. With regard to transitioning out of terrorism into crime or insurgency, Cronin argues that al-Qaida is actually already doing both and sums up with the words: Al-Qaida continues to exploit what is essentially a civil war within the Muslim world, attracting alienated Muslims around the globe to its rage-filled movement. Al-Qaida will end when the West removes itself from the heart of its fight, shores up international norms against terrorism, undermines al-Qaida’s ties with its 28 followers, and begins to exploit the movement’s abundant missteps (Cronin, 2006:47). Cronin finally concludes that the most important feature in any successful countering of terrorism and expedition of the demise of it, is replacing reactive responses with proactive initiatives. 2.2 Empirical Studies of the Decline and Demise of terrorism In addition to the comparative studies on decline or demise of terrorism, mentioned above, studies on specific groups have been conducted. In the following these are presented according to the geographic areas in which the groups operated; North America, the Middle East, Central and South America, and Asia and Europe. In the following overview, the external factors will be subdivided into two categories; namely “stick” or “carrot”. “Stick” factors include factors such as repression, deterrence and persecution – the hard-line. “Carrot” factors include negotiations between the group and the state, inclusion into democratic politics but also splitting off the radicals from the pragmatics by offering supporters of a terrorist group a better alternative (Cronin, 2006:28) which will leave only the hard core of the group using terrorism. This may also lead to an easier legitimization of harsher means against the individuals now exposed as the uncompromising hard core. North America in The Rise and Fall of Québecois Separatist Terrorism: A Qualitative Application of Factors from Two Models (1995)7, Jeffrey Ian Ross focuses on the case of the Québecois terrorism in Canada. Ross firstly argues that “the structural causes for oppositional political terrorism can be related to those factors connected to its decline” (Ross, 1995:285) and divides those causes into eight variables which 7 In addition to Ross and Gurr (1989) Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States introduced in chapter 2.1.2 29 can be attributed to either preconditions or precipitants: “Deterrence, accommodation/cooptation, and counterterrorist tactics can be considered the preconditions. Death of a terrorist, imprisonment, individual burnout, group disintegration, and support impairment are the precipitants for decline” (Ross, 1995:286). All of those factors may appear and have influence independently or interdependently. Of those eight variables only six were, according to Ross, important in the decline in the case of Québecois terrorism in Canada, namely: “deterrence, counterterrorist practices, imprisonment, accommodation / cooptation, individual burnout, and support impairment” (Ross, 1995:292) the importance of the later variables being more profound than the first ones. With regard to the variable individual burnout Ross writes that the members of the FLQ who chose to leave “were given light sentences for old offenses” (Ross, 1995:293) and although Ross does not go further into this fact, it may be quite relevant as it contributed further to the positive effects of the accommodation/cooptation in which adherents to or supporters of the FLQ were given an alternative and legal way of addressing the grievances. The creation of such legal alternatives contributed to de-legitimize the use of violence as it no longer seemed necessary. Simultaneously, the use of terrorism was framed as undignified and “childish” (Ross, 1995:293). This resulted in a feeling by the general public that continued use of terrorism would lead to suspension of civil liberties. This belief in turn led to a lack of support among the public as the costs were perceived as heightened and the benefits substantially lowered. Ross sums up that “[a]uthorities had to rely on a combination of antiterrorist tactics, group disintegration, and cooptation for the movement to finally subside” (Ross, 1995:294). Although terrorism seemingly subsided in Canada when this combination was brought about Ross concludes that “[i]n the final analysis, the nature of the FLQ made it impossible to eliminate the group completely. It was as much a state of mind as an organization” (Ross, 1995:294). As a result of this, Ross predicts “[o]thers under the right circumstances may resort to the once familiar practices of terrorism” (Ross, 1995:295). The measures employed in this case have been a combination of “stick” and “carrot” but they have had a predominant focus on “carrot” measures. 30 The Middle East Hillel Frisch argues in Motivation or Capabilities? Israeli Counterterrorism against Palestinian Suicide Bombings and Violence (2006) that hard-line counterterrorism measures in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have proven fertile. Frisch’s argument is that because the “organizational capabilities” (Frisch, 2006:844) of the insurgents are far more important than their motivations, the assumption that hard-line policies will only further motivate insurgents to promote violence is of less importance. Frisch supports this conclusion by linking a decline in Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israel from 2003 to 2004 to a hard-line offensive from the Israeli side in this period, including “the killing of the two Hamas leaders Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and his successor Abd al-Aziz Rantisi in March and April 2004” (Frisch, 2006:845) which may have motivated retaliation from Hamas’ side but in effect crippled their capabilities to actually do anything. Frisch concludes that Israeli offensive and preemptive measures have played crucial roles in the decline of terrorist attacks especially as “[v]iolent organizations are no different than business firms who seek maximum sales at minimum costs” (Frisch, 2006:852). Ten years prior to this study, Victor T. Le Vine and Barbara A. Salert drew the opposite conclusion. Their study on the effects of hard-line measures in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict Does a Coercive Official Response Deter Terrorism? The Case of the PLO (1996) focuses on the responses of PLO and suggests that “official coercive responses had more use as political defenses than deterrence” (Le Vine, 1996:22). At the same time they suggest that the costs related to terrorism as a result of deterrence might influence the choice of target sites and that this might lead to an export of terrorism to other countries (Le Vine, 1996:25-26) leading to only a relocation and not a decline. The study does, however, also conclude that “the frequency of arrests exerts a weak but statistically significant deterrent effect on the frequency of terrorist incidents” (Le Vine, 1996:42). However, this effect may only be temporary as “[…] we found it interesting that, on the face of it, there is no indication that countries that are ‘tough’ on terrorism are any more successful in the long term in eliminating the problem than their more ‘spaghetti-spined’ counterparts” (Le Vine, 1996:44). 31 Sergio Catignani to some extent supports the conclusions drawn by Frisch in The Security Imperative in Counterterror Operations: The Israeli Fight Against Suicidal Terror (2005). Israel has contented that counterterrorism or prevention of terrorism is more a question of managing the conflict than of resolving it (Catignani, 2005:258) and counterterrorism has been affected by this contention. In the new millennium Israeli counterterrorism has taken a turn and become severely hard-line and although this has not come cheap for the state, neither in personnel nor in material goods, the preventive measures have actually broken the curve of successful attacks on Israeli targets by Palestinians. However, Catignani argues, the price of the decline in successful attacks has been severe in more terms than material. The measures taken to counter the threat have been in conflict with human rights to such an extent that even former head of the Israeli Security Agency has voiced critique of it (Catignani, 2005:257). Catignani, however, concludes that in relative terms the price of Israeli counterterrorism has probably been lower than other measures would have been and more effective and that although they may lead to an increase in motivation on the short term, it is most likely to lead to a decrease in capabilities on the longer term. In Measuring the Success in Coping with Terrorism: The Israeli Case (2005) Nadav Morag is primarily concerned with identifying variables by which the success or failure of counterterrorism measures can be evaluated, but also gives some insight into the measures applied in Israel against the threat from the Palestinian side in the conflict. Firstly Morag argues that defining victory and success in relation to terrorism is much more complicated than in relation to more traditional types of threats. In fighting terrorism, however, the eradication of terrorist cells, the decapitation of the terrorist leadership, the blocking of terrorist funds or the destruction of terrorist safe havens do not necessarily (and in fact, rarely) result in the cessation of terrorist violence. Yet the lack of cessation of terrorist violence does not necessarily mean that the war against terrorism is being lost – although it does not necessarily mean that it is being won either (Morag, 2005:307). Much in the same way as Catignani views the Israeli counterterrorism measures as a crisis management rather than a crisis ending venture, Morag 32 shows that Israeli counterterrorism has been relatively successful in limiting the number of successful terrorist attacks on Israeli targets since the year 2000. Morag identifies seven parameters distributed in three main categories by which the success of counterterrorism can be measured: Human life (reduction in civilian casualties among both Israelis and Palestinians), economic resources (minimization of the negative economic impact on Israel), and political resources (Israeli social cohesion, international and domestic support for the Israeli government, and the extent of weakening of international and domestic support for the Palestinian leadership) (Morag, 2005:309-310). By those parameters Israel’s hard-line policies since 2000 have been quite successful and only failed on the reduction of civilian casualties among Palestinians. Morag writes on this: Consequently, a policy that does not attempt to minimize ‘collateral damage’ must be deemed a faulty one because: (a) it is morally wrong – and morality is an important factor in democratic governance, (b) it creates greater hostility and support for terrorism, (c) it undermines the self-image of professionalism (and therefore, efficacy) that the security forces try to cultivate, and (d) it can put the state fighting terrorism under greater international pressure to alter policies that may otherwise be effective (Morag, 2005:311). Morag, however, concludes that apparently none of those side effects have been brought about. It is an open question whether they may appear on a longer term. Morag concludes that in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis the Israeli government can perform crisis management but only a Palestinian leadership can end the crisis (Morag, 2005:318). Although hard-line policies may be effective in managing the crisis and minimizing the number of Israeli casualties it does not end terrorism and may in fact contribute to the motivations and energy of it in the longer run. The measures taken in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have predominantly been what can be characterized as “stick”. 33 Central and South America In Political Crises, Strategic Choices, and Terrorism: The Rise and Fall of the Uruguayan Tupamaros (1989) Fernando Lopez-Alves bases his analysis on an assumption on the role of rationality. He contends that, in the case of the Tupamaros, there was a very high degree of rationality which played a crucial role in the group’s use of terrorist measures as well as in the later abandonment of those measures and the subsequent decline in terrorism. Lopez-Alves argues that, from the very beginning, the Tupamaros “accepted terrorism as a strategy with a clear awareness that it must ultimately be abandoned afterwards” (Lopez- Alves, 1989:203) and that “[t]error, as used by the Tupamaros, expressed a clear response to governmental actions, was geared to cause changes in the environment, and, when the cost was too high, was abandoned for what seemed a more sustainable strategy” (Lopez-Alves, 1989:205). What then brought about a situation, in which terrorism was perceived as having too high costs and being an unsustainable strategy, was the fact that, relatively soon after implementing the use of terrorism, the Tupamaros realized that they lacked the popular support for it. This was to some extent because the broader population were confident that alternative, non-violent, ways of addressing grievances were available, since “the political system had not yet exhausted its capacity to absorb and channel citizens demands” (Lopez-Alves, 1989:221). Lopez-Alves further argues that the Tupamaros’ use of terrorism was not adopted “as a sign of weakness, but as a reaction to what they viewed as positive responses and new opportunities in its environment” (Lopez-Alves, 1989:227). When it turned out that the use of terrorism did not bring about the anticipated rewards, but rather increased the costs, the movement became divided internally and “the group shifted from urban guerrilla and terrorism to guerrilla warfare” (Lopez-Alvez, 1989:231). Consequently the army was able to quite easily dismantle the movement. The measures taken in Uruguay have been a combination of “carrot” and “stick”. 34 Asia Robert F. Traeger and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva argue, in Deterring Terrorism. It Can Be Done (2005), that deterrence as a way to counter and prevent terrorism is grossly overlooked. Moreover they contend that it has proven to have been both cost-effective as well as operationally effective in the Southern Philippines. They base this contention on a study of the cases of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group with regard to deterring them from supporting al-Qaida. Traeger and Zagorcheva initially argue that the three reasons why deterrence as a strategy is often discarded is based on various misunderstandings to do both with deterrence as well as the concept of terrorism in general. The first reason is that terrorists are assumed to be irrational and “therefore unresponsive to the cost-benefit calculations required for deterrence” (Traeger and Zagorcheva, 2005:87). This, according to Traeger and Zagorcheva, is “contradicted by a growing body of literature that shows that terrorist groups (though not necessarily every individual who engages in terrorist activities) usually have a set of hierarchically ordered goals and choose strategies that best advance them” (Traeger and Zagorcheva, 2005:93-94). The second reason why deterrence is often discarded is that terrorists are believed to be so highly motivated that they cannot be deterred. This, according to Traeger and Zagorcheva, is also a misconception. The strategy of deterrence, however, has to be designed according to the intensity of the motivation as well as the type of goals of the group in question. The third reason why deterrence is often discarded is that “even if terrorists were afraid of punishment, they cannot be deterred because they ‘lack a return address against which retaliation can be visited’” (Traeger and Zagorcheva, 2005:87-88) This assumption is likewise rejected by Traeger and Zagorcheva, because “when states devote sufficient resources, they can find members of terrorist organizations” (Traeger and Zagorcheva, 2005:108). And even without a “return address” the costs-benefit balance for the terrorist can be changed, if the costs cannot be increased then the rewards can be made even more unattainable. According to Traeger and Zagorcheva, the more motivated the group is the more effective this method will be; “[h]ighly motivated terrorists, because they 35 hold their political goals so dearly, are loath to run even lower-level risks to these goals” (Traeger and Zagorcheva, 2005:110). Consequently, an elevation of the costs and the risks will result in a decline. The only trouble in the deterrence-approach is that “the very effectiveness of local antiterrorism efforts may even turn a local movement into a global one. When primary local goals are put out of reach, militants may shift their focus to secondary global goals” (Traeger and Zagorcheva, 2005:121). This then has to be deterred once again, which according to Traeger and Zagorcheva has been successfully done in the cases of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Southern Philippines. The measures, argued to have been effective in the Southern Philippines, must be characterized as predominantly “stick”. Europe According to Marie Smyth in The Process of Demilitarization and the Reversibility of the Peace Process in Northern Ireland (2004) the processes demilitarization and peace talks have been the main reasons for decline in terrorism. This choice of words reveals that the measures employed in the case of Northern Ireland, which are argued to have been effective in bringing about a decline in terrorism, primarily have fallen in the category of “carrot”. Smyth initially argues that “[…]militarization, with the concomitant ubiquity of weapons and fortifications is not merely an effect or by-product of conflict, but also makes a significant contribution to conflict’s continuity and escalation” (Smyth, 2004:544). And also that, in a time with “a global trend towards increasing military expenditures and the privileging of military or ‘security’ solutions over alternative approaches to complex political problems” (Smyth, 2004:544), it is relevant to examine the effects of militarization versus demilitarization in the case of Northern Ireland. Following the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 the deployment of troops was substantially lowered. […A]rmy installations or bases had been closed or demolished. In addition, land requisitioned by the army had been returned, vehicle control zones had been rescinded, barriers and checkpoints had been removed/relaxed, and 102 cross36 border roads had been reopened. The use of powers under emergency law was also reduced (Smyth, 2004:545). Smyth argues that the demilitarization is crucial to pave the way for peacenegotiations as militarization creates a general environment in which “[v]iolence is increasingly tolerated as all become habituated to it” (Smyth, 2004:560) and “[t]he emotional climate of the community shifts and stoicism replaces compassion” (Smyth, 2004:560). Once the demilitarization has affected the environment and normalized the situation the chance of success for further measures increases. In the case of Northern Ireland, Smyth argues, the combination of pressure on IRA to disarm and actual success for the non-violent, political alternative, Sinn Fein has been very important. In fact, “Sinn Féin’s successful electoral performances were crucial to their ability to persuade the IRA to engage in the decommissioning process” (Smyth, 2004:554). On the other hand, the lack of pressure on the other part in the process, the Loyalists, to decommission and the absence of an alternative, non-violent, path for them has resulted in less success on their part and this might result in a decline of violence from IRA but an increase in violence from the Loyalists. Smyth, however, argues that the popular support for such violence is minimal as “[…] mainstream Unionism’s consistent distancing of itself from paramilitarism or illegal activity makes it unlikely that they will be keen to be seen to sponsor those who have been involved in such activity” (Smyth, 2004:557). With regard to choosing between the “stick” and the “carrot” in Northern Ireland Smyth argues that the threat of political exclusion “may pressure the representatives of armed groups into action on issues such as decommissioning, it also has the negative effect of limiting their political room for maneuver” (Smyth, 204:558). Therefore “electoral success, not merely participation, may be required alongside political pressure before any decommissioning takes place” (Smyth, 2004:558). The primary trouble with this approach is that it requires a relatively strong government, able to legitimize “rewarding” terrorists before requiring them to make concessions. If a government decides to make concessions to a terrorist organization at the moment their own powerbase and legitimacy is low, the concessions will be seen as the only option available and this will only worsen the government’s position in relation to the terrorists. 37 In Pathways Out of Terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country: The Misrepresentation of the Irish Model (2004) Rogelio Alonso argues that the reason why Spain was unsuccessful in applying the peace process model from Northern Ireland to Spain was that two fundamentally wrong interpretations of the experiences from Northern Ireland crippled the attempts from the very beginning. The first was “[t]he formation of a pan nationalist front offered the Republican movement, made up by the IRA and Sinn Fein, an alternative through which they could achieve their objectives and compensate for the weakness evidenced in their electoral and social support” and secondly “[...] IRA’s cessation of violence was a direct consequence of the British and Irish government’s recognition of the right to self-determination” ( Alonso, 2004:696). The primary difference between the situation in Northern Ireland and that in Spain was that IRA and Sinn Fein were willing to compromise on their ultimate goals with regard to territorial claims, whereas ETA was not. The significance of this difference could be well explained by John B. Alterman’s conclusions that “[p]eace overtures must be well-timed. Ideally, they should come at a time when the government is strong and the terrorist organization is undergoing a period of introspection” (Alterman, 1999:1). Alonso further agues that the conclusion that recognition of the right to self-determination was crucial to IRA’s cessation of violence was wrong, since IRA publicly rejected this right as recognition of the demands of IRA. As a consequence, the Spanish government’s offer to the ETA, that they could be granted the right to self-determination, did not lead to the expected results. Alonso argues that “[c]onsequently, it is necessary to conclude that, as Donald Horowitz has pointed out, the Belfast Agreement was not so much the end result of a process of negotiation but of ‘filtering the past’” (Alonso, 2004:702)8 Alonso’s critique of the Spanish attempts to learn from best practices in the case of Northern Ireland, illustrates the trouble with learning from past experiences; the risk of overlooking crucial elements or oversimplifying the process. In The Red Brigades: Farewell to Arms (1993) Xavier Raufer argues that a communiqué, published by the German Red Army Fraction in April 1992, announcing that it would “lay down its arms in the fight for communism” (Raufer, 8 Belfast Agreement and Good Friday Agreement are the same 38 1993:315) “[…] marked the end of the armed struggle for groups all over Europe. In particular the communiqué signaled the move from military to political for the remaining active members in Italy’s Red Brigade” (Raufer, 1993:315). The article is an interview with a former member of the Red Brigades who reveals that “[a]ttempts to solve the planet’s problems with militarism have brought the world within a hair’s breadth of nuclear conflict, and there you have it. This global thought led the RB to the conclusion that there was no room left in Europe for the armed struggle” (Raufer, 1993:325) According to this reading, the decline in violence from the left-wing groups in Europe was primarily a result of processes internal to the groups in which the costs of violence, not only to the groups in question, but to the world in general, were becoming much too high. In the article The Decline of the Red Army Fraction (1991), published one year prior to the abovementioned communiqué from the RAF, Hans Josef Horchem argues that in the decline of the RAF several factors have been crucial. Firstly, following the arrests of the group leaders Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Ulrike Meinhof and Jan Carl Raspe in June 1972 the decision-making top of the organization was isolated from the rest of the organization and soon led to a change in organization transferring “initiative-taking and decision-making to the ‘commando’-level” (Horchem, 1991:66) another group of persons within the organization which had earlier been responsible for carrying out the decisions made in the top. The changes in organization were accompanied by a loss of sympathy and support, or in the terminology of Ross and Gurr “burnout and backlash”. During the mid-1980s, the RAF murdered several persons believing that this would better their chances of mobilizing new recruits, but in fact it led to divisions within the group as well as a decline in the support from the Left-wing milieu in Germany. Simultaneously RAF began co-operations with the French Action Directe but in 1987 the leading members of the “internationally-oriented wing of the AD” (Horchem, 1991:68) were arrested and, according to Horchem “the ‘Front’ of the West European Terrorists was, for all practical purposes, smashed” (Horchem, 1991:68). Horchem, however, finishes the article by concluding that “[...] RAF only gives the appearance of having given up the hope of being able to [continue] the armed struggle” (Horchem, 1991:74). 39 In Not the End of German Left-Wing Terrorism (1992) Bruce A. Scharlau and Donald Philips describe the RAF communiqué from April 1992, mentioned above. They argue it was an offer of a ceasefire. [i]f the group negotiates its end, it will be a result of their isolation and weakness within society, government security efforts and the group’s realisation that the radical public it might have hoped to recruit are more interested in day to day issues, rather than the wider anti-imperialism issues and concern over its imprisoned members which the Red Army Fraction has concentrated on (Scharlau and Philips, 1992:108). According to Scharlau and Philips the role of the government in the decline of the RAF’s activities has been minimal since “[…] the government has not been successful in arresting suspected faction members despite its supergrass legislation, and widened powers of search and arrest. It has not arrested an active hard-core member since August 1986” (Scharlau and Philips, 1992:108). As a consequence “[i]t is a question of the terrorists having problems of recruitment, rather than the government pressuring the group into retirement” (Scharlau and Philips, 1992:108). The problems which RAF was having with recruiting were to some extent caused by the “irrelevance of its ideology in a post-Cold War world” (Scharlau and Philips, 1992:108). Martijn Rasser in The Dutch response to Moluccan Terrorism, 1970-1978 (2005) argues that the success of the Dutch government in ending Moluccan terrorism, primarily in the form of hostage-takings, during the 1970s was the result of a pragmatic and flexible approach, including several factors. Firstly, the Dutch government quickly centralized decision-making in crises. Secondly, the Dutch government steadfastly rejected to give in to the demands of terrorists and engaged in lengthy negotiations with hostage-takers, with the intent to wear them out. The use of force was only authorized when the danger to hostages was considered to be too great. A critical under-appreciated element of Dutch counterterrorist policy during the 1970s is the government’s efforts to address the social and economic roots of the problems. As a first priority, Dutch officials clearly stated throughout the decade the Netherlands would not support the establishment of an independent 40 Moluccan state, effectively eliminating the major justification for the Moluccan terrorist’s acts (Rasser, 2005:487). This way of changing the cost-benefit balance, not by increasing the costs but by further decreasing the chance of achieving the desired benefits, resembles the tactics suggested by Robert F. Traeger and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva in Deterring Terrorism. It Can Be Done and argued to have been effective in the Southern Philippines. In combination with the steadfast rejection of the goals of Moluccan terrorism the Dutch government “launched a series of outreach initiatives to help integrate the Moluccan community into Dutch society by providing additional educational programs and job skills training” (Rasser, 2005:487). Rasser concludes that “[a]lthough tensions among the Moluccan population in the Netherlands flared occasionally after the 1970s the Netherlands experienced no further Moluccan terrorist incidents” (Rasser, 2005:488). As the Moluccan attacks in the Netherlands continued through the 1970s popular support for the Moluccan demands and methods diminished and the support for hard-line action from the government increased. Although an important element of the Dutch approach, the patient negotiations, treating the hostage-takers with respect but ultimately wearing them out, was a spent force by the end of the 1970 and had to be abandoned and replaced by more brute force, the remaining elements, according to Rasser, are highly relevant today. Rasser argues that: Addressing grievances and sources for radicalization within Dutch society (particularly in conjunction with civil leaders and NGOs) does not undermine the tough, determined counterterrorist policies already adopted and should play a significant role in their efforts to greatly reduce the appeal of, and sympathy for, militancy within the Netherlands (Rasser, 2005:489). 2.3 Challenges in Drawing on Lessons from the Past Defining Decline Defining decline is rather challenging. Cronin illustrates some of the dilemmas when asking: “are there more people dying? Yes. But are fewer attacks happening? Yes. So is that a decline? I don’t know. I mean, you can also look at 41 public opinion polls and there clearly is an increase in the level of anxiety in most Western states but it is not always directly correlated with the level of the threat […] It just matters on what you care more about, incidents or number of people killed?” (Cronin, interview 13 September 2007). Morag (2005)9 drew attention to another aspect of the challenges by pointing to the absence of variables by which success or failure can be measured. One of the issues of the article was that a decline in civilian casualties in the Israeli part of the population was accompanied by an increase in civilian casualties in the Palestinian part of the population. Morag elaborates further on the challenges when explaining: The variables that I focused on have to do with the impact of terrorism and not its decline or demise. However, if policymakers address the impact of terrorism through attempting to increase the public’s sense of security and facilitating normal economic and social activity, this may be expected, over the long term, to reduce the cost-effectiveness, and therefore desirability, of terrorism and this, in turn, may lead to a decline in terrorism - though I do not think that terrorism will ever truly disappear. (Morag, interview 18 December 2007). Crenshaw draws attention to yet another set of challenges in defining decline: “[s]ometimes when movements are in disarray and there is a lot of competition from groups within a social movement sector, you see an increase of violence. Sometimes the decline of a movement can resolve in violence. So the decline of a movement and presence of violence do not have to correlate in the same line” (Crenshaw, interview 14 December 2007). Finally there was the challenge illustrated in chapter 2.2.2: if only one country or even one region has observed a decline in terrorism might appear to have taken place but if a larger area was observed it would become obvious that it was only a relocation of terrorism, i.e. attacks were simply being carried out in another country. One country or region might be rid of the threat only because it has passed it on to another country or region. This highlights the need for coordinated, international cooperation. 42 Bringing About Decline The next challenge revealed by the examination of the scholarly work is whether or not a decline or demise in terrorism can actually be brought about. Pedahzur’s view on this is quite pragmatic: [i]f I take the Rapoport approach, he is saying that terrorism is something that comes and goes - there are endless numbers of variables that can contribute to this. I would not say that terrorism is declining. There is nothing that you can do to eliminate terrorism altogether. Terrorism is here to stay and it is going to be here unless you declare a state of totalitarian regime and you take every measure to repress opposition. Terrorism is always a big part of the delights of democracy. (Pedahzur, interview 18 December 2007) This challenge once again draws the attention to the impact of the perceiving counterterrorism as a matter of crisis management or of ending crisis. It also draws attention to an aspect of counterterrorism which is constantly at risk of being underestimated; the impacts of and on surrounding society. On this Pedahzur further argues: [t]he factor that I would focus on is how terrorism has been communicated and perceived by the target audience, rather than how to make terrorism go away. […] So I would focus more on the target audience and educating the public not to be afraid. If you take the fear factor out of the terrorism equation you will have won the war on terror (Pedahzur, interview 18 December 2007). Gunning points out another aspect of the impact of and on surrounding society: “I will say again that we need to move from state security to human security (see TTSRL WP2: Del 1). A secure state is not always a secure human state” (Gunning, interview 31 January 2008). In a somewhat more encouraging line of thought Crenshaw indicates that the current threats of terrorism in Europe are in fact symptoms of a decline: “[t]errorism is organized protocol behavior. Not spontaneous like small 9 See chapter 2.4.2 43 underground conspiratorial organizations. That is decline” (Crenshaw, interview 14 December 2007). Differences Between Countries The Spanish attempt to learn from experiences in Northern Ireland, as described earlier, illustrated that this can be a difficult task. There can be profound differences between groups carrying out terrorist attacks that are not directly observable, for instance those to do with leadership and other internal organizational factors. There could also be substantial differences in reactions by the populations in countries where terrorist attacks are carried out. Moreover the ways in which countries have countered terrorism in the past may also affect their repertoire of choices at present: “[w]hile thinking about counter-terrorism in Europe, one should take into account both the similarities and differences in the threat facing the US and Europe, as well as their approaches in combating the threat so far” (Zagorcheva, interview 20 June 2007). These differences however, may become comparatively lesser in scope as international and transnational cooperation increases. Della Porta argues that “[w]hat we see now is the transnationalization not only of the terrorist organizations but also the context in which they develop and I think this is a relevant change which is important to analyze and address” (Della Porta, interview 28 November 2007). Countering Terrorism Drawing on lessons from the past is certainly not the only challenge in countering terrorism. Oversimplification, rash decisions and lack of determination and coordination are among the most detrimental. [t]he first thing is to not simplify and to avoid simplistic labels and categories. The second thing is to avoid dichotomies, for example the one that states that if you are religious you cannot be democratic, so if you are Muslim you cannot be 44 pro-democracy. […] Another important issue is about the context. We must not forget the social context when we are talking about political violence. If you focus just on violence you will lose many elements and variables, we should also look at history in order to learn about the past. (Gunning, interview 31 January 2008) Many experts have also pointed to the risks associated with overemphasizing the threat of terrorism. In the words of Della Porta: [a]nother suggestion to policymakers is not to try to over emphasize the risks of terrorism […] I think that sometimes in part related to this tendency to play with terrorism in the political game, there is some tendency to over emphasize the strength and the risk coming from terrorism. […] But I think that democracies have shown themselves strong enough to address the challenge of terrorism and that over emphasizing the risks with the terms like “the war on terrorism” could backfire because [they] eventually reduce the trust of the citizens on the governments and on democracy. (Della Porta, interview 28 November 2007) Finally, there is the risk that the measures implemented to counter a threat might actually reinforce it: [o]ur arguments are a call to realism in the sense that terrorism will never be eradicated completely, but it could be managed in a better way than we have done so far. In this connection, our research addresses some anti-terror strategies that could be counter-productive and could lead to increasing the number of terrorists and the appeal of their cause, rather than achieving our political objectives. (Zagorcheva, interview 20 June 2007) Drawing on lessons from past experiences might reduce the risk of implementing counter-productive strategies. Expecting that lessons from the past will provide a manual for handling the present challenges appears to be unrealistic but they might provide a compilation of ideas which can bring together and target the present efforts. In the words of Ross: “[i]f we know which factors in which situations and with which particular kinds of groups lead to the decline or end of terrorism, then we need to focus our 45 resources in this manner, rather than coming at the problem from all directions” (Ross, interview 20 June 2007). 2.4 List with most often mentioned factors in decline and demise The lists given here will be based on the previous sections. As such, there are two lists here: the first one pertains to the factors in decline seen from a terrorist perspective, divided into internal and external factors. Internal factors are dynamics that evolve within a terrorist group. External factors are for example government activity or police action that can influence the terrorist’s activity. The second list will mention the factors relevant from a governmental perspective, divided into “stick” and “carrot”. These lists are not an exact ‘top 5’ representing the most often named causes for decline in the literature research. The order in which the causes are listed therefore do not represent their relative position in relation to one another. However, the list is a subjective derivation of the most important factors of terrorism decline (that were, as a consequence, very often named in the literature) from the qualitative research. Factors of decline for terrorist organizations: No. Internal External 1 Burn-out: loss of commitment by members Preemption: capturing or killing of active terrorists 2 Backlash: loss of popular support Deterrence: elevating costs and lowering rewards for terrorists and supporters 3 Decision by the group Nature of grievances changes 4 Organizational disintegration of the group: splitting up, death of leaders Achievement of the cause 5 Unsuccessful generational transition Repression 46 Possible government measures to influence decline of terrorism No. Carrot Stick 1 Accomodation/Cooptation of terrorists in political process Imprisonment of terrorists, splitting of the group by isolating members 2 Softer sentences for old crimes in exchange for information Killing of terrorists 3 Dialogue with terrorist group or associated political party Blocking of terrorist funds 4 Peace or demilitarization processes Destruction of terrorist safe havens/training camps 5 Public outreach in the form of media and social projects countering radicalization and polarization Repression in general: suspending certain civil liberties, legal requirements, etc. The lists mentioned here above are not exhaustive nor exclusive. Many of the factors can be in effect simultaneously and the differences may only be small or perceived. Nevertheless, they do offer a basic foundation for analyzing how the factors can correlate to one another. This could lead to better insights concerning the countering of terrorism. A comparative analysis could be made between the situation in Northern Ireland with the IRA and in Northern Spain with the ETA using these lists. What were the differences and why did the policy in Northern Ireland lead to the decline of terrorism and does the ETA still exist? These are important questions to be answered since only a small amount of research has been done concerning the decline of terrorism. As some researchers already pointed out, the reason for this lack of attention for the decline is due to the fact that a lot of research is initiated by governments which are interested in reactive instead of proactive research initiatives. Lists that can be used to enlarge knowledge about possible ways to attain terrorism decline could prompt proactive research initiatives. 47 2.5 Concluding Remarks In the examination of the scholarly work conducted on the decline or demise of terrorism two strands of patterns could be detected. First of all, in the general and generic qualitative literature on the study of terrorism, the declining factors were mostly defined as internal to the terrorist group, or external. It is important to note that these two distinguishing categories are not mutually exclusive. The distinction is simply due to the different basic point of reference for description. With the internal declining factors these are factors that can be found within the group. The external factors are variables that take place outside of the organizational sphere of influence and simply have or could have, an influence on the groups internal functioning. When investigating the most commonly mentioned factors of group decline, the five most commonly mentioned criteria are: unsuccessful generational transition, burn-out by the members, decision by the group to give up terrorism, back-lash or loss of popular support, and organizational disintegration of the group. The five most commonly mentioned factors that are external to the group are: preemptive policies by the governments capturing or killing active terrorists, deterrence strategies elevating the costs of terrorism, lowering rewards for terrorists and supporters, nature of grievances changes, achievement of the cause, repression by the state. As mentioned before, some of these external factors could reinforce terrorism as well as stop it. Those factors internal to the group in question could to some extent be accelerated or strengthened by measures taken external to the group. Even if these factors do not entirely eradicate a group they will contribute to split off the moderates from the hard core10 leaving only the latter accepting violence. This could legitimize a hard line against the remaining core. In the case of the Moluccans in the Netherlands, however, Rasser strongly argued that the role of the Dutch government was crucial and that the decline in terrorism was brought about by a combination of patient negotiations, in which the terrorists were regarded as rational actors, consequent rejection of support for the declared goals of the terrorists and whole-hearted efforts to integrate the Moluccan community into the Dutch community. 10 See chapter 2.3.1 48 The investigation on which factors of decline have an actual decline in practice, was then studied by looking at practical case studies and analyses. The distinction that was made with regards to governmental action in the field of counterterrorism, usually that of the “carrot” and the “stick”. “Carrot” factors include the social measures governments can take, such as negotiating between the groups and the state, inclusion into democratic politics and splitting off various members of the terrorist organization. The “stick” measures include the hard-line measures of repression, deterrence and persecution. Noticeably, there is a marked difference in the measures used by governments when putting the results in a geographical perspective. In the works on the Middle East which specifically dealt with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the “stick” was the measure that was usually chosen and was arguably effective to some extent. In the case of Canada the “carrot” measures appeared to have been the preferred and effective ones. When a clear distinction could be made between the larger part of the population and the terrorists, “stick” measures were employed. When this distinction could not be sufficiently made, the government employed “carrot” measures in order to be more effective. The distinguishing element of criteria hinges on what and when the state considers a person a terrorist. The fact that this strategy of a mixture of “carrot” and “stick” elements in different cases, illustrates how important a generally accepted definition of terrorism is. It also illustrates that the context in which terrorism is occurring must be included as a variable when studying whether lessons can be drawn from specific experiences with decline in terrorism. The “carrot” measures appeared to have been effective when it was in one way or another possible to accommodate the goals of the group in question. Or when it was possible to grant alternative non-violent ways of addressing the grievances addressed by the group in question, as was the case in Canada. The examples of Northern Ireland and Spain show that one should be careful with oversimplifying lessons learned and practice followed. There are still many varying factors at play which can lead to completely opposite outcomes of the same measures and action undertaken by different governments. This finding is again proof that terrorism and as such, effective counterterrorism, can never be taken out of its proper, local context. Even though various international elements can and might have an influence on the 49 individuals concerned or group in question, the local situation is always the key element at play. 3. Linking Root and Trigger Causes and Causes for Decline In this paper we have taken a look at two important sections of the life cycle of terrorism. In the first chapter, we discussed the root and trigger causes, and found that although a list can be made of possible root and trigger causes – which was done in the chapter – additional research is necessary in order to create a better theoretical framework, and to isolate causes more specifically, so that they can be better dealt with. The second chapter shows that several factors play a role in the decline of terrorism, both internal and external to the organizations. In addition, governments must use different approaches for different organizations to have the best chance for success. For instance, in some cases “carrots” are more effective than “sticks”, in other cases it is the other way around. Although lessons can definitely be learned from past events, they must be carefully scrutinized, and where necessary adjusted to the situation at hand. In the following paragraphs we will analyze the interaction between root and trigger causes of terrorism on the one hand and decline of terrorism on the other. This has a two-fold goal: first, it enhances in-depth knowledge of the phenomenon and provides the possibility to discuss it in more general, abstract terms. Second, this analysis may explain the nature of both past and present terrorist attacks to a certain extent, although it should be kept in mind that little predictability can be deduced from this analysis, due to the uniqueness of each terrorist group and of the situation in which it evolves. The first general condition for terrorism that should be mentioned is the existence of a government that displays particular behaviour that we refer to as “government action”. Each case presents a government that “does something”. This behaviour may refer to concrete events, but in most cases it has a more general character. Government action can evoke strong reactions, in a negative as well as a positive way. Examples of general government behaviour are support for the Vietnam War in West Germany, or (alleged) suppression of Catholics in Northern Ireland and of Basques in Spain. Concrete events are for 50 example the display of disproportional police violence at demonstrations. The distinction between general government actions and concrete occurrences is important, since the former creates a significant root cause of terrorism, whereas the latter can form a trigger cause, which in itself generates terrorist activity. Of course, trigger causes can also be very particular personal situations, which are not directly influenced by state activity. Once terrorist activity gains momentum, governments typically react with more government action. Obviously, this affects the occurrence of more terrorist attacks, but not necessarily always in the same way. Basically, there are two possible consequences of this government action. The first possibility is that a chain reaction is set in motion: governments’ actions provoke even more terrorist attacks, which require an even stronger reaction from the side of the government. An important phenomenon here is the change that could take place in root causes. Whereas usually the original root cause can be traced back to rather abstract ideologies, the new root cause of terrorist activity can become a mix of the original root causes, affected by the impact of the government’s response to terrorist activity. This means that the dynamics of terrorist activity and counterterrorism can affect the very foundations upon which terrorists base their legitimacy. This could result in more realistic and more concrete demands from the side of the terrorists, whereas the relevance of the original ideology could slowly fade. An example of this effect can be found in the history of the Red Army Faction. This group was initially driven by a genuine ideological commitment, its main goal being the complete overthrow of the capitalist system. However, in the course of the years, after the arrest of the leaders, the group’s demands were characterized by more pragmatic aims, such as the release of imprisoned comrades. The second possibility is that government measures are quite successful, leading to a serious decline in the number and severity of attacks. However, decline is not necessarily equal to a complete cessation. That is just one of the possibilities. Another is that terrorist activity may resurface after a certain period of time. If this is the case, the character of the activity may be different. Terrorists tend to reassess the relation between the violence and their original root cause. The same shift in relating terrorist activity to the root causes following government action, as described earlier, can thus be observed after a period of relative tranquillity. The ETA, for example, violated several cease fires 51 following long periods without violence. This sudden reappearance of violent means was usually accompanied by a changing character of demands. A final link exists between the nature of the root causes themselves and decline. This means that the same factors that explain the emergence of a particular terrorist group can be used to explain its decline. In other words, if something changes in the roots, an immediate decline of activity could set in. For example, the significance of communist ideology in the 1960s as the main alternative to the capitalist order can be seen as one of the root causes for the emergence of left-wing terrorism in several European countries, whereas the total collapse of “real existing socialism” in and after 1989 marginalized this ideology to such an extent that left-wing terrorist attacks decreased considerably. The previous paragraphs may explain the nature of terrorist activity and the relation between the different relevant factors, but it cannot be regarded as a clear menu for every single terrorist group. The most important flaw is formed by the fact that it does not indicate when government action results in decline and when it results in an increase of terrorist activity. Both internal and external factors play a role in explaining the outcome of government action. Even though this fact does not allow an all-encompassing model in this respect, the relation between root causes, trigger causes and causes for decline can be assessed using the model below. 52 As described below, Terrorist activity itself can also lead to decline, creating a new, similar, circle as a result. The included model shows a circle with the terms “roots causes”, “trigger causes”, “terrorist activity”, “government activity” and “decline”. The difficulty of creating a comprehensive model to capture all aspects of the terrorist dynamics is based on the several points in the model where alternatives to continuing the circle are possible. The main point of focus in this respect is “government activity”. As already explained in the text above, government activity could lead to a decline of terrorist activity, it could lead to new root causes that could create new trigger causes, it could maintain the status quo allowing the root cause and possible trigger causes to persist or it could lead directly to new trigger causes. Of course, if we knew the answer to the question of how to influence the dynamics in order to assure and keep assuring decline, terrorism could be marginalized. However, a plethora of factors interact in each situation where terrorism can evolve. Therefore, government action in relation to terrorist activity is the crux and the proof that each situation should be assessed emphasizing its uniqueness in order to avoid catastrophe. Root causes Government activity Trigger causes Terrorist activity Decline End of Terrorism / Organization 53 Another point of focus where the circle could be broken is “terrorist activity”. Of course, it is important due to the fact that it evokes government activity which in turn has a great influence, as explained above, in the further proceedings of the circle. Another reason for the importance of this point is the consequences terrorist activity can have on decline. As we have seen in the case of the Al-Qaida bombing in 2004 in Madrid, an attack this size can prompt other terrorists to openly distance themselves from this scale of destruction to achieve their means, as did the ETA. Of course, ETA bombings have occurred since in Spain, a dynamic which is spoken of earlier when saying that decline is a continuous process that can suddenly lead to reappearance of violence. This brings us to a third focus point: decline itself can suddenly lead to a new root or trigger cause. Once again, the dynamics are too complicated and diverse to capture in a model, but the fact that there is a relation between decline and re-emergence of terrorism can not be disregarded. Furthermore, decline can of course persist causing a terrorist organization to disappear. This can occur at any given moment. In the cases of the IRA and RAF, decline had set in and persisted causing the disappearance. In other cases, such as the Hofstadgroep, government action not only caused decline but actually achieved success in stopping the existence of the group. Then, what can we say about the model? It is clear that a relationship exists between root causes, trigger causes, terrorist and government activity and decline. The constant interaction of these factors proves that they affect each other and form a continuous movement; sometimes moving away from violence, in other cases accelerating it. Therefore, the circular model has been chosen to represent the relationship between the various factors. The difficulties lie in the various moments, captured in the circle especially in the crossroads following “government activity” but also at “terrorist activity” and “decline”, that present us with many alternative future dynamics. These are the places where everything comes together. The choice for using “carrot” or “stick” methods, internal dynamics of a terrorist group, geopolitical circumstances, legitimacy of a cause and many other aspects blend together to form the situation where counter terrorism policy is made. Therefore, acknowledging the interrelatedness of root and trigger causes and causes for decline are important, but emphasizing uniqueness should be given priority. 54 It is of utmost importance to stress the complexity of terrorism. A model like the one presented in this deliverable may work as a simplified scheme to relate the root causes, trigger causes and causes for decline. However, even this scheme has been difficult to create. There is no example of two terrorist organizations following the exact same path, nor is there an example of a flawless general thematic description of various forms of terrorism, let alone a universal definition. Capturing the essence of terrorism using a model is therefore close to impossible. The reason to create such a model is to point out that there is definitely a relation between the various causes for the emergence and decline of terrorism, only that this relation is constituted by an endless and incalculable amount of variables in the equation. Even though this conclusion will not help us solve terrorism, it shows where to look for answers: the separate cases and in particular the differences of these cases with previous terrorist activities. 55 PART B. 1. Trends in Terrorism 1.1 Demarcations For any paper that involves terrorism it is inevitable to formulate demarcations. After all, much has been written on the subject, and a complete overview would require hundreds of pages, if not more. Here, it is important to note that the definition of terrorism itself will not be discussed, since it has been thoroughly dealt with in other TTSRL deliverables, most notably deliverable 4. Secondly, the geographical area should be considered to cover Europe, along the lines of the rest of this research project. Despite this, some examples and statistics from other countries are used as well, since they are in some cases very relevant for Europe. Thirdly, many databases exist that keep track of terrorist incidents in the world. Each one of them uses a slightly different approach or definition. In order to illustrate the trends with statistical data, we have chosen two such databases, ITERATE (Mickolus, 2003) and TWEED (Engene, 2007). Although these databases list different terrorist attacks, inevitably, there will be some overlap, while at the same time some attacks may be missed by both. Fourthly, when speaking about the risk of terrorism, it is difficult to give an all-encompassing overview. After all, there are different types of terrorist organizations, and the risk a “regular” terrorist organization poses to society is dissimilar to the risk posed by an organization that intends to use Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Here, we will not give a complete overview of the risk generated by all types of terrorist organizations. Instead, we will focus on the way the risk of terrorism can be determined and analyzed, and how it may change, using examples from the entire spectrum of terrorist organizations. The questions posed above will be addressed in several chapters of this report. Subsequent chapters focus on trends in terrorism, aspects of threat and risk 56 analysis, as well as our analysis of information on terrorism as reflected in two terrorism databases, ITERATE and TWEED. An important part of this paper is a qualitative analysis of academic literature on trends and risk analysis in terrorism.11 This analysis revealed, as will be illustrated throughout the deliverable, that risk and trends are inherently intertwined yet extremely complex concepts. The discussion in the first chapter provides the theoretical background of trends encompassed in terrorist incident related databases. It then draws heavily on David Rapoport’s description of the anarchist, anti-colonial, new left, and religious waves of terrorism that signify the general trends in terrorism over the past century (Rapoport, 2004). Obviously, other relevant authors and prevailing literature are also addressed. Besides these general trends (or waves) specific trends within the fourth wave are identified and utilized in subsequent portions of the report to establish the connection between trends and risk. The chapter also presents the results of our analysis of the data on terrorism from TWEED and ITERATE. We have extracted several tables and graphs from the data provided by these databases in an effort to understand whether the trends described lead to increased risk of terrorism. Juxtaposing the graphs and tables to the opinions of leading scholars on trends, our aim is to answer the central questions of this report: whether or not the changing trends in terrorism have increased the danger it poses. The second chapter deals with the threat and risk of conventional and CBRN terrorism and presents various aspects of risk analysis of terrorist organizations. The consequences, capabilities and intentions of terrorist organization are discussed and evaluated to further examine links between trends and risk. Drawing on the information presented in the first chapter, as well as a framework developed by Cragin and Daly which is discussed at length 11 Given the enormous body of terrorism related publications over the years, and especially since 9/11, it is virtually impossible to discuss all aspects or even a significant portion in any considerable detail. As such, the parameters of this report include discussion and analysis of some of the most prominent sources that specifically address the questions posed above. Although we realize that this is merely the tip of a very large iceberg, it is in our opinion the best way to present a high quality, coherent academic paper. In order to convincingly illustrate arguments, examples are given that are often best described in newspapers or journal articles. We will therefore use these journalistic sources as a supplement to the academic core. 57 in the chapter, we developed a model to help conceptualize the dynamic movement of terrorist organizations. It is intended to help explain the interconnectedness of risk and trends and visually demonstrate how changes in trends affect changes in risk. Finally, in chapter three we build on the theoretical notions of changes in trends and risk by analyzing three terrorist organizations: Al-Qaida, ETA and FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). The groups are used to illustrate the dynamic changes within the context of the established framework and serve as examples of how risk levels vary when capabilities, intentions and consequences of terrorist attacks are juxtaposed with trends in terrorism. 1.2 Trend analysis “A trend analysis is a comparative study of the parts of a product or system and the tendency of a product or system to develop in a particular direction over time.” (ITEA - International Technology Education Association) In this chapter we focus on trends in terrorism as discussed in the scholarly literature. The conclusions in the literature will be supported by our own analysis of the terrorism data available in the ITERATE (Mickolus et al, 2004) and TWEED (Engene, 2007; http://folk.uib.no/sspje/tweed.htm) databases. By doing so we try to connect qualitative and data research regarding terrorism. Efforts to combine both data and qualitative research have been made by several scholars (for example Enders & Sandler, 2000, 2002; Engene, 2004; and Robison et al 2006). Publications by David Rapoport (Rapoport, 2004), William F Shughart II (Shughart, 2006), Walter Enders and Todd Sandler (Enders & Sandler, 2005a), Erwin Muller (Muller et al, 2003) and Bruce Hofmann (Hoffman, 1999) are examples of the qualitative resources used.. As said above quantitative data is extracted from the ITERATE and TWEED databases. The first provides records on international terrorist incidents, the latter’s content consists solely of domestic terrorist incidents. By combining these datasets the most complete statistical input is gathered. 58 The heart and main body of terrorism research consists of qualitative analysis. The bulk of studies on terrorism uses qualitative methods, mainly based on primary sources including experiences of terrorists and victims, and/or secondary studies such as case studies of terrorist organizations, types of terrorism or particular incidents/territories (Ross, 2004: 26). This type of research is very useful in offering a context and background on the phenomenon of terrorism. Qualitative research depends very heavily on open source work (Silke, 2001: 3). In The new guide to Political Terrorism by Albert J. Jongman and Alex P. Schmid (2005), a review on research and researchers of terrorism, shows that 50 questioned researchers use primarily scholarly books and articles (100%), media and news services (92%) and open government documents (92%) to get their information (Jongman and Schmid, 2005: 138). They further note that 23 of the 50 respondents confirm to have generated their own information on the subject of terrorism (Jongman and Schmid, 2005: 137). At the moment the amount of quantitative studies pales in comparison to the number of those dependent upon qualitative methods (Ross, 2004: 29). Quantitative research on terrorism is relatively rare, though it could reveal new and useful relationships and patterns in the knowledge of terrorism (Silke, 2004: 11). These findings will be backed up by hard data instead of theoretical generalizations. There are two basic types of statistics: descriptive and inferential. For the purposes of this study, we found it sufficient to stick with simple descriptive statistics. 1.3 Four Waves of Modern Terrorism Over the past several years UCLA Professor Emeritus of Political Science David C. Rapoport has popularized the notion of the wave theory. He argues that there are four distinctive waves of modern terrorism, where each wave has its own ideological identity. Rapoport first pointed this out in 1999 (Rapoport, 1999) and the theory has since been rooted in the academic literature (Gupta, 2008: 3). In this part of the chapter the four waves according to Rapoport will be discussed whilst adding further enhancements by other scholars. It is important to understand that the waves signify general trends in terrorism and that within these general trends more specific trends occur. Consider an orange as an 59 example of the general encompassing more specific trends, so that when the first layer is peeled off it reveals a number of sections. In a similar vein, the general trends can be compared with the outer layer of an orange whereas the sections resemble smaller, more specific trends that together form a wave. According to Rapoport a wave is: “a cycle of activity in a given time period – a cycle characterized by expansion and contraction phases. A crucial feature is its international character; similar activities occur in several countries, driven by common predominant energy that shapes the participating groups’ characteristics and mutual relationships” (Rapoport, 2004: 47) The waves illustrate the general ideological trends in terrorism over the past 130 years. It is important to note that the name of each wave reflects the dominant, but not the only ideology of the wave. Nationalist groups, for example appear in all waves (Rapoport, 2004: 47). The origin of the first wave, which is generally also seen as the origin of modern terrorism as we know it, is set around 1880 in Russia. The wave was anarchistic in character and was the first global terrorist experience (Rapoport, 2004: 47). One of the main characteristics of the first wave were political assassinations. The most important group was Narodnaja Volja, or “People’s Will”. The group expected that targeting specific political representatives would ignite a popular uprising. This led the group to choose its targets very carefully, ultimately killing Tsar Alexander II (Richardson, 2007:56-58). The wave that started in Russia soon swept Europe and eventually reached the United States. Anarchists killed, amongst others, the President of France Marie François Sadi Carnot, the President of United States William McKinley, the Prime Minister of Spain Antonio Cánovas del Castillo and later also Prime Minister José Canalejas, Elisabeth of Bavaria the Empress of Austria and Umberto I the King of Italy. It is thus not a surprise that the period is sometimes called the “Golden Age of Assassination” (Rapoport, 2004: 52). The wave of anarchist violence that swept the world led President Roosevelt to “ask in December 1901 for international treaties among all civilized powers to make anarchism a crime against the law of nations and to empower the federal government to deal with this crime” (Jensen, 2001). This was a call 60 for an international battle against anarchist terrorism, one hundred years prior to the call of President Bush for a war on religious terrorism. Figure 1: Rapoport’s four waves of modern terrorism The Anticolonial wave emerged in the 1920s and had its root causes in the Treaty of Versailles signed in 1919 (Rapoport, 2004: 52). The European victors broke up the old defeated empires (the Ottoman Empire and the Austro- Hungarian Empire) and decided that its non-European parts were not yet ready for independence. Terrorist groups appeared in, for example, Palestine and Cyprus. Following World War II terrorist activity emerged in the overseas territories of the battered European colonial superpowers. The second wave receded with the dissolving of the colonial empires in the 1950s and early 1960s (Shughart, 2006: 15-20). The third wave, known as the New-Left, emerged in the 1960s out of discontent with the western political climate that was characterized by the Vietnam War and had of course the Cold War as broader context (Robison, 2006: 2009; Shughart, 2006: 21). Terrorist groups were active in Europe, Latin America and the United States and were often aided by Palestinian organizations (most notably the PLO) and state sponsors (for example Libya, Iran and the Soviet Union) (Laqueur, 1987: 270-290; Laqueur, 1999: 160-70; Cronin, 2002: 37). The end of the Cold War (in 1989/1991) and as a result the decrease of state sponsorship of terrorism (as there was no longer a need for destabilizing Western Europe) were the main reason behind the demise of the third wave (For more on the decline of terrorism see TTSRL deliverable 5a). The fourth, and for now, last wave has its roots in the Iranian Revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979 (Rapoport:, 2004: 52). Although religion has always played an important role in some terrorist 61 organizations (for example in the IRA and Irgun), it was typically subordinate to other main causes. The IRA, for instance, wanted to liberate and unite the whole of Ireland, while the Irgun aimed to create a Jewish state. In the fourth wave religion became the ideological justification for perpetrating terrorist attacks. While terrorist violence associated with Christianity has been relatively low, other religions including Hinduism and Judaism played a greater role in this fourth wave. Ultimately, according to scholars, the wave is predominantly characterized by fundamentalist Islamist terrorism (Rapoport, 2004: 52). This wave is further characterized by specific trends like suicide terrorism, the decline of the number of terrorist groups and the targeting of ‘softer’ targets (Rapoport, 2004: 62-65). As stated above the waves stand for general trends in terrorism that have occurred over the past century. These general trends are the outer layer and inside a wave there are more specific trends that together give the general trend its character. William Thompson (2006) identifies some of these specific trends or characteristics inside the waves several of which were also noted by Rapoport (2004: 62-65). Given the scope and particularities of this deliverable, we have chosen to focus attention only third and fourth wave characteristics. Third Wave Fourth Wave Primary Strategy Hijackings, Kidnappings, Assassinations. Attacks on antagonists and their symbols, suicide bombers (beheadings). Target Identity Governments in general with increasing focus on U.S. as patron of conservative regimes. Strong focus on U.S., Israel and secular regimes with Muslim population. Special Characteristics Increased international training/cooperation/sponsorship. Casualty escalation, decline in number of terrorist groups. Table 1 (Thompson 2006: 190) Having presented the general characteristics of the more specific trends, we digress to elaborate on the various enhancements made to the wave theory by 62 leading authors. A more detailed discussion of the specific trends within the fourth wave will be undertaken in the following sections. Additions/Enhancements of Theory As stated earlier, Rapoport’s theory has rooted quickly in scholarly literature (Ben-Dor & Pedahzur, 2003; Bergesen & Han, 2005; Devezas & Santos, 2006; Gupta, 2008; Harrow, 2008; Kaplan, 2008; Lizardo & Bergesen, 2003; Neumayer & Plumper, 2009; Robison et al, 2006; Shughart, 2006; Thompson, 2006), however not everyone agrees with this explanation. As such, relevant enhancements and adaptations of the theory as used by scholars in the field are discussed in greater detail. Adjusted Waves One of the most interesting additions to Rapoport’s theory is offered by Omar Lizardo and Albert Bergesen. In their article Types of terrorism by world-system location (2003) the authors argue that different types of terrorism exist which arise from dividing the world system into a core, a semi-periphery, and a periphery. Out of this division they distil three types of terrorism: terrorism perpetrated by core actors against core governments (type-1), terrorism that originates in the periphery or semi-periphery and is directed against governments of the periphery or semi-periphery (type-2), and terrorism that originates in the periphery or semi-periphery and is directed against core governments (type-3). Lizardo and Bergesen use an adapted version of Rapoport’s theory in which they see an Anarchistic Wave in the period 1879-1914, a National Liberation Wave from 1945-1969, a Marxist Wave from 1960-1989 and a Religious Wave from 1979 onwards. They agree with Rapoport that the different character of each wave can partially be explained by its ideological character, but they want to “add an emphasis on the larger international dynamics of the world system. Namely on the structural origins and location of the state targets that each wave of terrorist activity attempts to target” (Lizardo, 2003: 164). 63 They further dispute Rapoport’s claim that the fourth religious wave is a qualitatively different wave. They see the religious wave as the return of the anarchist wave in “holy disguise”. This is where their three distinct types of terrorism come into play. Type-1 terrorism can assume either ethnic-separatist (ETA), radical leftist (RAF) or anarchistic/nihilist (Aum Shinrikyo12) ideology. Type-2 terrorism is by far the most occurring form of terrorism, but because it happens in the periphery or semi-periphery, does not affect the Western world and therefore gets minor attention. Type-3 terrorist activity only appears in two of the four waves, namely the anarchistic and religious wave. Consequently, Lizardo and Bergesen conclude that: “[b]oth 19th century anarchist and currently active Arab-Islamic terrorist organisations view the secular state model of the Euro-American core of the world system as an essentially illegitimate and oppressive institution and therefore do not wish to redeem it, but simply to further its destruction” (Lizardo, 2003: 177. For further reading see also Bergesen & Lizardo, 2004; Bergesen & Lizardo, 2005; Bergesen & Han, 2005). A second interesting addition to the theory is offered by William Thompson (2006) in the chapter Emergent Violence, Global Wars, and Terrorism in Devezas Kondratieff Waves, Warfare and World Security. Thompson suggests some enhancements to the theory, namely that it is possible to distinguish two more waves prior to the anarchistic wave and suggests that there are certain events that encourage waves of terrorism. Considering the extra waves Thompson sees one appearing as early as 1800 (lasting until 1830) around the time of the Napoleonic wars and one several decades later (1830-1860) as a result of unsettlement in the society due to rapid industrialization (Thompson, 2006:193). Thompson sees the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, World War II and the Cold War as fundamental in the emergence of various terrorist waves because: “these wars gave terrorist groups new targets by weakening old regimes, installing new regimes, creating new norms justifying self-determination, and colouring the rhetoric of political discourse (e.g. Cold War left-wing competition)” (Thompson, 2006: 193). Besides the encouragement through wars, Thompson also sees economical development as a factor contributing to the emergence of terrorism: “[…] early 12 They see Aum Shinrikyo as anarchist/nihilist because they don’t consider religious terrorism as a new wave, but see it as the return of the Anarchist wave in holy 64 industrialization helped alienate segments of the population from their 19th century political systems. A second wave of industrialization in the latter part of the 19th century generated more lethal and dramatic chemical tools (dynamite), as well as transportation networks and an acceleration of globalization processes that made terrorists, their ideas, and news of their activities more mobile. Another round of acceleration of globalization in the late 20th century and thereafter has helped to create more alienation (to which religious fundamentalism is one response)” (Thompson, 2006: 194). Primary System-Contextual Factors Undergirding Terrorism Evolution Wave Encouragement Discouragement 1800s-20s Napoleonic wars Great power suppression 1830s-60s Industrialization diffusion Government suppression 1870s-1910s Dynamite, globalization, communication and transportation networks Labor diversion, government suppression, World War I 1920s-60s Post-WWI Versailles Treaty (selfdetermination) and decolonization norms Post-WWII decolonization due in part to war exhaustion 1960s-90s Cold War ideological struggle End of Cold War, government suppression 1970s-2020s Information technology, Globalization, and US systemic leadership and patron-client ties, government suppression? Government suppression? Figure 2: Thompson’s Waves of Terrorism (2006: 193) Mark Sedgwick (2007) offers another characterization of the global waves of terrorism. In his article Inspiration and the Origins of Global Waves of Terrorism he argues that Rapoport’s theory does not supply a fully satisfactory explanation “disguise”. For purposes of this study, we would qualify Aum Shinrikyo as a group within the religious wave. 65 for the appearance of global waves of terrorism. Sedgwick believes the names of the waves may tell us more about the “zeitgeist” in which they appear than about the waves themselves, because as Walter Laqueur said: “terrorism always assumes the protective colouring of certain features of the zeitgeist” (Sedgwick, 2007). Sedgwick stresses that something more than ideology is needed to explain the global waves of terrorism. For instance, he thinks that the success of a group of terrorists that have a certain strategy inspires other groups to try a similar strategy. Sedgwick agrees with Rapoport that there have been four waves of terrorism, but suggests that: “if ideology tells us more about zeitgeist than anything else, ideological fashion cannot be the best way to define a wave [and] that, to some extent, the appearance of recent waves is an optical illusion” (Sedgwick, 2007: 102). Sedgwick distinguishes an Italian Wave, a German Wave, a Chinese Wave and an Afghan Wave. He sees the Young Italy movement, Nazi movement, Mao’s communist and the Afghan Mujahedeen as the groups that inspired other movements to take over their strategy. Although Sedgwick’s classification of waves is interesting, it is not yet well developed. He offers little evidence that the preceding groups inspired other groups. For example he says that the Mujahedeen inspired Hezbollah, Hamas and Al-Qaida but does not provide evidence that these groups are inspired by the Mudjahedeen. His critique of Rapoport’s qualification of the waves in ideology is in a way legitimate, maybe ideology tells us more about the zeitgeist than anything else. Nevertheless, it is still true that all groups share the same ideology and that this choice of ideology indeed makes them part of a wave of groups that share, under influence of the zeitgeist, the same ideology. Fact is that when one reasons like Sedgwick it appears as if a terrorist is someone that wants to commit a violent act and for this reason chooses an ideology under the banner of which he or she can commit this act. The classification in ideology is arguably one of the strongest points of the theory. It is clear that the waves are exponents of a certain “zeitgeist”, but this is what makes the waves researchable. Ideology is what gives the groups in the waves their identity and makes them identifiable as part of a wave. Last, but certainly not least of the scholars to offer a supplement to Rapoport’s arguments is Jeffrey Kaplan (2008, 2009). Kaplan major contribution is that there is a distinct fifth wave, characterized by groups that operate in what 66 Lizardo & Bergesen (2003, 2004, 2005) would call the periphery and semiperiphery, and that have a high rate of religiously indoctrinated followers. Groups that are categorized in this wave are the Khmer Rouge (before they came to power), and the Lord’s Resistance Army in central east Africa (Kaplan, 2008: 13). Due to the fact that one of the characteristics of this wave is that groups in it operate in the periphery, we will not further elaborate on a possible fifth wave here. Wave Dynamics Dipak Gupta (2008) addresses wave dynamics with questions concerning terrorism’s occurrence in waves and how waves begin in the first place. Gupta uses journalist Malcolm Gladwell’s theory of “how ideas spread” to explain the occurrence of waves and how global terrorism spreads. To illustrate his argument, Gupta uses Al-Qaida as an example of an important group from the fourth wave, but underlines that in principle the classification applies to groups across all four waves. Drawing on Gladwell’s hypothesis, Gupta sees three major forces driving a wave: 1) the messenger(s), 2) the message and 3) the context. The messenger(s) are political entrepreneurs which can be divided into three subcategories; the connectors – individuals who know lots of people, the mavens – theoreticians who can accumulate and explain the current crisis/problems, and the salesmen – people who can attract followers. In the fourth wave, for example, he sees men like Hassan al-Bannah and Sayyid Qutb as the mavens of the wave and Osama Bin Laden as the most important connector and salesman, but this does not mean they are the only political entrepreneurs of the wave (Gupta, 2008: 5). The message is a story composed and brought about by the messenger. To make a message stick it must be simple, concrete, credible, contain unexpected elements, appeal to emotions, and have a storyline. In the case of the fourth wave, and more specifically concerning Al-Qaida, the message can be dissected as follows: that Islam is under attack from infidels (simple), all Muslims have the religious duty to join the jihad (concrete), and if not the Muslim world will be destroyed (appeal to emotions). This is proclaimed by Osama Bin Laden, a rich man fighting “injustice” (credible) who uses a lot of analogies in his speeches 67 (i.e. Westerners – Crusaders, Bush – Hulaga Khan) with implications that are clear to his audience (story line). The context is the (political) climate in which the messenger and his message can appeal to people. In the case of the fourth wave Gupta sees both historical (Iranian revolution, Afghan war) and social economic struggles (the large number of structural imbalances with which young Muslims in Europe and in the Arab world are faced today, poverty, lack of opportunities, unemployment etc.) as reasons for the context in which the wave could occur (Gupta, 2008: 6; For further reading on wave dynamics see also Harrow, 2008). 1.4 Data Analysis In their article Ideologies of Violence: The Social Origins of Islamist and Leftist Transnational Terrorism Robison, Crenshaw and Jenkins (2006) statistically tested the idea that there are a distinctive third (leftist) and fourth (religious) waves. Although they found evidence that supported the wave theory they also stress that the theory seems “overly simplistic” (Robison, Crenshaw and Jenkins, 2006: 2022). Our simple analysis of data shows that in both ITERATE and TWEED, thus in both transnational and domestic terrorism, there is a clear wave of left wing terrorism. Graphs 1 and 2 show an evident upward trend starting around 1968. As graph 2 shows, the peak in domestic left wing terrorism in Western-Europe can be found in 1984, while the last significant number of attacks occurred in 1991. Graph 1 shows worldwide transnational left wing terrorism and has a last peak in 1991. It is clear that both peaks were followed by a massive decrease in left-wing terrorism. The end of the Cold-War 1989/1991 definitely marked a turning point for left-wing terrorism, but as graphs 1 and 2 show ,the decrease in attacks started somewhat earlier in the domestic terrorism in Western-Europe. Graphs 3 and 4 (the number of fatalities caused by Left-Wing terrorism) demonstrate more or less the same pattern, with the exception that the number of fatalities caused by transnational left wing terrorism had a short recoil in 1993-1994. 68 Attacks Left Wing Terrorism ITERATE 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 Year Number of Attacks Graph 1 Graph 2 (1984 = 181 attacks) Fatalities Left Wing Terrorism ITERATE 0 50 100 150 200 250 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 Year Number of Fatalities Graph 3 Fatalities Left Wing Terrorism TWEED 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 1949 1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 Year Number of Fatalities Graph 4 Interesting to note as a general trend in terrorism, is the fact that ITERATE (see graph 5) shows that there is a downward trend in the number of terrorist attacks, especially since the start of the 1990s. Even more interesting is the fact that according graph 6 the number of fatalities in ITERATE does not show the same downward trend. In graph 7 it becomes apparent that the average number of fatalities per transnational terrorist attack demonstrates an obvious upward trend. This is a strong indication that transnational terrorism is becoming more lethal. The data from TWEED database does not demonstrate the same pattern 69 as strongly as ITERATE, but it is likely that there is an explanation for this fact, on which we will elaborate in the following. In their article Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening? Walter Enders and Todd Sandler (2000) statistically analyze the phenomenon of increasing lethality. They conclude that in the post Cold-War era the number of attacks has dramatically decreased, while attacks have become significantly more lethal (the same is noted by Hoffman 1999: 8; and Bird et al, 2008). The article is written in 2000 and therefore does not account for the 9/11, Madrid and London attacks, which seems to indicate that terrorism is indeed becoming increasingly lethal. Among Enders and Sandler’s more interesting conclusions is that the scholars connect the increase of lethality to the rise of religious fundamentalism as an ideology for terrorist groups (Enders & Sandler, 2000: 310) and thus to the rise of the fourth, religious wave of terrorism, because as Enders and Sandler argue: “such groups view civilians as legitimate targets of a “decadent” society. Religious groups that declare a Jihad or holy war against another nation consider its people, not just its officials, the enemy” (Enders & Sandler, 2000: 311). While this conclusion was made in 2000, since then it has become even more clearer that terrorism has become more lethal especially, following 9/11 (Enders & Sandler 2005). If it is true that the rise in the average number of fatalities can be ascribed to religious terrorism, then conclusions can be drawn as to why TWEED does not immediately indicate this upward trend. This is because religion crosses global boundaries and is therefore generally transnational, at least this seems to have been the case until recently (Hoffman, 2006: 86). Lets have a closer look at the fourth wave and its religious terrorism. Terrorist Attacks ITERATE 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 Year Number of Attacks Graph 5 70 Fatalities Terrorist Attacks ITERATE -200 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 Year Number of Fatalities Graph 6 Avg. Fatalities Terrorism ITERATE 0,00 1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00 6,00 7,00 8,00 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Year Avg. Fatalities per Attack Graph 7 1.5 The Fourth Wave Taking into consideration what we have discussed earlier, now it’s the time to turn our attention to the fourth wave and the specific trends within it. We have to try and peel of the outer layer to have a look inside the wave to the characteristics that give the religious wave its shape. But first before we turn to the specific trends, we will need to take a closer look at the fourth wave in general. 71 Attacks Religious Terrorism ITERATE 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 Year Number of Attacks Graph 8 Fatalities Religious Terrorism ITERATE 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 Year Number of Fatalities Graph 9 Injuries Religious Terrorism ITERATE 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 Year Number of Injuries Graph 10 Avg. Fatalities Per Attack Religious Terrorism ITERATE 0 5 10 15 20 25 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Year Avg Fatalities per Attack Graph 11 72 Avg. Fatalities Religious vs. non-Religious Terrorism 0,00 5,00 10,00 15,00 20,00 25,00 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 Year Avg. Fatalities per Attack Avg. Fatalities per Attack Religious Terrorism Avg. Fatalities per Attack Non-Religious Polynoom (Avg. Fatalities per Attack Non-Religious) Polynoom (Avg. Fatalities per Attack Religious Terrorism) Graph 12 Characteristics of the Fourth Wave Graph 813 shows that there is a clear rise in religious terrorism from 1970s onward. Inside this wave of religious terrorism there seems to be a second wave pattern. In 1973 we can see an early peak in the number of attacks. This peak can be ascribed to a Malaysian religious group. The attacks, however, did not cause many fatalities (compare 1973 in graph 8 and 9). After this, a wave of religious terrorism seems to be rising from 1979 onwards, booming in 1983 and dropping after 1987, then rising again from 1991 onwards and dropping in 1995 and rising again after 2001 and dropping once again in 2005. Thus there seems to be a four year cycle in number of attacks within the fourth wave. Graphs 9 and 11 show another pattern. From 1993 onwards there is a spectacular increase in the number of fatalities. More importantly, in the second half of the 1990s a spectacular increase in average fatalities caused by religious terrorists can be witnessed (even without taking into account the attacks of 9/11). As graph 1214 13 Both ITERATE and TWEED do not code for religious affiliation of terrorist organizations. We therefore have chosen to insert this variable into ITERATE13 ourselves and make use of a list of terrorist groups coded by Robison et al (2006). It is further important to note that ITERATE does not include fatality numbers when the exact number is unknown. As a result of this for example 9/11 has not been given a value for the variable “number of victims”. 14 The difficulty with coding terrorist groups is made clear in this graph. The peak of non-religious terrorism in 2004 is caused by attacks by Chechen Rebels. We have coded these rebels as separatists, but they partly justify their struggle in the name of Jihad, thus there is something to say to call them religious 73 shows religious terrorism, and thus the fourth wave, is more lethal than other terrorism. (For an interesting addition see Piazza 2008) The shift to religious terrorism has brought along some major changes to the identity of terrorism. Provided that religion spans across global boundaries, a more transnational approach is adopted by terrorist organizations that see religion as a unifying factor. Additionally, according to various scholars, religion applied for political purposes by extreme factions provides a heavenly justification for the acts, thus leading to a heightened readiness to commit brutal deadly attacks. Bruce Hoffman writes on this last argument: “terrorism motivated either in whole or in part by a religious imperative, where violence is regarded by its practitioners as a divine duty or sacramental act, embraces markedly different means of legitimization and justification than that committed by secular terrorists, and these distinguishing features lead, in turn, to yet greater bloodshed and destruction” (Hoffman, 2006: 83). Mark Juergensmeyer notes that even though religion does not explain everything, it is certainly not irrelevant: “it transforms the struggle. It expands timelines into eternal goals and expands the rewards of the strugglers into cosmic rewards” (Juergensmeyer, 2006: 60). Daniel Benjamin contrasts groups such as ETA and the IRA, that typically used limited violence, with religiously motivated terrorists that seek “unconstrained and often indiscriminate violence […] The violence is sacred and, therefore, the more the better” (Benjamin, 2006: 65). 15 Audrey Kurth Cronin even lists five reasons why religious terrorism may be especially dangerous to international security in the foreseeable future. For instance, religious terrorists see their struggle as “good” against “evil”, leading to dehumanization of whoever is not part of their religion or sect. Furthermore, they see themselves as unconstrained by secular values or laws. And rather than aspiring to create a better society, they aim to replace society (Cronin, 2003: 286-287). 15 Other reasons for different levels of violence may include the notion that ETA and IRA are localized struggles. See also: Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 88-89. Hoffman also mentions several statistics on the differences in casualties between religiously and non-religiously inspired attacks, 74 Fourth Wave Dynamics Focusing on what Rapoport and Thompson have said about the fourth waves specific trends (decrease in groups, use of suicide terrorism, attacking ‘softer’ targets) we will take a closer look at the characteristics that give the fourth wave its identity. We have chosen to elaborate on two specific trends that occur within the fourth wave. These two trends emerge from the broader picture of the rise in lethality ascribed to religious terrorism, namely choice of targets and suicide terrorism. In the West the use of suicide bombing is nowadays seen as an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist phenomenon and certainly not without reason. Hoffman has noted in 2005 that 31 out of 35 terrorist groups that have committed suicide attacks since 9/11 have a Jihadist ideology (Atran, 2006: 127). The first religious group to use suicide bombing on a large scale was Hezbollah in Lebanon in the 1980s. The strategy was a massive success, driving both France and the US military out of the country. Hoffman says that suicide attacks on average kill four times as many people as normal attacks (Hoffman 2003: 3). The success is further clarified by Pape (2003) in his article The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Pape shows that while only 3% of the terrorist attacks since 1980 were suicide attacks, such tactics account for 48% of the fatalities in the same period (despite exclusion of 9/11). Besides that, he argues, the act of suicide itself sends a very strong message (Pape, 2003: 4). This makes suicide terrorism a very strong weapon, because it not only kills more people but also brings along massive fear. In Europe, the display of suicide terrorism as the intention to sacrifice one’s life while carrying out attacks was evident in the London attacks. Furthermore, Theo van Gogh’s murderer - Mohammed Bouyeri - left a farewell note that implied he was expecting to die during the attack as well. Although this did not materialize, Bouyeri did seem to have the intention, or at least the willingness, to give up his life to achieve his objective. Thus, in recent years suicide attacks have become a significant proportion of total terrorist attacks and a remarkable increase in the use of this tactic has supporting the thesis that the religiously inspired ones claim a proportionately large part of terrorism related fatalities: Ibid., 86-88 75 been exhibited among Islamist organizations in the years since 9/11.16 What exactly is the connection between religious terrorism an suicide attacks. Figure 3 (Atran, 2006: 128) In his article Pape argues that suicide terrorism is not explained by religious fanaticism. He argues that: “although religious motives may matter, modern suicide terrorism is not limited to Islamic Fundamentalism. Islamic groups receive the most attention in Western media, but the world’s leader17 in suicide terrorism is actually the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a group who recruits from the predominantly Hindu Tamil population in northern and eastern Sri Lanka and whose ideology has Marxist/Leninist elements. The LTTE alone accounts for 75 of the 186 suicide terrorist attacks from 1980 to 2001. Even among Islamic suicide attacks, groups with secular orientations account for about a third of these attacks” (Pape, 2003: 1). According to Pape the root cause for suicide terrorism was foreign occupation. Although this may possibly have been 16 There are some scholars that are not convinced by the arguments that religion has something to do with the increased role of suicide terrorism. Bruce Hoffman discusses this in his book: Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 325n.1 17 This was the case untill 2001, but as figure 3 shows suicide terrorism has become far more occurring since. 76 an important factor for the period 1980-2001, it is probably as Scot Atran notes a too easy an explanation (Atran, 2006: 130-132). Atran says that: “Those who believe suicide terrorism can be explained by a single political root cause, such as the presence of foreign military forces or the absence of democracy, ignore psychological motivations, including religious inspirations, which can trump rational self-interest to produce horrific or heroic behavior in ordinary people” (Atran, 2006: 144). Both seem to have a good point and from there different views one can substitute two different views at suicide terrorism in recent years there seem to be two distinct types of attacks. Those where it seems to be the case, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, that there is a clear political goal (expelling a foreign occupation force). And those that seem to lack such a clear political goal, such as the Bali-bombings and London attacks. This second type of attacks seem to aim for a higher abstract and thus milleniaristic goal. The goal is so to say undefined or impossible to reach, because it searches for a higher ‘sacred’ goal, there is no ‘worldly’ political goal an the attacks are religiously justified.18 These attacks are filled with rage and hate against everything Western and kill without regard for the victims. This brings us to a second trend this time in ‘choice of target’. (For another, but corresponding view see Piazza, 2008) Another trend that comes with the fourth wave is a shift away from predominantly hard targets in the third wave to all targets in the fourth wave. Religious groups tend to both attack soft and hard targets. For example the attacks on the USS Cole (hard) and the trains in Madrid (soft). This of course is a result of the fact that religious groups see civilians as a legitimate target. Their attacks thus focus on as much destruction as possible to get their point across. As Hoffman notices (1999: , third wave groups chose targets that were symbolic for the source of their anger (banks, embassies, etc.) or attacked government officials. They chose their targets with care and explained their actions endlessly. The milleniaristic religious groups have no problem attacking soft targets and therefore killing people that were conceived innocent by terrorist in previous decades. This because they “see themselves as unconstrained by 18 I think it is this lack of a realistic defined goal, that makes Lizardo and Bergesen (2003) argue that religious terrorism is the return of anarchistic terrorism in a holy disguise. Anarchists also strived for a higher undefined goal (better society) without a clear policy of how to reach it. (think of what Cronin said about religious terrorists: “Furthermore, they see themselves as unconstrained by secular values or laws. And rather than aspiring to create a better society, they aim to replace society” (Cronin, 2003: 286-287). 77 secular values or laws” (Cronin, 2003: 286-287). In their eyes everybody is a legitimate target. In Europe religious terrorists have until this day solely hit soft targets (trains in Madrid, in London, Theo van Gogh). There hasn’t been a significant attack on hard target in Europe for a long time. This can possibly be explained by the greater security hard targets have, but as noted above is a new phenomenon. Hoffman notes about al-Qaeda that “with our counterterrorism measures improving and becoming stronger while al-Qa’ida constantly scrambles and struggles to adapt itself to the new, less congenial operational environments in which it must exist. During this period of adaptation, there will be continued low-level attacks and, as has been the pattern of late, mostly against accessible, soft targets” (Hoffman, 2003: 17) Also outside Europe the most notable attacks in recent years have been against soft targets (Bali-bombing, WTC). It is thus possible that the choice of soft targets is in part due to the lack of capabilities to hit hard targets, for instance al-Qaeda has hit hard targets in the past (attacks on US-army bases in Saudi-Arabia, attack on the USS Cole, attacks on Kenya and Tanzania embassies, attack on Pentagon). Whether or not this is the case, it is nonetheless a new phenomenon that major terrorist attacks are mainly directed against soft targets and that they are so cruel. These are two of the trends that let to the rise of lethality of terrorism in recent years. Two Types of Religious Terrorism Although a lack of space and time restricts us from elaborating much more, some general conclusions have to be drawn from everything mentioned in order to stimulate further thoughts about religious terrorism. Regarding what we have said above, it seems to be possible to distract two types of religious terrorism. First religious terrorism that aims for a political goal, for instance insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan and that use religion as a way to attract followers and justify its actions. Second religious terrorism that doesn’t have such a ‘worldly’ goal and that strives for a higher abstract sacred goal that is impossible to reach. The first we call Political religious terrorism, the second 78 milleniaristic terrorism. It is this latter type that affects the European society most and that strikes most fear. It is generally in retaliation of something somebody has said/done or something a society has ‘done’, if society has done something everybody in is a possible target. The perpetrators are not personally affected (except in their honor) by the events in the name of which they commit terrorism. Take for example the failed attacks on German trains in retaliation of the cartoons publicized in Denmark(!) and the killing of Theo van Gogh, because he offended Muslims (he offended everybody if he felt like it, he was very cynical), the perpetrator Mohammed Bouyeri was not personally affected (except in his honor) by van Gogh. The passengers of the trains in Germany where in no way involved in the publicizing of cartoons in Denmark. It is this shift away from hard specially chosen targets that makes that milleniaristic religious terrorism strikes such fear into a society, everybody is a legitimate victim even if you don’t agree with the ‘policy’ of society. James Piazza (2008: 9) shows in his article that groups associated with al-Qaeda are far more lethal (36.1 kill per attack) than religious groups not affiliated to al-Qaeda (9.1 kill per attack). Al-Qaeda is of course the best example of a group that symbols the rise of milleniaristic religious terrorism. Only the milleniaristic groups seem to perpetrates attacks within the Western Core. Religious terrorism bares features of all previous waves, but the addition of faith has changed the outlook dramatically. The table below doesn’t claim to be complete it only shows some similarities and dissimilarities, which seem to be caused by the lack of secular values that religious terrorism brings along. Wave Political Religious Millenearistic Religious Striving for a higher goal Willingness to give up life Anarchistic Similarities Dissimilarities Killing representatives, Fighting a foreign occupation force Anti-colonial Similarities Dissimilarities Willingness to give up life 79 Anti-Us/Western society, Anti-capitalist, Killing of antagonists New-Left Similarities Dissimilarities Type of target, Killing representatives, Willingness to give up life, Clearness of goals, Political goals Some similarities and dissimilarities between religious terrorism an other terrorism The general conclusions that can thus be drawn from the discussion is that the changing trends within the fourth wave of terrorism have led to a significant change in threats posed to society. As religion seems to be the dominant overarching tendency for the fourth wave of terrorism, and suicide attacks appear to be the driving force of an increase in lethality, analysis on the potential connection between trends and risk thus warrants a more detailed discussion. The following chapters will consider the dynamics of threat and attempt to synthesize it with the development of trends to illustrate the overall risk that terrorism poses. 2. The Risk Terrorism Poses Among many politicians, military leaders, and civilians, terrorism is considered one of the gravest dangers to our society, particularly because the highly publicized events of 9/11 demonstrated the consequences of terrorist acts. In Europe, attacks in Spain, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and the Netherlands, as well as foiled plots and failed attacks in those and several other countries, have further raised awareness and sometimes fear. As the concepts of risk and threat have already been detailed in the introduction, the following sections will focus on illustrating the risk terrorism poses to European security. Again we clarify that the risk posed to Europe by one group is very different than that posed by another. With this caveat in mind, we nevertheless aim to provide a general 80 overview of trends in terrorist attacks rather than attempt to predict specific events. The general question addressed here is: what is the risk of terrorism for Europe? Of course this query is extremely broad and given the subject matter can be investigated from a number of perspectives and include a variety of types of terrorism. While it is possible to list the number of past attacks and the number of casualties, as we did in the previous chapter, or account for the amount of damage produced by a terrorist attack, as is done in TTSRL Deliverable 9, quantifying the willingness of terrorists to carry out certain attacks is nearly impossible to translate into any meaningful numerical metrics. As such, the main focus here will be on qualitative rather than quantitative analysis. This approach lends itself to interpretation and a thorough assessment of risk. Obviously, this interpretation can lead to conclusions that are subject to debate. Academic debate, however, is a useful development and any comments or alternative explanations are always welcome. Since a single risk analysis cannot encompass every type of terrorism, every country, every terrorist organization or every business, we isolate two types for assessment: conventional terrorism and CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) terrorism. Addressing the risk in this capacity provides a platform for evaluation in most countries within Europe (and many outside Europe as well). Specific nuances notwithstanding, the broad lines are comparable. Additionally, the two categories have a very different risk profile, thus providing further insight into the trends of terrorist activity. 2.1 Quantifying the Risk of Terrorism First, it is instructive to determine what risk entails. Here, a simple but very useful definition of risk will be used. The two main factors involved are: 1) the probability (or in case of terrorism, the threat); and 2) the potential impact or consequences of terrorist activity: Risk = Threat x Consequences.19 For example, if the threat of a certain terrorist organization is very high, and the consequences 19 This is described in many places, for instance on the Internet on sites such as that of the European Network and Information Security Agency ENISA (see their page on Risk Assessment, http://www.enisa.europa.eu/rmra/rm_process_02.html), or the site of The Risk Management Guide, their pages on Risk Evaluation, http://www.ruleworks.co.uk/riskguide/risk-evaluation.htm and on Risk Analysis and Risk Log, http://www.ruleworks.co.uk/riskguide/security-risk-log.htm). 81 of the attack it is willing and able to carry out are also high, the risk should be considered high. On the other hand, if a group considers an action that would result in fairly low damage, the threat is also considered to be lower. Direct consequences of a certain act of terrorism are often relatively easy to gauge. For example, we can predict with relative precision the consequences of an attack with a nuclear device, or the extent of damage due to a suicide bomber’s detonation of explosives. Of course, the attacks of September 11, 2001 have shown that the consequences of conventional terrorism can be very devastating, leading to an increased risk perception by many since that day, even though the attacks themselves did not directly increase the risk. By contrast, the threat of terrorism is often harder to assess and is not easily established in quantitative terms. The two factors involved in establishing the threat of terrorist organizations are capabilities and intention: Threat = Capabilities x Intention (See for instance Cragin and Daly, 2004: 7). For example, if a group does not have the intention to kill many people, but only to cause material damage and get attention, its threat is much lower than if the organization aims at causing World War III by detonating a nuclear device. At the same time, if for instance, the intention to use a nuclear weapon exists, but the organization does not possess the capabilities to either build or procure a nuclear device, the threat is also lower. Cragin and Daly discuss in detail indicators of terrorist groups’ intentions as they relate to anti-U.S. sentiment. Establishing five thresholds within the framework of threat analysis, the authors produce a matrix where each threshold is assigned a numerical value that is used for comparison. In a similar vein, these indicators can also be applied to the case of Europe. For example, a terrorist organization may have the intention to kill many people, but at the same time avoid European targets and instead aim to carry out an attack against a particular government in the Middle East. In such a scenario, the threat such an organization poses to Europe would be significantly lower. It is possible to add a third factor to the first equation, the vulnerability of targets. The equation would then be as follows: Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequences. In this report, however, vulnerability will be discussed along with threat, since it is strongly linked to capabilities. Since certain targets are more vulnerable than others, fewer capabilities are needed to overcome potential obstacles, thus reflecting a greater threat to a particular object. For example, a 82 nuclear facility is better protected than a shopping mall, and is therefore less vulnerable. As a result, a terrorist organization with limited capabilities could successfully attack the latter, but not the former. Therefore, for the purposes of this study we consider vulnerability as a component of capabilities rather than a separate variable. In their original study, Cragin and Daly developed metrics to highlight terrorist threats to the United States. Although their method is not the only possible way of measuring intent and capability, the value of their framework is the fact that there are identifiable metrics to assess terrorist threats. As such, drawing on the research findings of Cragin and Daly (2004), we apply their methodology to better understand the treat terrorism poses to Europe. Cragin and Daly’s model describes the threat of particular organizations, and therefore consists of two parts, intentions and capabilities. As previously mentioned, in designing their framework the authors established five thresholds of anti-U.S. sentiments, each threshold indicating increasing severity. The thresholds were then assigned a numerical value from 0 (it does not pass even the first threshold) to 5 (it passes the highest threshold) to compare terrorist groups’ intentions against each other. According to these criteria, a group that scores 5 on both intentions and capabilities poses the largest threat to the U.S. By contrast, an organization that gets 0 on intentions and 3 on capabilities is not a direct threat to the U,S., but may be a severe threat to another country. As the scope of this project focuses mainly on Europe, we have directly replaced “U.S.” with “Europe” within their framework in order to make the research more relevant to the issue at hand. The tables below illustrate the five indicators for terrorist intentions and capabilities as applied to Europe: Indicators of Terrorist Groups’ Intentions Thresholds of Anti-European Sentiment Value Anti-European rhetoric and/or a stated goal of destabilizing important partners of Europe 1 Association with another terrorist group that seeks to target European citizens and institutions 2 Explicitly anti-Western ideology and/or a history of significant attacks on important partners of Europe 3 83 Targeting European citizens and/or property to pursue a local agenda 4 Specifically focusing attacks on European targets 5 Indicators of Terrorist Groups’ Capabilities Thresholds of Demonstrated and Perceived Attack Skills Value Kill or injure 50 or more people in a single attack 1 Intentionally target unguarded foreign nationals 2 Kill or injure 150 or more people in a single attack 3 Strike at guarded targets 4 Successfully coordinate multiple attacks 5 It is worth reiterating that other indicators and variables can be used to assess the terrorist threat and Cragin and Daly thoroughly deal with this issue in their paper. Keeping in mind the scope of this report, it is not our intention to create a new framework. Rather, our aim is to examine the risk posed by terrorist organizations to Europe. To do this, we use Cragin and Daly’s structure to focus on Europe and assess the threat terrorism poses to European nations. Looking at three terrorist organizations – ETA, Al-Qaida and FARC – we examine their intentions and capabilities, as well as the potential consequences of their activities, to establish relevant connections between risk and trends in terrorism as they relate to Europe. While discussing conventional terrorism, focus will be on threat, whereas for CBRN terrorism, consequences are of particular importance and interest. In order to explain continuity of threat and its convergence with trends in terrorism, we have developed a model to illustrate the relationship between the two concepts. Drawing on the research of Cragin and Daly and the model they have designed to assess threat, our three dimensional model combines the variables used to establish threat with another dimension – consequences (see figure 4). This allows us to understand movement of terrorist organizations based on the combination of perceived threat as well as the specific trends identified in the previous chapter. Taken together, the three dimensions – intentions, capabilities and consequences – denote the characteristics of risk. The aim of conceptualizing these characteristics in the model is to illustrate the dynamic movement of 84 terrorist groups along the three dimensional axes. In the following sections, specific examples will help explain the model as well how terrorist groups move within the space. Figure 4: Understanding Characteristics of Risk 2.2 Consequences of Terrorism The consequences of conventional terrorism can be very dire, with hundreds or in rare cases even thousands of deaths, and great economic damage. Still, the majority of terrorist attacks have had relatively minimal consequences. Tables 1 and 2 provide overviews of the fatalities of domestic terrorism in Western Europe and transnational terrorism across the world in the past four decades.20 20 Source of the Graph: MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. See: http://www.tkb.org/ . Please note that there are some problems with quantitative terrorism databases like MIPT. For instance, the Intentions Capabilities Consequences Low High High Low 85 Fatalities Terrorist Attacks TWEED 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 1949 1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 Year Number of Fatalities Table 1: Fatalities in Western Europe Resulting from Domestic Terrorism 1950-2004 (Source: TWEED) Fatalities Terrorist Attacks ITERATE 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 Year Number of Fatalities Table 2: Fatalities Resulting from Transnational Terrorism 1968-2006 (Source: ITERATE) It is interesting to note that even the highest number of fatalities as a result of terrorism throughout the European continent is still much lower than the average definition for terrorism that each database uses may be slightly different, which may lead to slightly differing statistics. See for example: Jeffrey Scott, “Terrorism Databases: An Empirical Comparison,” (University of Maryland, Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 2003). More on this elsewhere in this deliverable. 86 number of annual traffic-related deaths in a country as small as the Netherlands (Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands). At first glance, the consequences represented in the graphs seem minimal, potentially leading one to conclude that the risk of terrorism is also not very high. The reality, however, is more complex. Comparing consequences of terrorism as witnessed in Europe over the past few decades is not an accurate representation of terrorism’s consequences in general. In other words, the number of people killed in just one day on September 11, 2001 demonstrates that terrorism with “conventional” weapons can still cause high numbers of fatalities. While the incident did not occur in Europe, it is a good example of the detrimental consequences a terrorist attack perpetrated in the West can have. While the consequences of past attacks in Europe were less severe, their impact should not be discounted. Successful attacks in Madrid and London, as well as the failed attempt to blow up a number of airliners, are good examples of terrorist activity in which a many people were, or could have been killed. The number of casualties, however, is not the only consequence of terrorist acts. Taking the economic impact of terrorism into account produces a fuller picture. However, it is extremely difficult to accurately determine such costs. One year after 9/11, the New York City Comptroller estimated that 146,000 jobs were lost as a result of the attacks. Furthermore, the cumulative economic costs totaled between 83 and 95 billion U.S. dollars (New York City Comptroller, 2002). At the same time, the impact resulting from attacks in other parts of the world present a different picture. According to the findings of a research institute in Spain, estimated costs of terrorist attacks carried out in Madrid on March 11, 2004, amounted to 212 million euros. According to the researchers this “confirms that the immediate economic dimension of a terrorist attack such as the one of March 11 – apart from human catastrophic consequences – is relatively low.” (Buesa et al., 2006: 1). The same report also states that even with high-profile attacks, the economic consequences are usually not very high if attacks are considered individually. Terrorism “is a war of low intensity that produces a certain weakening on the economy of the societies that are attacked. This weakening only becomes significant when the campaigns of attacks persist over time.” (Buesa et al., 2006: 23). In other words, when terrorism becomes a more 87 frequently occurring phenomenon in Europe, it may have significant economic effects in the long term. Another important set of consequences of terrorism is formed by the psychological effects on the population. For some, these effects can be very serious. For example, one report about the psychological effects of 9/11 on people in the entire United States – not only in the attacked cities – notes that sixteen percent of the respondents had persistent psychological problems related to the terrorist attacks. They expressed trouble sleeping, accomplishing less at work, drug and alcohol use, and fear of going to public gathering places (Stein et al., 2004: 105-106). Although the psychological impact on individuals as a result of terrorist attacks is important to consider, the effects on the functioning of society are relatively mild. Thus far, even in countries such as Israel, where at times series of attacks occurred, civil society has not been completely debilitated. One research project, for example, notes mild terrorism related stress among Israeli adolescents, but little or no severe psychological consequences. In addition, most of the adolescents were not willing to stop going out despite the existing threat of terrorism in places they would visit (Cohen and Eid, 2007: 54). Similar results can be found in Europe. Several research projects were carried out to assess the psychological impact of the Madrid attacks. The researchers generally found a relation: according to one study about a quarter of the people living close to the location of the attacks experienced psychological symptoms (Gabriel et al., 2007: 339-346). Another study shows a lower, but still significant percentage of people in the whole city of Madrid that suffered from psychological problems (Miguel-Tobal, 2005: 75-80). According to one study, psychological impact of the attacks in London was lower than for the cases mentioned above. Whereas a large part (about a third) of the population is reported to have had substantial stress and an intention to travel less, only a very small minority (one percent) thinks it needs professional help to deal with these psychological problems (Rubin, 2005: 606-611). In sum, much like the human toll and the economic costs, the psychological consequences do not pose a strategic threat to a society that is the target of terrorist attacks. Very important is the political and societal impact of terrorism. Although on the individual level the human toll is obviously the most disastrous consequence, on the state and systemic levels the political and societal consequences of terrorism are undoubtedly most severe. This is perhaps not 88 surprising. After all, one of the main characteristics of terrorism is that it always has a political objective (see for instance Hoffman, 2006: 40-41). A successful terrorist attack, thus, does not need to involve many deaths, but it must include political ramifications, at least in the long term.21 Several examples of political consequences after terrorist attacks can be considered. The outcome of the Spanish election just after the attacks in Madrid is an obvious one that comes to mind. The unexpected loss by incumbent Prime Minister Aznar has been widely attributed to the attacks and their aftermath. According to several polls and research projects, many voters came to the polls to vote for the opposition, even though they were not planning to do so before the attacks (Powell, 2004: 376-382; Chari, 2004: 954-963). Charles Powell notes that “[w]hether or not they were right to do so, a significant number of Spanish voters assumed that the bombings in Madrid were related to the Aznar government’s support for the war in Iraq, and reacted to them by seeking to vote his party out of office.” (Powell, 2004: 380). The fact that countries are often eager to react militarily to terrorist attacks is another example of potential political consequences. This could be because of an actual desire to reduce the capabilities, or as a result of public pressure to “do something” following the incident. One of the best and most recent manifestations of such outcomes is the US-led invasion of Afghanistan following after the events of 9/11. A number of European countries assisted in this military operation. The decision of Turkey to invade Iraq in order to militarily deal with the hiding Kurdish insurgents who were carrying out attacks across the border, or the Colombian attacks against FARC rebels in Ecuador, are additional examples of the political consequences of terrorism (White House, 2001; Arsu and Tevernise, 2007; Romero, 2008b). Attacks like these can have stern implications for international relations. As a result, anti-terrorist actions can spiral into dangerous instability, and ultimately even to interstate or intrastate war (Romero, 2008a; Mander and Moloney, 2008; Cockburn, 2008). 21 In some cases it can be debatable whether a certain political development is actually a consequence of terrorism, or that terrorism merely functions as an excuse. For example, US President George Bush tried to link the American invasion of Iraq to the 9/11 attacks, while there is evidence that plans for the invasion already existed before 9/11, and that the terrorist attacks were used as an excuse for the invasion. See for example Woodward, 2004. On the other hand, it can be argued that if this is the case, the fact that terrorist attacks convince people to support an invasion, is a political consequence of terrorism as well. 89 Although it has happened outside of Europe (for example in Israel, after the war against Hezbollah in 2006, see Macintyre, 2007a; Macintyre, 2007b), it is debatable whether terrorist attacks could directly result in large-scale military reactions by countries in Europe. Thus far, Islamist inspired attacks in London, Madrid, or Amsterdam have not led to military repercussions abroad. In addition, although IRA attacks in England have led to military and non-military measures by the British in Northern Ireland, the British army was for the most part thought to handle the situation with relative care and restraint, especially in the later stages of the conflict (see for instance Wilkinson, 2006: 70-71, 93-95). At the same time, however, military mistakes have led to international reactions. “Bloody Sunday” for instance, in which 13 Irish civilians were killed by the Brits, as well as the British policy of internment without trial and other measures, led to heavy international criticism (BBC, 2002). Even when a war is carried out with restraint, incidents can lead to implications for international relations. Turkish accession to the European Union could mean that the conflict between the Kurds and the Turks is brought into Europe. In that sense, the argument of international relations being affected by counterterrorist activities may become even more salient for European countries in the near future. While current international relations of most European countries are unlikely to be directly affected by present counterterrorism policies, there are other possible forms of political instability that are more applicable. For instance, social tensions can easily arise after terrorist attacks, and perhaps spiral a country into unrest and instability. In the Netherlands, for example, after Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh was assassinated, Islamic schools and mosques were set on fire, leading to a tense climate in the country (New York Times, 2004; Huband, 2004; Traynor, 2004). Although tensions subsided after a relatively short time, it is not unlikely that if another terrorist attack had happened, that the tensions would have worsened. This Dutch case in point is just one of many in Europe, for the large Muslim minorities residing in countries across the continent are at risk in experiencing xenophobia after terrorist attacks, despite repudiating terrorism and terrorist ideologies. As such, terrorism could lead to permanent structural divisions within societies. Finally, political consequences of terrorism can impact decision-making beyond military action. For instance, law makers may decide to implement legislation meant to reduce the risk of terrorism that may infringe on essential 90 liberties such as freedom of speech and press, or the right to privacy. (These aspects are discussed in greater detail in other portions of TTSRL including deliverables 6 and 12). The intention here is not to pass judgment on such legislation or to say what should or should not be done. Rather the aim is to clearly articulate the fact that any society that has to deal with terrorism faces certain political choices. These include trade-offs between security and certain personal rights that often have been considered to be a fundamental part of a particular society. Despite the eventual outcome of the decision, the reality remains that political consequences of terrorism are present. It is interesting to note that indirect consequences can profoundly differ between states, or even between events. State reaction to similar attacks will vary as it is often affected by factors unique to that country, including for example the type of political culture or government (e.g. dictatorship or liberal democracy), the region (e.g. Middle East, Africa, or Europe), or the history (e.g. a country that has been targeted by terrorists often as opposed to a country that has not witnessed the phenomenon before). These different reactions may lead to different indirect consequences as well. In sum, there are a number of direct consequences of conventional terrorism that are important to consider, but that do not pose an existential threat to a state. At the same time, some indirect consequences, mainly of political nature or overtones, are more likely to do severe damage, cause profound changes, and in some cases, pose an actual strategic threat to a country. Having discussed the consequences of conventional terrorism, it behooves us to also briefly consider the impact of CBRN terrorism. Unlike conventional terrorism which has been shown to have a relatively low magnitude on the human toll, the consequences of CBRN terrorism – terrorism using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons – can be much greater. Although CBRN terrorism has generally not been very successful thus far, examples of the potential repercussions are widely available. The most obvious historical manifestations of such use of weapons are the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki which took the lives of tens of thousands and injured many 91 others.22 Considering the fact that significant improvements of nuclear weapons have been made over the years, as well as the ease with which a nuclear bomb can be constructed today, a terrorist attack carried out with such weaponry would undoubtedly yield profound destruction (see for example Freedberg, 2005). The 1984 disaster in Bhopal, India sheds additional light on the consequences of a chemical leak in a Union Carbide pesticide factory where thousands of people were killed in their sleep and many others died from longer term impact. Although the source of the leak is uncertain, Union Carbide claims that a disgruntled employee deliberately caused the disaster. However, since the attack was not found to have political motivations, it cannot be considered a terrorist act. On the other hand, this example confirms that a terrorist attack perpetrated with similar intentions might have comparable consequences. Biological weapons are also a concern when it comes to terrorism. Historically, biological diseases have been successfully used as weapons despite their crude dispersal devices. A grim example of this is bubonic plague – or Black Death as it was known – which swept across Europe in the 14th century. The origins of this disaster have been traced back to the use of plague-infested corpses by Tatar- Mongols to infect the population of cities, killing many inhabitants and setting into motion a chain reaction where survivors continued to spread the disease causing an extermination of nearly a quarter of the European population. Several centuries later, American traders in Pennsylvania gave Indians blankets exposed to the smallpox virus, thereby decimating the tribe (Schmid, 2000: 110-111). Although modern medicine will reduce the number of casualties, diseases still have the potential for mass casualties. Smallpox, for example, has been eradicated in the 1970s, however, the virus is still present in laboratories and many among the younger generations have not been inoculated. As such, a new outbreak in Europe and elsewhere could be disastrous, especially when the authorities are not prepared (Schmid, 2000: 111). Of the CBRN weapons, an attack with the radiological variant is deemed to be the least lethal. In such an event, radioactive material is dispersed using explosives, this is also known as a “dirty bomb”. A successful attack of this sort would kill 22 It is hard to find the exact numbers. The Avalon Project at Yale estimates that the total number of fatalities topped 100,000, with the number of injuries just below that. See: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/abomb/mp10.htm 92 people by the conventional blast and continue to affect survivors by irradiating them. As P. Andrew Karam notes “[i]n spite of the fact that any radiological attack is unlikely to lead to mass radiological casualties (indeed, there may be no radiological casualties at all), radiation safety measures and radiological regulations are likely to complicate our efforts” (2005: 520). However, an attack on a nuclear installation that would lead to leakage of radiation – also considered a radiological attack – would have significant effects that could be much deadlier and more widespread than a dirty bomb. The psychological effects of CBRN terrorism could be similar to those described following an attack of conventional terrorism. As M. Granger Morgan describes, fear among the population can result in greater demands for government action against “uncontrollable” or “unobservable” events (1993: 41). While it can easily be argued that the consequences of CBRN terrorism are potentially disastrous, the extent to which terrorists are capable or willing to use these weapons remains uncertain. As such, the following sections will present an analysis of the capabilities and intentions of both conventional and CBRN terrorism with the aim of assessing the risks posed by terrorist groups involved in this type of violence. 2.3 Capabilities of Terrorist Organizations Conventional terrorism is far from rocket science considering the fact that the 9/11 attacks were carried out with box cutters. Similarly, the London and Madrid attacks were perpetrated with backpacks full of explosives, while Theo van Gogh was murdered with a knife and handgun. Terrorist attacks in the Middle East are usually committed using easily constructed contraptions such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide belts, as well as unsophisticated rockets such as the Qassam or the Katyusha. In short, terrorism can be carried out with very little expertise using information that can easily be downloaded from the internet and constructed with cheap, common materials. As such, in most cases, terrorists in Europe will match the technical requirements to convincingly and effectively use terrorism as a tactic. Furthermore, organizational and communication skills are an important component of the capabilities and will be discussed in greater detail throughout the following sections. 93 Naturally, the more capable an organization, the more options it has at its disposal. For example Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Al-Qaida,23 as well as some affiliated jihadist organizations, have been widely credited for their highly developed organizational skills. Although the weapons used for the 9/11, London, or Madrid attacks were not exceptionally sophisticated, the timing of the operations demanded significant effort, coordination and preparation. It is believed that some of the terrorists who carried out the attacks had been preparing to do so for years. The Dutch intelligence agency AIVD notes in its annual report that “transnational networks continue to play a role, but have formed in 2006 through decentralisation and disintegration less of an organised global threat than in the past.” (AIVD, 2007: 25). This would be mostly due to the efforts to attack the capabilities of the organizations in Afghanistan. Still, as the German intelligence agency notes: “As a result, however, these networks have increasingly decentralised their structures, and the [intelligence agencies] now face new challenges.” (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 2005: 188). In other words, the threat has not necessarily subsided, it has simply changed. After all, even after its safe haven in Afghanistan under the Taliban was lost, Al-Qaida and the groups it inspired still have the capabilities to do much harm to their enemies, as can be seen throughout the world, where (attempted) attacks continue to occur. An interesting aspect of terrorist capabilities is now formed by the internet. While an in-depth discussion of the internet is beyond the scope of this report it is important to at least marginally mention it here. A more thorough discussion on how terrorists use the internet can be found elsewhere in this project (see for example Deliverable 6 and 7). Internet forums, chat rooms and cyber communities like Facebook provide opportunities for sustaining a movement that was unfathomable in years past. More people are able to disseminate more information than ever before with ease and relative anonymity. This has opened up a world of opportunities and possibilities to radicalizing individuals seeking direction. A latent recruit or radicalizing candidate in Europe can be tapped 23 The term “al-Qaida” (or, depending on transliteration “al-Qaeda”) can be used in several ways. The first way is to describe it as an organization, currently led by Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. This is the view used, for example, by Rohan Gunaratna. See among others: Gunaratna, 2004: 91-100. The second way is to describe it as a loosely linked network of cells, groups, and individuals, or even as an ideology more than an organization, like Jason Burke. See for instance: Burke, 2004: 8- 26. Burke even coins the term “Al Qaedism” to describe the ideology. For clarity, here the term will 94 effortlessly by someone sitting behind a computer in Pakistan in virtually real time. This means an increase in potential for more people joining terrorist organizations, and thus, more options to carry out attacks. Additionally, it is much easier than ever before to obtain and proliferate manuals for building or using weapons. This in turn provides more opportunities for terrorists to access and implement these tools (see for instance Cronin, 2006: 77-87). The influential scholar Joseph Nye notes that “[i]n 1900 and 1970, it was possible to have instantaneous global communications, but the capability was restricted to large organizations with large budgets: governments, multinational corporations or the Catholic church. Today, that capability is available to anyone in internet cafes, in cities throughout the world. The west sees itself as leader of the information revolution, but the democratization of technology enables terrorists to close the gap. Insurgents in Iraq are using improvised explosive devices they learnt to build via the internet. They have delivered more precision munitions on their targets than the American military has on them.” (Nye, 2005). In short, the internet has increased the ease with which terrorists can disseminate information and ideas, providing them with additional capabilities and thereby increasing the risk posed by the organizations. Reducing terrorist capabilities could therefore include “cyber” actions to disrupt internet use. An important factor in the terrorist capabilities is the vulnerability of the target. For example, it is much easier for a terrorist to attack public transportation or a shopping mall than to attack the headquarters of an intelligence agency, or a nuclear plant. The latter are much better protected, and thus, less vulnerable. A terrorist organization that has aspirations to attack one of the more protected targets would need much higher capabilities than one with a desire to attack the less protected targets. Steps have been taken in European countries to reduce the vulnerability of targets. The European Commission, for example, has drafted several documents that outline how critical infrastructure can be protected against terrorism (see for instance European Commission, 2004a). With this in mind, it is worth mentioning that protecting vulnerable targets is rather difficult in democratic societies due to possible infringement on personal rights and freedoms. As such, a delicate be used in the first sense: “al-Qaida” describes the actual organization. For the second sense of the meaning terms like “Jihadists” will be used. 95 balance must be attained between security on the one hand and respecting personal rights to privacy, freedom of speech and press on the other. Unlike the readily available weapons used to carry out conventional terrorist attacks, the capabilities required to accomplish a CBRN terrorist campaign are much more advanced. Numerous opportunities with the potential to create enormous destruction and disruption are accessible to terrorist organizations with such aspirations. For instance, manufacturing a nuclear device to disperse a chemical agent, disease or radiation, obtaining an already functioning device through theft or purchase or even attacking a factory, are all options that terrorist organizations have at their disposal. In order to better understand the potential threat and assess the risk of such an occurrence, we take a revealing look at past attempts of terrorist organizations that have tried to develop and use CBRN weapons. On March 20, 1995 a Japanese apocalyptic cult known as Aum Shinrikyo carried out a deadly attack in Tokyo’s busy metro by puncturing holes in packages filled with the nerve gas sarin. Twelve people died following the incident and thousands more were injured (Falkenrath, 1998:48). According to research reports, Aum had vast financial assets, worth up to a billion U.S. dollars (Kristof, 1999), and had recruited several high-ranking biologists, chemists and nuclear scientists to assist them with their plan. In addition, the group attempted to purchase heavy weaponry – such as air fighters, tanks, rocket launchers, and according to some reports, a nuclear bomb. While a nuclear bomb was out of reach, Aum did manage to obtain a military helicopter further strengthening their capabilities. Several researchers have pointed out that if Aum’s plan to acquire a nuclear device failed, the group would seek to mine uranium on a large estate in Australia and ship it to Japan for enrichment and subsequent manufacture of a nuclear bomb (Hoffman, 2006: 119-127; Tucker, 2001: 207-226). While these plans were unsuccessful prior to the eventual downfall of the cult, Aum did succeed in developing several chemical and biological agents – such as VX, anthrax, Q-fever and sarin, which was used in the 1995 attack. In addition to the metro attack, the group managed to carry out several other terrorist acts, albeit to a lesser extent vis-à-vis casualties. It is constructive, however, to consider the inability of Aum to effectively use the CBRN weapons despite the organization’s financial and technical 96 capabilities to do so. Furthermore, the theoretical expertise available to Aum, as well as the material capabilities to produce CBRN weapons, did not result in generating a massive attack with large scale destruction. Other organizations that have previously attempted to use CBRN weapons include Al-Qaida’s determination to develop chemical weapons. Experiments with chemicals on dogs shown in several videos have been corroborated by prisoners (Borger, 2002), yet do not confirm the group’s capabilities of actually manufacturing and dispersing such weapons. Questions continue to linger as to what kind of chemicals were used in the video experiments and whether or not these chemical agents were actually produced by Al-Qaida. As such, the video evidence is not enough to decisively conclude that Al-Qaida’s capabilities to develop a chemical device are authentic. In general, scholars agree that while certain deadly chemical warfare agents can be developed in kitchens or basements in quantities sufficient for mass-casualty attacks (Falkenrath et al., 2001: 98), it is fairly difficult for nonstate actors to effectively use CBRN weapons for terrorism. High level capabilities and adequate assets are required to secure a CBRN device, smuggle it across international borders without detection and actually succeed in detonating it. As previously discussed, even an organization like Aum Shinrikyo that, incidentally, had significant support from non-government actors in Russia, considerable financial assets and highly skilled technicians, was not able to secure a “loose nuke” following the fall of the Soviet Union (early 1990s) when security measures were not as strict as they are today. Finally, addressing the vulnerability of European states to CBRN terrorism, it is important to note that the exposure is lower than with regard to conventional terrorism. Again, this is because CBRN weapons are much more difficult to acquire and implement during a terrorist attack. As Bruce Hoffman poignantly notes: “as mesmerizingly attractive as these nonconventional weapons are to some terrorists, they have historically proved frustratingly disappointing to whoever has tried to use them” (2006: 276). The difference between capabilities of terrorist organization thus lies not only in the types of weapons used, but also in the general aims of terrorist organizations. While conventional terrorism does not require extensive resources for a successful attack, greater capabilities are required to carry out CBRN terrorism. Additionally, organizations that maintain adequate capabilities in terms 97 of communication and management networks, manpower or weaponry have the potential to carry out more complicated attacks with greater consequences than those who do not possess such resources. 2.4 Intentions of Terrorists Over the past decades many groups have demonstrated their willingness to use terrorism to achieve certain political objectives. Previously, the often reverberated statement coined by Brian Jenkins seemed applicable: “terrorists want many witnesses, not many dead” (1995: 44-47).24 Jenkins was, of course, referring to the fact that the fear terrorists instill in the public would lead to political change. Such intentions were displayed by terrorists’ capturing of hostages, as was the case during the Munich Olympics or in the Netherlands, where in the 1970s Moluccan terrorists took control of a train, school, and the Indonesian consulate. As of late however, this attitude seems to have changed. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, London, Bali, Madrid, and several other attempted strikes confirmed that the intentions of terrorist organizations can sometimes entail mass casualties with many witnesses and subsequent inculcation of fear among the population. This change in intention can, at least in part, be explained by the continuingly changing milieu of terrorism. As previously mentioned Rapoport’s theory of waves of terrorism combined with the research of a number of scholars in the field reveal that currently the religious wave seems to dominate the environment and thus has several implications for researchers and policymakers alike (Rapoport, 2004: 46-73). Suicide terrorism, for example, significantly alters the motivations of terrorists to not only use indiscriminate violence but also establish a trend for others to follow. In effect, it can be supposed that the intentions reach beyond the typically ascribed political objectives and into the realm of instilling fear while establishing fertile grounds for other groups to copycat such actions. In addition to scholarly research, terrorists themselves have shed light on their destructive intentions. Ayman al-Zawahiri, for example, openly threatened 24 Jenkins coined the concept of terrorist acts as “theater” in the 1970s, and repeated this exact statement in 1995. 98 the West on a number of occasions, asserting that “What you have seen in New York, Washington and Afghanistan, are only the initial losses”, “horror to make you forget the horrors you saw in Vietnam”, and “if you don't withdraw today you will inevitably withdraw tomorrow, but only after scores of thousands of fatalities and double that number of wounded" (Hughes, 2005). Al-Qaida has also specifically addressed Europe with regard to their intentions, particularly after the re-publication of the Danish cartoons starring the prophet Mohammed. In fact Bin Laden compared the reprinting with the bombing of “modest villages that collapsed over our women (and) children” and then stated that the publication of the cartoons “is the bigger catastrophe and the more dangerous one and for which the punishment is graver” (Spiegel Online, 2008). Increasing attention to mass media and its affect on opinion formation has led to development and use of sophisticated media strategies by terrorist organizations to explicitly express their intentions. There is nothing fundamentally new about this concept, since emphasis on propaganda has been a major driving force with many terrorist groups as a way to advertise their existence and justify their cause. However, when threats are combined with actual (or attempted) attacks, it is important to at least consider the possibility of the intended action. As such, for organizations like Al-Qaida, or other jihadist groups who have openly expressed their desire for destruction in the West, it can certainly be supposed that they have at least the intention to do so. While it is clearly difficult to tangibly assess intentions of terrorist groups or individuals, surveying the current landscape of terrorism trends allows us to draw conclusions from past activities. As has already been mentioned, the tendency to cause mass destruction is one of the trademarks of modern terrorism. In addition to conventional weapons and means such as suicide bombings, there is a growing concern regarding terrorists’ intentions to utilize CBRN weapons to sustain their campaigns. Although this report has already illustrated that CBRN terrorism requires tremendous resources and capabilities that have thus far been an obstacle to most terrorist groups, it is worth briefly exploring the extent to which such groups are actually willing to use CBRN weapons should the opportunity arise. Currently, the main suspects for CBRN terrorism are jihadist organizations, including Al-Qaida and its affiliates. Al Qaida’s activities, as well as the expressed interest of their top leadership, seem to indicate that the group has intentions to 99 develop and use CBRN weaponry. Furthermore, documents with blueprints for CBRN devices have been found in previous raids and Al-Qaida agents have allegedly attempted to purchase uranium from South Africa for development of such devices. Furthermore, like Aum Shinrikyo, Al-Qaida has reportedly recruited scientists and engineers capable of assisting the group in their endeavors. Several plots have been uncovered where use of CBRN weapons was a prominent possibility. Rob de Wijk and Carla Relk researched 48 successful and unsuccessful attacks perpetrated by Islamist organizations in the European Union between the end of 1994 and September 2006. Their findings revealed that over 20 percent of the plots involved plans to use CBRN weapons, including sarin gas against the European Parliament in Strasbourg, poisoning drinking water in Rome and use of a biological toxin (de Wijk and Relk, 2006: 20-26,64). These failed plots provide insight into the intentions of terrorist organizations, especially as it concerns the real threat they pose to the West and particularly to Europe. Apart from destruction – or perhaps through use of it – intentions of terrorist organizations include an affect on the normal political process; for without a political objective, an organization cannot be labeled terrorist. In most cases, the organization is garishly open about its political aims, for example for the West to retreat from the Middle East and to stop supporting the regimes of Arab states. Therefore, it is always important to keep the political goal in mind, since governments’ reactions to terrorism are liable to play into the hands of terrorist groups, thereby inevitably furthering those political aims. A good example is the US invasion of Iraq,25 which has not led to a reduction of Al- Qaida’s potential, but rather to new options for worldwide recruitment by the organization, and to the spawning of new jihadists. In Europe, the decision in 2004 by the new Spanish government, elected just after the Madrid attacks, to withdraw from Iraq, may also fall into this category. Assessing the intent of terrorist groups to carry out destructive terrorist attacks revealed a number of trends that should be considered when evaluating risk. It has been illustrated that terrorist organizations exhibit clear and 25 It is of course subject to debate whether this attack can actually be called a consequence of terrorism, but nevertheless it can function as an example here, since even if 9/11 did not play a direct role in the invasion of Iraq, it was definitely used as a pretext, as can be seen, for instance, in Powell’s speech at the United Nations: “Full text of Colin Powell’s speech, US secretary’s address to the United Nations security council,” The Guardian (online), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa (especially part two, where Powell mentioned among others the “nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network”. 100 concerted aspirations to continue using destructive means to achieve certain stated objectives. The intent and desire for large-scale violence and destruction indicate a trend where mass casualties, media attention and the willingness to use CBRN weapons is growing. Combined with a tendency of certain terrorist groups to evoke religion as a factor, the threat of transnational terrorism both inside and outside Europe remains relatively high. This said, how can we further examine whether trend changes in terrorism have led to changes in the risk that terrorist organizations pose to society? 3. Risk and Trends: Where To Go From Here? Previous sections discussed trends in terrorism and the rise of the fourth wave commonly associated with religious terrorism. The threat terrorist groups pose to European and global security has also been explored in terms of consequences, capabilities and intentions of terrorist groups. Building on an earlier mentioned framework developed by Kim Cragin and Sara Daly in their study of the dynamic terrorist threat, the following sections further explain the notion that trends and risk are interlinked concepts. Particularly, that changes in trends can lead to changes in the risk posed by terrorism. Referencing back to the model presented in chapter two, risk is viewed as the combination of all three dimensions comprising the model: intentions, capabilities and consequences. An important caveat to keep in mind is that forecasting social and political consequences of terrorism is not an exact science. This means that a numeric value cannot be assigned to represent the intensity of a particular consequence. Rather a range of “high” to “low” is used to indicate the relevance of consequences to the overall risk posed by a terrorist group. In their study, Cragin and Daly assess how terrorists adapt and change based on an analysis of intent and capabilities. Generating a framework that allows researchers and policymakers to place parameters around the threat of terrorism without compromising its dynamic nature, the authors provide a platform for considering the relationship between trends and risk (2004: 86). Mapping the threat of terrorist organizations in a simple diagram, Cragin and Daly argue that terrorist groups are not static entities but rather ever-adapting 101 organizations (2004: 22). Combining an assessment of the intentions of various terrorist groups with their capabilities, the authors illustrate this concept in a two dimensional matrix. This allows them to plot the existing threats of terrorist groups, as well as the perceived changes in their motivations and capabilities. Considering the original purpose and possible limitations of Cragin and Daly’s matrix, our model adds a third dimension to account for the variable relationship between trends and risk of terrorist groups. Subsequently, the fluid complexity of terrorist organizations’ movement is illustrated within the parameters of the three dimensional space. As previously mentioned, terrorist groups are not stagnant. They grow, fade and otherwise respond to the shifts in their internal and external environment; be they political responses to terrorist acts on the part of governments, social changes driven by public perception, structural changes within the group or the overall economic and security situation. Addressing the trends established in previous chapters along with the threat organizations pose to European societies, we examine the movement of three terrorist groups: Al- Qaida, ETA, and FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). Referencing the thresholds established by Cragin and Daly which we have shaped to fit the European trajectory, these groups were chosen as examples to illustrate of the dynamic changes within the context of the framework. The tables below set out the measurements and variables used to determine both the initial positioning of the terrorist organizations (see figure 5) and the subsequent movement of the groups within the model (see figure 6). Indicators of Terrorist Groups’ Intentions Thresholds of Anti-European Sentiment Value Anti-European rhetoric and/or a stated goal of destabilizing important partners of Europe 1 Association with another terrorist group that seeks to target European citizens and institutions 2 Explicitly anti-Western ideology and/or a history of significant attacks on important partners of Europe 3 Targeting European citizens and/or property to pursue a local agenda 4 Specifically focusing attacks on European targets 5 102 Indicators of Terrorist Groups’ Capabilities Thresholds of Demonstrated and Perceived Attack Skills Value Kill or injure 50 or more people in a single attack 1 Intentionally target unguarded foreign nationals 2 Kill or injure 150 or more people in a single attack 3 Strike at guarded targets 4 Successfully coordinate multiple attacks 5 It is important to highlight once again that when considering consequences, emphasis is placed not just on the casualties or human loss of life that result from terrorist attacks. Rather, the broader context of consequences is presented as reflecting political, social and economic implications, which are of course more difficult to quantify but nonetheless essential in examining the relationship between trends and risk. As such, the model is not meant as a tool for predicting changes, but rather as a way to conceptualize the dimensions involved in contemplating the connection between risk and trends. As illustrated by figure 5, plotting the position of terrorist organizations in the model depends on a combination of indicators and reflects their movement potential based on the changing risk. According to this model, groups that demonstrate hostile intentions toward Europe and maintain high capability to carry out sophisticated attacks are placed in the upper right corner, and depending on the extent of consequences (political, social or otherwise) associated with an attack, the organization would shift either to the front (high point) or back (low point) within the model. In other words, terrorist organizations can move not only along the x- and y-axes in a two dimensional plane, but that movement is possible along three dimensions. For example, despite the fact that ETA as a terrorist organization has been concerned primarily with the Spanish Basque region, taking into account their intentions, conclusions can be drawn that they pose a high threat to Europe as a whole. Based on the information contained in the tables above and what is known about the aims of ETA, we have assigned the organization a numerical value of “1” on the capabilities indicator and a “4” on the intentions indicator (see figure 5 for initial position of group). This is because while targeting EU 103 citizens may be a result of ETA’s terrorist actions, the group seems to pursue a more local agenda. The positioning Colombia’s militant group FARC has also been determined by considering the risk it poses to European societies. FARC has been labeled terrorist by both the U.S. and Europe, and while it has not posed a significant threat to Europe in years past, recent news reports have revealed links with recognized European terrorist groups including ETA and the IRA. In June of this year, Spanish investigators began probing possible financial links between ETA and FARC. The investigation gained momentum when incriminating evidence of the two groups’ connection was found on a seized laptop computer of former FARC number-two, Raul Reyes (AFP, June 2, 2008). Reyes was killed during a clash with Colombian forces. According to Spanish prosecutors, FARC sought to re-establish contacts with ETA in order to stage attacks against Colombian politicians or personalities visiting or residing in Madrid (Colombia Reports, June 3, 2008). Colombian officers have described FARC as “a sponge, absorbing international terrorism” and that the group “has sufficient money and drugs to pay for the most sophisticated armaments, training, and most hi-tech communications” (The Independent, August 20, 2001). FARC does seem to possess vast amounts of money through drug trafficking which could potentially be used to carry out terrorist attacks outside Colombian borders. FARC’s capabilities notwithstanding, we could not conclude that the group maintains high intentions beyond attacking their own nationals. Furthermore, it can be assessed that the group’s intentions for acts of terrorism remain low due to a shift within the organization’s own structure. Reports indicate that FARC has been progressively moving away from a terrorist group and more into a criminal organization. Positioning FARC within the model (figure 5) was thus based on the following variables: a numeric value of “2” on the intentions indicator and a “4” on the capabilities. Unlike FARC who has never explicitly targeted Europe, Al-Qaida is considered among the most dangerous transnational terrorist organizations that has openly expressed interest in attacking European targets. According to the EU counter-terrorism coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, Al-Qaida and its affiliates continue to be among the most serious terrorism threats to Europe. Splinter cells have been tracked down in a number of European countries and particularly in 104 Belgium. Additionally, on the fifth anniversary of 9/11, Ayman al-Zawahiri appeared in a video urging to punish France as a leading target for Islamist militants. In fact, European converts to radical Islam have helped elevate the threat level due to their involvement in planning deadly terrorist plots on European soil. Last September’s foiled attack in Germany is just one example of Al-Qaida’s broader objectives. UK-based The Guardian reports that “senior Islamic militant leaders based in Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan have decided to step up attacks in Europe” (The Guardian, September 9, 2007). In targeting Europe, Al-Qaida hopes that a successful attack on a European country that has troops deployed in Afghanistan may force governments to pull them out from the fight against the Taliban. Such aspirations and general analysis of the organization’s intentions and capabilities indicate that the risk Al-Qaida poses to Europe is considerably high. Plotting their position in our model reveals that the numeric value of “5” is appropriate on both the intentions and capabilities indicators. Intentions High Capabilities Consequences Low High Low ETA AAQQ FARC Figure 5: Position of Terrorist Groups Given the above analysis, it can be determined that the convergence of risk and trends in terrorism is most prominent when threats are examined alongside consequences. As previously mentioned, the characteristics of risk are 105 assessed using three variables: intentions, capabilities and consequences. Taken together these variables determine the risk of terrorism. The changes in risk are further assessed in relation to the current trends within terrorism’s milieu, namely the use of suicide terrorism as an evolving tactic. In the study we have shown that suicide terrorism is four times as lethal a other terrorism, thus the consequences following the use of suicide attacks are more severe. This can be clearly observed from figure 6 which illustrates the affect of trends on the risk posed by a particular group. According to this model, the extent of consequences (political, social or otherwise) associated with a terrorist attack serve as the triggers for shifts of a group from the high point (front of model) to a low point (back of model). This is meant to demonstrate that terrorist organizations can trek not only along the x- and y-axes in a two dimensional plane, but that movement is possible along three dimensions. Consequences Figure 6 : Dynamic Movement of Terrorist Groups Intentions Capabilities Low High High Low AQ ETA FARC Where religion and suicide terrorism are clearly rising trends, terrorist organizations that fit this profile pose a higher risk to European societies than do others whose threat to consequences ratio is lower. In the diagram the 106 movement of the abovementioned groups is revealed with shadows and arrows, indicating their potential progression along the axes. For example, since ETA has not demonstrated a strong desire to use suicide tactics, it scores fairly low on the consequences dimension, thus lowering the risk posed to European societies as a result of their activities. This is illustrated by moving the group toward the back of the 3D model. In a similar vein, FARC is observed to be moving toward the back of the model indicating that the risk they pose to Europe tapers off in the mid- to low tendency. Al-Qaida’s positioning, on the other hand, is clearly shown to be moving toward the front of the model indicating a high risk. This is of course due to the fact that the group continues to rely on extensive use of suicide terrorism thus posing a substantial risk to Europe. 107 PART C. 1. CASE STUDIES 1.1 Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups The first type of terrorism discussed in this deliverable are Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups “that seek international recognition and political selfdetermination. They are motivated by nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion.” (Europol 2008: A logical condition for such a situation is the existence of a separate identity, that can be based on religion, language, ethnicity or a combination of those. If such a group feels suppressed by a state which is dominated by a different ethnic or religious group, a clear motivation for terrorist activities might emerge. The most conspicuous examples of such an emergence in Europe are provided by the IRA in Northern Ireland and the ETA in Spain and (to a lesser extent) in France. Whereas the nationalism of the former roots in a religious (Roman-Catholic) identity, the latter emphasizes the uniqueness of the Basque language and culture. Both organizations have sought to gain independence from a dominating state, which were the United Kingdom and Spain and France, respectively. Although the nationalist nature of ethno-separatist groups is obvious, we should still keep in mind that some organizations have found inspiration in Marxism as well. For example, the socialist promise of a world without oppression, combined with the support that many communist states and movements expressed with regard to oppressed minorities, strongly appealed to both the IRA and ETA (Burleigh, 2008: 272, 296). Their exact nature may be ambiguous, the fact remains that both aforementioned groups so far formed the most aggressive and deadly terrorist organizations on European soil. It is therefore that exactly these groups will be discussed below, although they were not the only ethno-separatist groups in Europe. Another example is provided by several Corsican terrorist groups, such 108 as the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica. However, in order to maintain conciseness, only the IRA and the ETA will be discussed below. IRA IRA Fact sheet Name: Irish Republican Army (IRA) Alternative Names: Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA, Provos), Óglaigh na hÉireann Directly Liaised Organizations: Sinn Féin Cause: A Unified Irish Republic Members: 1970s: 1,500 (peak); 1994: 500 (cease fire); currently, after decommissioning: unknown.26 Operative Since: 1919 (IRA), 1969 (PIRA, now generally called IRA) Operative Until: 2005: Decommissioning of weapons complete. (1998: Good Friday Agreement.) Split off Organizations: Old IRA (1969), Continuity IRA (1986), Real IRA (1997) Areas of Operation: Ireland, Northern Ireland, United Kingdom, some international operations History of the IRA The IRA (Irish Republican Army) finds its roots in several organizations, most importantly the paramilitary group Irish Volunteers,27 created just before World War I, and a much older secret revolutionary society, the Irish Republican 26 Estimate. Source: CAIN database, 2008A. 109 Brotherhood, founded in the 1860s. Those organizations proclaimed the Irish Republic in 1916 in an act of insurrection against the British rule (Augusteijn, 1994: IX-X). When analyzing the theoretical notions on the rise and decline of terrorism in deliverable 5a, the repression by foreign occupation or colonial powers is named as one of the factors contributing to domestic terrorism. Of course, The UK did not perceive its sovereignty over Ireland as an occupation, but it was felt this way by a share of the Irish population. Therefore, it can be said that this factor was indeed a root cause for the violent struggle in Northern Ireland. The term Irish Republican Army (Óglaigh na hÉireann) appeared for the first time to denote the Irish Volunteers as a legitimate armed forces of the separatist parliament of the Irish Republic, the Dáil (Augusteijn, 1994: x).28 Under this name it took part in the guerilla conflict known as the War of Independence (1919-1921). The crucial moment in the Army’s history is 1922 when the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed granting Ireland partial independence and confirming the partition of the island into the Catholic South and Protestant North (Moloney, 2002: 37). Part of the republicans started a civil war refusing to accept this solution and turning their weapons against the government of the newly emerged Irish Free State (English, 2003: 4).29 It was at that moment that several root causes, discerned in deliverable 5a, converged to form the precondition for violence and the emergence of what some would call domestic terrorism. Historical antecedents of political violence, a root cause of domestic terrorism, were present and many still experienced the situation as a repression by a foreign power. On top of that, a third root cause that is also named earlier in deliverable 5a could be perceived at this time: experience of discrimination based on ethnic or religious origins. From this moment, the partition of Northern Ireland would be based increasingly on religious differences. Polarization occurred along the lines of Protestantism and Catholicism. 27 The Volunteers and several other militia organizations were formed after the failure of the constitutional means of obtaining Ireland’s autonomy and as a reaction to a similar growth of paramilitary organizations in the Protestant North. 28 The Dáil consisted of the Irish MPs which after the 1918 elections refused to take their seats in Westminster. The legitimacy of the IRA is stated clearly e.g. in August 1918 statement: ‘The Irish Volunteers are the Army of the Irish Republic’. (Coogan, 1995: 24) 29 In March 1922 the convention of the anti-Treaty commanders issued in a statement: ‘The Army should be known as the Irish Republican Army.’ Its aim was to protect the independence of the 110 In the period between the late 1920s and the late 1960s the IRA remained an active, yet gradually marginalized phenomenon both in the Republic and in the North (English, 2003: 42-78). However, in the late 1960s attacks of the Unionist paramilitary groups (ignored or even supported by police forces) against the Catholic areas in Northern Ireland (NI) brought the province on the verge of civil war (Moloney, 2002: 63-73). In these circumstances a part of the Northern Command of the IRA (and some members of the Southern Command) formed the Provisional IRA in December 1969 (English, 2003: 81). The primary aim was to provide protection for the Catholic minority in NI and – taking advantage of the new wave of violence – to re-introduce the issue of a united Ireland (English, 2003: 82-83). Here, concrete grievances among a subgroup of a larger population and revenge actions acted as trigger causes for the violence. It is this splinter group which shortly afterwards evolved into one of the most powerful and enduring terrorist organizations of Western Europe. The Provisional IRA came to be identified with the name IRA without further specifications – contrary to the “official” Army, referred to as the Old IRA (OIRA).30 The relatively long lifespan of the Provisional IRA (1969 to the present) can be divided into several periods. In the first years the organization – poorly armed and small in numbers – rose to the position of the major paramilitary power in the Northern Ireland and one of the self-proclaimed defenders of the Catholic minority. In these years the IRA gradually took control over the spontaneous anti-governmental resistance of the Catholics (English, 2003: 132-133), claiming to be responding to the grievances of this subgroup of the population. This motivation for violence is actually named as one of the trigger causes for domestic terrorism in general. From 1971 it emerged as a major player in the Troubles, as the conflict in NI is referred to (Darby, 2003: 3-4). Especially between 1971 and 1975 the conflict can be characterized as a guerilla war with the IRA activities ranging from bombings to open warfare with army forces (English, 2003: 146-147) This period was underlined by the strategy of escalation, which contributed to the suspending of the devolved NI government in 1972 and the introduction of direct rule from London as a response to the critical situation in the province (Coogan, 1995: 351). With the elimination of nogo zones, as well as the tightening of British security policies, the organization Irish Republic – i.e. not the Irish Free State but the non-existent Republic proclaimed in 1916 and consisting of ‘the whole territory of Ireland’. (Coogan, 1995: 30 ; English, 2003: 34). 111 moved towards a less military and more secret character (English, 2003: 161). After 1975 – when the hopes for the expulsion of the British faded – the IRA introduced the doctrine of a long war of attrition aiming at the exhaustion of the British government and society with the conflict (English, 2003: 190). In 1973 the armed campaign was brought for the first time to the mainland Britain, and in the 1980s the IRA attempted several attacks on the British targets around Europe (Germany, The Netherlands, Gibraltar). Since 1981 the organization had adhered to a joint policy of violence and political activities, the so-called bullet and ballot strategy (English, 2003: 245). The second element of the strategy consisted of participation in the NI local elections and were implemented by the IRA’s political wing, Sinn Féin. The gradual evolution of some of the former IRA’s commanders into the Sinn Féin politicians (the most famous being Gerry Adams) influenced the shift in strategy towards the preference for political solutions. A first ceasefire was declared in 1994 as the IRA expressed willingness to enter the political negotiations over NI’s future (Darby, 2003: 6). It was called off a year later when the British demanded disarmament as a precondition of negotiations (Holland, 1999: 262- 274). Nevertheless, a second ceasefire followed in 1997 (English, 2003: 295). Since this ceasefire the IRA limited its activities to occasional retaliatory killings, securing control over own forces, policing the Catholic areas of NI31 and providing financial resources by criminal means. Ironically, the eventual blow to a possibility of return to political violence arose from a particularly bloody attack, the Omagh bombing of 1998, undertaken by the splinter group Real IRA. This attack marked the ‘definite discrediting of violent republicanism’ (Holland, 1999: 295). Additionally, the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks greatly changed the global perception of the justifications for political violence. In 1998 the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement was signed by the British and Irish government, supported by all the NI political parties and ratified in the Republic and NI by a referendum. Among others it aimed at the reconstitution of the NI Assembly, the promotion of the equality of the NI ethnic groups and the cessation of hostilities and disarmament of the paramilitary groups (BBC, 30 Therefore if not stated otherwise the name “IRA” refers hereafter to the Provisional IRA. 31 The IRA attempted to act as a ‘police force’ in the Catholic areas, dealing ‘with robberies, assaults, non-payment of child-support or drug-dealing’ by methods as punishment beatings or knee-capping (Collin, 1992: 57) 112 2008A). Sinn Féin’s engagement in the peace process marks a shift from the prominence of the military solution to the political one (BBC, 2008B). From 1998 the main issue connected with the IRA was disarmament under the auspices of the Independent International Committee on Decommissioning (BBC, 2008B). However, only after 9/11 did the IRA agree to full cooperation with the Committee, with the first act of decommissioning in October 2001 (BBC, 2008C). In July 2005 the IRA declared a definite end to its military activities and shortly afterwards the Committee proclaimed that it believed the decommissioning process was successfully accomplished (BBC, 2008D). Initially, as already mentioned earlier in deliverable 5a, the decline or demise of terrorism can be viewed in terms of the role played by factors external or internal to the terrorist group. In the case of Ireland, a combination of these factors attributed to the demise of the organization. The external factors can be divided in ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ methods. ‘Carrot’ referring to soft line measures – embedding organizations in political frameworks, offering alternatives to violence, negotiations – and ‘stick’ referring to hard line measures like police action, repression or use of the army to resolve matters. In Ireland, the hard line measures did not produce a durable violence-free situation but rather suppressed the organization responsible for the violence. Therefore, the root causes of the conflict were not addressed and violence was able to persist as the means to an end. As Martha Crenshaw puts it: “The assumption that the decline of terrorism is due simply to the physical defeat of extremist organizations is too simple a conclusion of the process. The physical defeat must be preceded by the organization being discredited and losing popular support as well as a loss of internal support” (Crenshaw, 1991: 87). Eventually the combination of demilitarization and the success of a political alternative in the form of Sinn Féin has been crucial. Without electoral success, Sinn Féin would not have been able to persuade the IRA to engage in the decommissioning process. (Smyth, 2004: 554) Furthermore, government concessions to the IRA could be perceived as a sign of weakness and were therefore timed to occur at a moment that state legitimacy was high and ‘the terrorist organization was undergoing a period of introspection’ (Alterman, 1999:1). 113 Databases The two databases used in this research, TWEED (Engene, 2007) and ITERATE (Mickolus, 2003), give some information as to the number of attacks and casualties. TWEED, that has kept track of domestic terrorism in Western Europe, lists a total of 439 attacks, in which 212 people died and another 1,034 were injured. ITERATE, listing transnational terrorism, counted 556 attacks, with 162 deaths and 2,235 people injured. As mentioned in deliverable 5b, there may be some overlap between the attacks. Additionally, the databases may not have inserted all attacks. Other databases have far higher estimates of attacks and casualties, for instance, the CAIN research project at the University of Ulster estimates, that 1,822 people were killed by the IRA.32 There may be several reasons for this difference, one of them being that the CAIN database counts attacks on military targets as well. Over 1,000 of the victims in CAIN are British military personnel, and there are several other groups included that may not be counted by TWEED or ITERATE. In the following table and graphs the number of attacks, deaths, and injured people can be seen per year, for the period from 1969 to 2005, according to the two databases we have used for our statistical data, ITERATE and TWEED. From the data it becomes clear that the main periods of IRA terrorist activity was in the first decade of its existence as PIRA, in the 1970s. Although the organization is still active in the 1980s the numbers of terrorist attacks and casualties drop somewhat, after which the 1990s see an increase again. After the Good Friday Agreement the IRA basically stopped carrying out terrorist attacks, both with a domestic and a transnational character. Number of Attacks Number of Deaths Number of Injured Year TWEED ITERATE TWEED ITERATE TWEED ITERATE 1969 0 0 0 0 0 0 1970 0 1 0 0 0 0 1971 34 1 12 0 191 0 1972 123 3 41 9 343 19 32 See the summary of the data at CAIN database, 2008B. 114 1973 25 84 0 3 91 356 1974 32 43 10 44 80 418 1975 20 29 15 11 7 224 1976 19 31 9 5 0 101 1977 35 18 4 1 0 0 1978 55 20 27 1 39 17 1979 38 28 47 24 30 29 1980 7 12 2 1 7 7 1981 15 10 7 2 46 45 1982 21 4 21 9 86 49 1983 3 4 2 8 0 93 1984 6 2 12 5 42 33 1985 0 13 0 0 0 0 1986 0 1 0 0 0 0 1987 3 5 1 0 62 31 1988 1 9 1 5 9 25 1989 0 16 0 16 0 33 1990 0 17 0 6 0 38 1991 1 86 0 3 1 45 1992 0 38 0 2 0 202 1993 0 30 0 2 0 119 1994 0 13 0 0 0 0 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 1996 0 11 0 4 0 350 1997 0 24 0 1 0 0 1998 0 2 0 0 0 0 1999 0 1 0 0 0 1 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 1 0 1 0 0 0 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 439 556 212 162 1034 2235 115 Number of Attacks by the IRA 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Year 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 Year Attacks Number of Attacks, TWEED Number of Attacks, Iterate Number of Deaths caused by IRA terrorist attacks 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 Year Deaths Number of Deaths TWEED Number of Deaths Iterate 116 Number of injured people caused by IRA terrorist attacks 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 Year Injuries Number of Injured TWEED Number of Injured Iterate 117 ETA ETA Fact Sheet Name: Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) Alternative Names: ETA-V, ETA-M (ETA Militar), Directly Liaised Organizations: Herri Batasuna Cause: Independence for Basque country (North of Spain and South West of France) Members: Approximately 100 active, although this number may be lower due to arrests. Some estimates are as low as 30. Approximately 500 members are in jail in France or Spain(US State Department, 2008 and BBC, 2007). Operative Since: 1959 Operative Until: Present Split off Organizations: ETA-VI, ETA-PM (ETA Politico-Militar, in some cases seen as part of ETA as well) Areas of Operation: Mainly Spain, to a lesser extent France and the rest of Europe. Some attacks overseas. History of the ETA The second ethno-separatist organization to be described in this deliverable is the Basque separatist movement known as the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) which was officially founded in 1959. Originally, the youth groups that merged to form the ETA did not believe in an armed struggle to achieve their goals, the independence of ‘Euskal Herria’.33 However, through violent escalation of several 33 ‘Euskal Herria’ means ‘land of Euskera’ which includes the Spanish provinces of Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa and Nafarroa as well as the French regions of Labort and Sola. 118 (attempted) arrests of leading members of the organization in 196134, the possibility of the use of arms was debated for the first time (Sullivan, 1988: 35- 36). Through several assemblies, the first held in Bayonne in 1962, the ETA manifested itself as politically independent from the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and willing to use armed force to pursue their goals. At the fourth assembly, important ideological and organizational steps were taken and a more violent struggle was approved including direct against action against the Spanish police, military and Civil Guard (Clark, 1984: 40). In June 1968, two ETA members killed a policeman when questioned about a minor traffic infringement. The assassination was unplanned but the fierce repression from the Franco regime resulting in the death of the responsible ETA member when he was discovered by the police met with demonstrations from a growing amount of ETA sympathizers that rallied to the support of the organization (Sullivan, 1999: 35 ; Sullivan, 1988: 71). The ETA committed their first planned act of violence in 1968 when they assassinated the chief of the Brigada Social de la Policía in San Sebastián. The State of Emergency was declared and a wave of arrests and torture followed, resulting in a spiral of resistance and more repression (Clark, 1984: 48-52). When six ETA members were sentenced to death in the famous 1970 Burgos trial for the killing of the police chief in San Sebastian, public outrage forced Franco to commute the death sentences. The ETA named this strategy ‘action-repression-action’. Because the repression from the Franco regime in relation to the ETA activities was disproportional, solidarity for the ETA increased (Visser, 1982: 23). Even though public support for the ETA and their cause had been on the rise since the early 1960s, the organization was internally divided over several issues. At the 1973 sixth assembly the organization split into two factions. The ETA VI, that would lose support, and the ETA-V that retained the support of ETA’s social base and quickly expanded (Sullivan, 1999: 35).35 In 1974, the ETA split yet again resulting in the formation of the ‘ETA Politico-Militar’ (ETA-PM) and the ‘ETA-Militar’ (ETA-M) (Visser, 1982: 45). When General Franco died in 1975, 34 Under the repressive military regime of General Franco, the Basque language was banned, Basque culture was suppressed and intellectuals were imprisoned for their beliefs. This suppression fuelled the conviction to use other than political means to gain independence (BBC, 2007). 35 For a comprehensive description of the rupture within the ETA resulting in ETA-V,ETA-VI and later ETA-Militar and ETA-Politico Militar including background information and various minor splits that also took place, please see: (Sullivan, 1988). 119 the ETA-PM agreed to a truce in exchange for a prisoner-release and formed a political wing called ‘Euskadiko Ezkerra’ (Basque Leftists) which had members elected to parliament (Clark, 1984: 97-98). The ETA-M chose to adhere to their violent struggle for independence, decided to boycott the elections and continue their radical nationalism (Clark, 1984: 93). The years that followed showed the impossibility of uniting the national and social struggles. The ETA-PM and ETA-M had become rivals, the former choosing to participate in the formation of a parliamentary democracy with a Constitution that they initially tried to prevent by urging their supporters to abstain from a referendum, the latter accusing the other of hypocrisy while continuing its armed violent struggle for independence (Sullivan, 1988: 223). The ETA-PM dissolved in 1983, following the formation of a Basque regional parliament and partial autonomy. Despite acknowledging the need for a political wing that resulted in the creation of ‘Herri Batasuna’ (People’s Unity), the ETA-M continued their attacks (Sullivan, 1999: 35). In 1980, its peak year, between 75 and 86 people were murdered by the ETA-M and robberies and kidnappings were carried out on great scale.36 The Spanish government responded to the escalating violence by using covert antiterrorist teams like the ‘Batallón Vasco Español’ (Spanish Basque Battalion or BVE). These paramilitary groups were given extensive powers to operate in the margins of the law and tried to fight the ETA by indiscriminately killing their members and leaders. When its actions proved counter productive, groups like the BVE were disbanded (Reinares, 2000: 130). The Spanish democracy was having great difficulties fighting the ETA terrorism. Aggressive approaches such as the BVE failed to achieve their goals since they rallied public support for the ETA. Moreover, political initiatives to break the deadly vicious circle of violence also met with great skepticism from all parties involved. The army’s dissatisfaction with the government’s inability to defeat terrorism is said to have been one of the leading motives for the coupattempt by Colonel Tejero in 1981 (Sullivan, 1988: 245). Fear for another coup, possibly resulting in the return to a military dictatorship like the one Spain had just experienced under Franco, resulted in the creation of yet another form of 36 Exact number of fatalities are always subject of debate. Some databases do not take into account for example victims of a particular terrorist organization when the action was carried out in a foreign country. Together with other differences in the analysis of attacks, this results in varying victim-estimations. 120 paramilitary anti-terrorist action named ‘Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación’ (Anti Terrorist Liberation Groups or ‘GAL’) (Reinares, 2000: 121-123). In terms of killing ETA members this organization was rather successful,37 but side-effects were also felt. The ETA countered violence with violence. Moderate nationalists were driven into the arms of the ETA and public support for the organization in general rose as a result from the indiscriminate violence used by the GAL commandos. In 1985, several journals in France and Spain linked the GAL-commandos to the Spanish government, making the tactic even more counter-productive. At the same time, the French government declared a willingness to increase cross-border cooperation with Spain to effectively diminish the power base of the ETA in France (Sullivan, 1988: 259-260). Initially, however, the ETA still kidnapped industrialists, increasingly targeted policemen and others, even firing anti-tank grenades at the car of the president of the Supreme Court in Madrid in 1986 (Sullivan, 1988: 261). Despite these initial setbacks, the Spanish anti-terrorism strategy depended more and more on cooperation with the French government that started to systematically expel ETA activists, handing them over to Spain or deporting them to other countries. These measures were of greater concern for the ETA activists than the GAL commandos, which by then had already ceased to operate. From the mid 80s onwards, more effective security measures forced the ETA to seek easier targets (Sullivan, 1999: 35). This, in turn, resulted in actions that did not fit the original ETA strategy and looked more like straightforward killings than like revolutionary acts in the struggle for independence. People’s sympathy started to shift to the conservative Partido Popular that had come to power in 1996 and even other nationalists’ hostility was provoked by the ETA actions (Alonso, R. and Reinares, F., 2008: 250).38 In 1998, following the public outrage after the assassination of the young Partido Popular local politician Miguel Angel Blanco, the ETA unilaterally declared a cease-fire. The truce was not unequivocally celebrated. Lingering distrust led to 37 GAL commandos are said to be responsible for the death of 27 people between 1983 and 1987 (Reinares, 2000: 121-123). 38 Especially the killing, from 1997 till mid 1998, of several municipal councillors from the (in 1996) elected ‘partido popular’ attributed to this shift. In 1997, when the young local councillor Miguel Angel Blanco was found shot twice in the head after being kidnapped, more than six million people across Spain took to the streets to command an end to the ETA violence. As a result, even ETA’s own supporters publicly condemned the killing (BBC, 2007). 121 accusations of ETA using the cease-fire to rearm39 and accusations of the government that it willingly avoided peace because ETA’s terrorism was easier to handle (Gutierrez, 2002: 22). The truce collapsed in November 1999 after the governments’ refusal to discuss ETA’s demands for Basque independence. The Partido Popular maintained that they would never engage in talks with the ETA unless it would renounce violence. This seriously impeded the peace process. During its re-election campaign for the 2004 elections one of the main points of the Partido Popular was its consequent and tough stance regarding the ETA. However, they would cross the line by blaming the ETA for the bombing of the Atocha train station in 2004 that was actually carried out by radical Islamists. In the following elections, the Socialist Party won. (BBC, 2008) In the aftermath of the Madrid bombings, there was a decline in ETA activity. Although the ETA set off a number of bomb devices, nobody was killed in the years leading up till March 2006 when a permanent cease-fire was declared by the ETA. However, already in December of that same year, a bomb was detonated in the car park of the Madrid airport and peace talks were once again suspended. Since the formation in 1959, more than 800 people died and more than 4000 were wounded as a result of ETA violence. Since the year 2000, more than 750 alleged ETA activists were arrested and intensified cooperation between France and Spain has led to the demise of the terrorist organization. However, bombings still occur and the ETA remains active in its fight for independence (Europol, 2007: 13). In June 2007, the organization called off the permanent cease-fire that it had declared in 2006. Ever since, as recently as July 2008, several incidents have taken place, once again resulting in casualties, among them fatalities. Databases In the following table and subsequent graphs the TWEED and ITERATE data on the ETA can be seen over the past decades. Again, these are not all people that were killed in ETA violence, just those in attacks that meet the requirements set up by the two databases. For instance, several other sources show that over 800 39 This was later confirmed. 122 people were killed by the ETA, whereas the combined number of ITERATE and TWEED reaches 561 only. The data shows that there was a clear peak in ETA activity in the late 1970s and early 1980s, especially in domestic violence. ETA is much more focused on domestic terrorism than on transnational terrorism. The difference with the IRA is obvious in this regard. Some of the cease-fires are clearly visible in the graphs. For instance, the cease-fire that started in 1998 led to almost no attacks, deaths, or injuries in 1999. The same applies to 2006, when the second “permanent” cease-fire was declared by the ETA. Since the databases have no data on the period after 2007, the new peak after the cease-fire was broken cannot be seen. A last observation is, that the peaks in the domestic terrorism graphs for number of attacks and number of deaths have become lower over time. With a clear peak in 1980, the trend seems to be one of less attacks and less fatalities, although 2000 and 2001 saw many injured people. It is interesting to see over the next years whether cooperation between France and Spain, incarceration of ETA members, and perhaps European integration or international counterterrorism measures after 9/11 will lead to a further decline in the number of attacks and deaths, and perhaps a more obvious drop in injuries as well. Number of Attacks Number of Deaths Number of Injured Year TWEED ITERATE TWEED ITERATE TWEED ITERATE 1969 0 0 0 0 0 0 1970 1 1 0 0 0 0 1971 3 1 0 0 0 0 1972 15 0 1 0 1 0 1973 12 2 5 3 6 0 1974 6 0 14 0 70 0 1975 9 0 11 0 2 0 1976 7 0 14 0 10 0 1977 12 1 7 1 6 0 1978 33 0 21 0 26 0 1979 56 11 40 2 124 11 123 1980 28 1 76 0 6 0 1981 20 5 19 1 54 0 1982 8 2 18 0 5 0 1983 7 1 4 0 9 0 1984 10 11 12 1 16 7 1985 21 20 27 21 8 45 1986 17 23 25 1 66 7 1987 7 11 47 3 65 4 1988 20 14 19 0 73 2 1989 42 8 16 0 23 3 1990 20 8 13 0 80 6 1991 23 13 21 1 20 4 1992 10 1 16 0 7 4 1993 9 2 9 0 32 2 1994 4 2 6 0 14 0 1995 10 0 10 0 86 0 1996 25 1 5 0 41 35 1997 19 1 10 1 15 0 1998 8 0 5 0 2 0 1999 0 2 0 0 0 0 2000 26 1 27 0 88 0 2001 25 0 15 0 125 0 2002 12 2 5 0 19 0 2003 14 1 3 0 17 8 2004 24 0 2 0 2 0 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 2006 x 1 x 2 x 0 2007 x 1 x 1 x 0 TOTAL 563 148 523 38 1118 138 124 Number of Terrorist Attacks Carried out by ETA 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 Year Attacks Number of Attacks, TWEED Number of Attacks, Iterate Number of Deaths Caused by ETA Terrorist Attacks 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 Year Deaths Number of Deaths, TWEED Number of Deaths, Iterate 125 Number of Injuries Caused by ETA Terrorist Attacks 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 Year Injuries Number of Injured, TWEED Number of Injured, Iterate 126 1.2 Left-wing terrorist groups The second type of terrorism to be discussed are left-wing terrorist groups “that seek to change the entire political, social and economic system of a state according to an extremist leftist model. Their ideology is often Marxist-Leninist.” (Europol, 2008: The two most infamous groups that operated on European soil were formed by the Italian Red Brigades and the West German Red Army Faction. Both emerged at the beginning of the 1970s and both had a Marxist-Leninist signature. Although some other European states also suffered from left-wing terrorism, most attacks took place in the former Axis-countries. This was no coincidence, since the motivations of both the RAF and the Red Brigades can be traced back directly to their respective countries’ national-socialist or fascist past (Becker, 1977: 25). The abundance of left-wing terrorist attacks in these countries compared to other European states is the main reason to discuss them below. RAF RAF Fact sheet Name: Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction, RAF) Alternative Names: Baader-Meinhof Gruppe (Baader-Meinhof Group) Directly Liaised Organizations: Bewegung des. 2 Juni Revolutionäre Zelle40 Cause: Overthrow of the capitalist system and replacement of it by a ‘people’s democracy’ (comparable to what had happened in Cuba and later would happen in Vietnam, 40 These organizations are closely related to the RAF and do not differ in ideology. The differences are minimal to such an extent that we did not consider it necessary to treat these groups separately. 127 Nicaragua, Angola and Mozambique). Members: 98 active members throughout the years Operative Since: 1970 Operative Until: 1998 (officially; the last attack was in 1993) Areas of Operation: Mainly the Federal Republic of Germany, but occasional operations in neighboring countries (Netherlands, France, Switzerland) and involved in the hijacking of an Lufthansa airplane in 1977 (Mogadishu-hijacking). History of the RAF The Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction or RAF) was founded in June 1970 by Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Ulrike Meinhof and Horst Mahler. A declaration sent to the anarchist magazine Agit 883 marked the official take-off (RAF Texte und Materialien, 1997: 24-26), but Baader and Ensslin (and some others) had already been involved in violent acts directed at the West German state before. In April 1968, Baader and Ensslin (who had a relationship) set fire to several department stores in Frankfurt am Main as an ‘act of solidarity’ with the Vietnamese people and to make a statement against the perceived indifference towards the suffering of these people in the Vietnam War among the West German public (RAF Texte und Materialien, 1997: 17). During their trial, Baader and Ensslin attracted attention from a notorious left-wing journalist, Ulrike Meinhof, who eventually developed a strong enthusiasm for possible actions in the future and decided to join the group. The ideological orientation of the group was communist (Ibid.: 48), although it should be kept in mind that this does not necessarily presuppose affinity with the states behind the Iron Curtain, which were considered authoritarian and reactionary (Strassner, 2003: 275). Main purpose of the group was to generate a collapse of the capitalist system, by provoking the authorities to take the hardest measures after a series of terrorist attacks. This would eventually provide the necessary incentive for the working class to start a revolution (Wilkinson, 2006: 23, 24). This revolution should be regarded as the 128 RAF’s own contribution to the struggle against ‘imperialism’ that was taking place in Third World countries. The roots of the RAF are twofold: first, they can be found in the turbulent social climate of the late 1960s, which struck entire Western Europe (Pflieger, 2004: 15). However, the emergence of left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic can also be traced back to Germany’s national-socialist past (Becker, 1977: 25). This might explain the lesser prominence of this phenomenon in other Western European countries. The Federal Republic, being a successor state of the Third Reich, still had to prove itself as a genuinely democratic state. It was exactly in this respect that the state was criticized, not only by the RAF itself, but by the entire Left. Although the Federal Republic had become a parliamentary democracy, people who had held prominent positions between 1933 and 1945 in several sectors (in the legal system, in business, in the federal bureaucracy) still occupied these positions, blocking the way for younger generations. It was especially this situation that fanned increasing suspicion towards the state from the side of critical students. The state’s political and military alliance with the US and its continuous support for the American involvement in Vietnam only aggravated the already existing suspicion and provided yet another argument to designate the state as ‘fascist’ and ‘militaristic’. The RAF can be divided into three separate so-called ‘generations’: the first generation was operative between 1970-1972 and was led by Baader, Ensslin and Meinhof, although the latter played a less prominent role than many assumed, considering the alternative name ‘Baader-Meinhof Group’ (Becker, 1977: 280). To their most successful attacks belongs the bombing of the USHeadquarters in Heidelberg in May 1972 (Pflieger, 2004: 187). After the arrest of the leaders of the first generation, terrorist activities were carried on by several sub-factions within the original group. These people still acknowledged the authority of their predecessors and Baader and Ensslin were able to keep in touch with these new groups and coordinate their activities to a certain extent (Pflieger, 2004: 41). It is this so-called ‘second generation’ that can be held responsible for the most infamous RAF-actions: the killings of Jürgen Ponto (head of the Dresdner Bank), Siegfried Buback (Federal Prosecutor) and the kidnap and subsequent murder of Hanns Martin Schleyer (President of the West German Employers Organization), all taking place in 1977. The suicide of the leaders of the first generation, which occurred in the aftermath of the murder on Schleyer, 129 disillusioned many of the remaining members. A wave of arrests urged some of them to reconsider their future plans and start a new life abroad. Although they had a strong preference for Angola and Mozambique (both led by Marxist regimes), Stasi interference eventually shaped the conditions for a resettlement of ten RAF members in the GDR, where they adopted new identities and refrained from any form of political activism (Müller and Kanonenberg, 1992: 152). The remaining members that were still active can be labeled as a ‘third generation’. They were responsible for several killings as well (see the fact sheet in the next section for more specific details), but the time gaps between the attacks were much larger in comparison with the second generation. Nevertheless, only in 1993 did the last attack take place. The final dissolution of the RAF occurred in April 1998, five years after the last attack (Pflieger, 2004: 199, 200). This was no abrupt turning point, but rather confirmed the situation as it had been already in the previous years. The main reason for this decline can be found in the general fatigue that had struck the group (Pluchinsky, 1993: 135, 136). The members had lost any inspiration to continue their struggle. This fatigue, however, had its own causes. First, the complete collapse of the Eastern European communist dictatorships in 1989 and the subsequent end of the Cold War came as a considerable blow to the group’s motivation (Pluchinsky, 1993: 144). The revolutions behind the Iron Curtain had a negative impact on all active Marxist-Leninist groups: terrorist attacks carried out by these groups declined by 50 % following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. (Johnson, 2001: 899). Second, support from the German public, which had always been minimal (Hoffman, 2006: 78), had reached its lowest ebb when even the Far Left openly distanced itself from the RAF (Horchem, 1991: 73). Therefore, continuing the struggle seemed useless. Fighting for communism in a state where an extremely large majority had embraced the principles of democracy and a free market no longer seemed logical. It is against this background of general fatigue that the group’s dissolution should be regarded. As pointed out in Del. 5a, several root causes of terrorism in general can be distinguished. One of them is a lack of democracy, civil liberties and a rule of law (TTSRL Deliverable 5a: 13). Although the Federal Republic was a parliamentary democracy, guaranteeing each citizen the enjoyment of civil 130 rights, the RAF perceived the state as a dictatorship in disguise. Members of the RAF defended this assertion by referring to the high number of (ex-)Nazi’s in several segments of the West German society. The German Nazi past, which in itself evolved from a failed democracy (the Weimar Republic), can definitely be designated as a root cause of the rise of left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic. (Becker, 1977: 25). The burden of a tainted past is also mentioned as one of the root causes in Deliverable 5a (TTSRL Deliverable 5a: 14, 15). In addition to this, general dissatisfaction with the capitalist system, which created inequality both in the Federal Republic, as well as in the Third World can also be mentioned as a root cause (RAF Texte und Materialien, 1997: 17). Deliverable 5a also mentions social injustice as a contributing factor to social revolutionary terrorism in general (TTSRL Deliverable 5a: 16). When it comes to deducing trigger causes for the emergence of the RAF, we can point out that the reaction of the authorities towards numerous left-wing demonstrations was often disproportional. An event that certainly triggered the rise of left-wing violence was the killing of the student Benno Ohnesorg during a demonstration against the Shah of Persia, who visited West-Berlin on June 2, 1967 (Becker, 1975: 39). Gudrun Ensslin herself exclaimed on the night after the incident that ‘negotiations with the generation of Auschwitz were useless’. The use of violence was the only remedy against the ‘fascism’ of the state (Ibid.: 41). Crenshaw also mentions provocative events that call for revenge as one of the trigger causes of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981: 385). The factors that have contributed the most to the decline of the RAF have already been mentioned above: a total lack of support from the German public (including the Left) and the sudden irrelevance of communist ideology in the aftermath of the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe. This analysis is supported by several authors that are quoted in Deliverable 5a as well. Scharlau and Philips mention ‘the irrelevance of the RAF’s ideology in a post-Cold War world (Sharlau and Philips, 1992: 108). Ross and Gurr mention burnout as one of the four main causes of decline in terrorist activity (Ross and Gurr, 1989: 422), which is highly applicable to the condition of the RAF in the beginning of the 1990s. Finally, Horchem adds another factor to the decline of the group: a structural change in organization after the arrest of the first generation’s leaders in 1972 alienated the group from that part of the German public that had been 131 sympathetic to the group when Baader, Ensslin and Meinhof were still in charge (Horchem, 1991: 66). Databases Below, the statistics can be found on the number of attacks, as well as the number of deaths and injured as a result of these attacks. Two databases have been used: TWEED and ITERATE. We see that TWEED mentions one attack prior to the founding of the RAF in 1970. This refers to the 1968 arsons in several warehouses in Frankfurt am Main. Baader, Ensslin and a few others set fire to these buildings, but only after closing time, which explains the absence of injured and deaths (Crijnen, 1975: 16). No actions occurred until 1970, when Meinhof and some others freed Baader from custody and injured a few guards in the process (Ibid.). The first death that can be attributed to the group occurred in October 1971, when a police officer was killed in yet another attempt to free an arrested comrade. The second killing took place in December 1971, when another police officer was killed in the aftermath of a bank robbery (Pflieger, 2004: 187). However, both databases fail to refer to these incidents. The peaks of attacks we perceive in 1972, 1975 and 1977 reflect the high activity of the RAF in these years. 1977 shows the highest number of attacks thitherto, which is fully compatible with the events leading to the ‘German autumn’, when Schleyer was kidnapped and killed. The following years indicate a serious decrease, although the group raised its number of attacks in 1984 and 1986. By that time, it mainly targeted the US military forces in the Federal Republic (Ibid.: 195, 196). After 1986, we see a considerable drop, the last attack taking place in 1993. These numbers reflect the general fatigue that struck the group, especially after the collapse of the communist regimes behind the Iron Curtain. Number of Attacks Number of deaths Number of Injuries Year TWEED ITERATE TWEED ITERATE TWEED ITERATE 1968 1 x 0 x 0 x 1969 0 x 0 x 0 x 1970 4 0 0 0 3 0 132 1971 1 0 0 0 1 0 1972 6 2 4 4 31 18 1973 1 0 0 0 3 0 1974 6 0 1 0 0 0 1975 7 1 4 0 31 0 1976 2 0 0 0 2 0 1977 10 7 10 6 3 8 1978 2 2 1 0 1 0 1979 1 1 1 1 4 3 1980 0 2 0 0 0 0 1981 1 7 0 0 1 22 1982 0 2 0 0 0 0 1983 0 1 0 0 0 0 1984 37 8 0 0 0 0 1985 7 11 5 4 21 43 1986 15 3 3 1 1 1 1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 1988 2 1 0 0 1 0 1989 1 0 1 0 1 0 1990 0 2 0 0 0 0 1991 1 2 1 0 1 0 1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 1993 1 0 0 0 0 0 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 133 2005 x 0 x 0 x 0 2006 x 0 x 0 x 0 Total 106 52 31 16 105 95 Number of Attacks RAF 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 Year Number of Attacks TWEED ITERATE 134 Number of Deaths Caused by RAF Attacks 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 Year Number of Deaths TWEED ITERATE Number of Injuries Caused by RAF Attacks 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 Year Number of Injuries TWEED ITERATE 135 Red Brigades Red Brigades Fact Sheet Name: Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades, BR) Alternative Names: - Directly Liaised Organizations: Potere Proletario Armato Nuclei Armati Proletari Prima Linea Cause: Overthrow of the capitalist and parliamentary system and its subsequent replacement by a state ruled by the proletariat Members: 120 active members throughout the years; usually between 50 and 75 operative members Operative Since: 1970 Operative Until: Present (although the last attack occurred in 2002) Areas of Operation: Italy; especially in Northern Italy’s largest cities (Milan, Turin, Genoa, Venice, Bologna) and in Rome. History of the Red Brigades The Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse in Italian, hereafter referred to as BR) formed the dominant left-wing terrorist group in Italy in the 1970s and 1980s. In retrospect, it has been one of the most violent left-wing terrorist organizations in Europe, so far claiming 145 killings (Burleigh, 2008: 191). It was also responsible for the mutilation of numerous victims, usually by inflicting irreversible damage upon their knees. The group was founded in October 1970 in Milan by Renato Curcio and his girlfriend Margherita Cagol. Both had been enrolled in a sociology major at the 136 University of Trento. They were soon joined by Alberto Franceschini, forming the leadership of a brand new communist militant organization (Ibid.: 198). Although most members came from middle-class families, they regarded themselves as a ‘vanguard of the imminent proletarian revolution’. The first objective was to provide an armed support to striking workers in the cities of Northern Italy. Initially the group’s main activities did not go beyond the burning of cars, owned by top managers and planting red flags on factory roofs. Occasionally BR kidnapped prominent individuals from the Right, but only for a few days, after which the victim was shaven and bound to the gates of a factory (Ibid.: 199). Although this may appear to be intimidating enough, these actions pale beside the reckless violence that characterized the group’s activities in the second half of the 1970s. In September 1974 Curcio and Franceschini were both arrested. Cagol managed to release Curcio from a poorly guarded prison complex, but this proved to be only a short revival: Cagol was killed after being cornered by a police force in June 1975, whereas Curcio was recaptured in January 1976 (Ibid.: 201). The entire leadership was put behind bars now. However, the group as such was left intact, mainly due to its meticulous division into columns, each representing another large city in Northern Italy. A Direzione Strategica (Strategic Management) supervised all these columns, whereas a Comitato Esecutivo (Executive Committee) coordinated activities. Each column as such was subdivided into several Brigate (Brigades), who themselves distinguished between underground cells and a larger group of individuals who operated in the open and limited themselves to supporting activities (Ibid.: 201, 202). This structure allowed a quick emergence of new leaders, of whom Mario Moretti was the most prominent. It also contrasts sharply with the comparatively poor inner structure of the RAF (Horchem 1991: 66). The BR’s new leaders focused mainly on the deterrence of the Italian judicial authorities, which should be regarded in the light of the imminent trial of Curcio and Franceschini. This strategy seemed to work, since this trial was postponed due to a lack of willing jurors after an intensive campaign of intimidation (Burleigh, 2008: 203). The new leadership did not eschew to carry out its threats either. Murder and so-called ‘kneecappings’ (crippling the victim by deliberately firing off a series of bullets in the knee) replaced the 137 comparatively mild forms of violence that had characterized the early years of the group (Ibid.: 204). As soon as negative reports on the group began to appear in the mass media, the BR extended their campaign immediately. Three prominent newspaper and television figures were kneecapped. Simultaneously, an attempt was made to kill the President of the Court of Appeals. The attack failed, although two police bodyguards were severely injured (Ibid.: 205). The most infamous act carried out by the BR was the kidnapping and subsequent murder of Aldo Moro. Moro, who had twice served as Prime Minister and was one of the most important leaders of the Christian Democrats, was abducted on 16 March 1978. This prominent public figure was a logical target, not only because of his conservative signature, but also because it was him who was largely responsible for the so-called Historic Compromise. This compromise signalled the accommodation between the Christian Democrats and the strong Italian Communist Party (PCI). Driving a wedge between these parties had topped the BR’s agenda for long (Ibid.: 207). Moro’s kidnappers (among them Morinetti) demanded the release of their imprisoned comrades. The authorities, however, refused any sort of negotiation. As soon as the kidnappers realized that the authorities would not change their stand, they killed Moro on 9 May. His body was left in a car which was deliberately parked right in the middle between the headquarters of the PCI and the Christian Democratic Party as an act of cynical symbolism (Ibid. 212). The violence intensified even more in the following years. This occurred to such an extent, that it is impossible to designate particular targets. In fact, even notorious communists were not left alone. When Guido Rossa, a communist union official, denounced a workmate who had handed out BR literature in his plant, he was shot as an act of ‘punishment’ (Ibid.: 212). Lethal arrangements were also made for those BR members who chose to cooperate with the police in order to prevent a possible lifetime sentence (Ibid.: 218). These pentiti contributed considerably to the group’s decline in the beginning of the 1980s. During this decade BR occasionally surfaced, this time focusing on the presence of US soldiers on Italian soil. However, ties with the working class were permanently severed. Although the BR were never disbanded officially, not much is left of its original intricate structure (Ibid. 219, 220). The last attack so far 138 occurred in 2002, when the BR killed Marco Biagi, an economic advisor to the Berlusconi government. Although the number of hardcore members at any given moment usually remained between 50 and 75 (Hoffman, 2001: 418), the BR initially enjoyed some support from the Italian working class (Crenshaw, 1991: 81) This contrasts clearly with the situation of the RAF who lacked that support. One of the reasons for the BR’s legitimacy in the eyes of a part of the Italian public was a general mistrust of the Italian state, which was regarded as weak, whereas the parliamentary system was considered extremely fragile (Ibid.). Indeed, neo- Fascist groups had the aim to overthrow the democratic system by letting the state disintegrate from within by numerous bomb attacks (Burleigh, 2008: 190). Violence from these groups and left-wing terrorism reinforced each other and eventually led to a negative spiral of attacks. The parliamentary state, at least initially, lacked the inner strength to act adequately. The weak nature of some democracies is also listed in Deliverable 5a as being one of the root causes of terrorism in general (TTSRL Deliverable 5a: 13, 14). If we have to indicate a trigger cause for the emergence of the BR, it is important to point out that it was not a specific example of police brutality that triggered left-wing terrorism (as was the case with the RAF). Two factors have contributed considerably. First, it was the Historic Compromise between the Christian Democrats and the Communists that caused widespread indignation in the extra-parliamentary Left. The PCI, which had turned to the more pragmatic ideas of Eurocommunism,41 was no longer seen as a vanguard in the struggle for the deliverance of the proletariat. This led to the idea that this gap had to be filled by a new vanguard. The BR identified themselves completely with this role. Second, a neo-fascist bomb attack on a Milanese bank in December 1969, which was meant to provoke anti-Leftist state violence, convinced many future BR members of the idea that they had to provide a response of their own (Burleigh, 2008: 189-190). In accordance with Deliverable 5a, which mentions particular political events as a trigger cause, we can conclude that it was both the policy shift in the established political parties and the neo-fascist bomb attack that led 41 Eurocommunism refers to the tendency of some Communist parties in Western Europe to loosen their traditional ties with Moscow and to adapt more to the parliamentary systems of their respective countries. This implied a closer cooperation with the social-democrats and a more pragmatic view on society in general. 139 to the formation of a major left-wing terrorist group (TTSRL Deliverable 5a: 17,18). In order to explain the decline of the BR two contributing factors can be brought forward. First, the government’s offer of leniency in exchange for information provided by ‘repenting’ terrorists urged many terrorists to reconsider their prospects. This eventually led to a revelation of crucial information regarding the BR, which aided the authorities to attack the group in its core (Crenshaw, 1991: 81, 82). Second, the BR made a serious mistake by choosing for extreme violence. This alienated them from the Italian public (even from their initial supporters) and gave the state the opportunity to regain its legitimacy Ibid.: 82). Ross and Gurr also mention a lack of support as one of the main causes of the decline of terrorism in general (Ross and Gurr, 1989: 421, 422). The strategy of leniency in exchange for information, however, seems unique to the Italian approach of counterterrorism. Databases The Red Brigades were founded in 1970 as a militant group, but initially its members shied away from outright murder. Although the group was involved in kidnappings and spreading dissension in factories, the first deadly attacks took place in 1974. In June of that year, two members of the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano were killed (http://www.brigaterosse.org/brigaterosse/index.htm, accessed October 27, 2008). These are the two killings TWEED refers to in the 1974-row. In the years that follow, we observe two peaks: one in 1978 and one in 1980, both indicating 13 killings. The first peak includes the killing of Aldo Moro and his bodyguards. The second peak, occurring in 1980, coincides with the large number of victims caused by right-wing terrorist attacks (the bomb attack on the Bologna train station took place in this year). The table indicates clearly that the number of attacks attributed to the radical left have made a significant contribution to the climate of violence as well. After 1980 a decline sets in. This can be explained by referring to the measures taken by the Italian government which implied judicial lenience towards active terrorists in exchange for information about their comrades. The 140 decline shown in the graphs can also be attributed to a general alienation of the group from the Italian public. The last two attacks, taking place in 1999 and 2002, which killed counselors to the government in both cases, are both mentioned by TWEED. However, the surrounding zeros in the table indicate a serious decline, marking the last two attacks as quite exceptional. We also see that ITERATE seldom indicates attacks. This clearly shows the domestic nature of BR-terrorism compared to other terrorist organizations. Number of Attacks Number of deaths Number of Injuries YEAR TWEED ITERATE TWEED ITERATE TWEED ITERATE 1968 0 x 0 x 0 x 1969 0 x 0 x 0 x 1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 1972 3 0 0 0 0 0 1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 1974 2 1 2 0 0 0 1975 2 0 0 0 3 0 1976 1 0 1 0 0 0 1977 9 1 3 0 5 0 1978 8 3 13 7 2 0 1979 8 0 5 0 7 0 1980 13 3 13 0 23 0 1981 5 1 4 0 0 0 1982 4 1 3 0 6 0 1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 1984 0 2 0 1 0 0 1985 2 0 2 0 0 0 1986 1 1 1 0 0 0 1987 1 1 2 1 1 0 1988 2 0 2 0 0 0 141 1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 1993 0 1 0 0 0 0 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 1999 1 3 1 0 0 0 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 1 0 1 0 0 0 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 2004 0 1 0 0 0 0 2005 x 0 x 0 x 0 2006 x 0 x 0 x 0 Total 63 19 53 9 47 0 Number of Attacks Red Brigades 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 Year Number of Attacks TWEED ITERATE 142 Number of Deaths Caused by Red Brigades Attacks 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 Year Number of Deaths TWEED ITERATE Number of Injuries Caused by Red Brigades Attacks 0 5 10 15 20 25 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 Year Number of Injuries TWEED ITERATE 143 1.3 Right-wing terrorist groups Unlike their left-wing counterparts, groups that are labeled as ‘right-wing’ do not share a clear-cut ideology. Nevertheless, it is possible to designate a few core characteristics that all these groups have in common. They seek to “change the entire political, social and economic system on an extremist rightist model. The ideological roots of European right-wing terrorism can usually be traced back to National Socialism.” (Europol, 2008: 42 Of course, they also share a willingness to use violence in order to achieve their respective political goals, which distinguishes them from other right-wing organizations. The organizations that will be treated below are the (originally) British Blood and Honour (B&H), Russian National Unity (RNU), New Order (Ordine Nuovo, NO) from Italy and Clandestine Corsicans/Corsican Resistance (CC/CR). The former three are closely linked to the fascist and national-socialist ideologies, whereas the latter has both the characteristics of a separatist movement and a neo-Nazi group, since it combines its struggle for independence with a virulent racism. (http://www.start.umd.edu/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3668 accessed October 27, 2008). Fact sheets Listed here are fact sheets for all of the organizations discussed in further detail below. Not all right-wing terrorism as one factor is dealt with here. BLOOD AND HONOUR FACT SHEET Name: Blood and Honour Alternative Names: - Directly Liaised Combat18 (armed wing) 42 Their American counterparts, white supremacist groups, are often categorised as religious terrorists. See Hoffman, Bruce (2006) Inside Terrorism, p. 237. (Europol, 2008: 144 Organizations: Racial Volunteer Force (RVF) Cause: Purge the UK (and in extension Europe) of immigrants and Jews and overthrow the democratic system. Members: Unknown Operative Since: 1987 Operative Until: Present, although the last attack occurred in 1999 Areas of Operation: Northern Europe, Western Europe, Eastern Europe RUSSIAN NATIONAL UNITY FACT SHEET Name: Russian National Unity (Russkoye Natsionalnoye Edinstvo) Alternative Names: - Directly Liaised Organizations: - Cause: Creation of a racially pure Russia by the expulsion of Jews, Turkic people and Caucasians Members: 6000 active members Operative Since: 1990 Operative Until: Present Areas of Operation: Russia, Ukraine, Baltic states ORDINE NUOVO FACT SHEET Name: Ordine Nuovo (New Order) Alternative Names: - Directly Liaised Organizations: Movimento Sociale Italiano 145 Cause: Abolition of the parliamentary system, annihilation of all left-wing influence and the re-establishment of a fascist state. Members: Several hundred Operative Since: 1956 (since 1969 as a terrorist group) Operative Until: Present, although the last attack occurred in 1980 Areas of Operation: Italy CLANDESTINE CORSICANS/CORSICAN RESISTANCE FACT SHEET Name: Clandestine Corsicans/Corsican Resistance Alternative Names: - Directly Liaised Organizations: National Front for the Liberation of Corsica Cause: Independence from France, expulsion of immigrants Members: Approx. 600 Operative Since: 1990s Operative Until: Present (CC); CR was dissolved in 2003 Areas of Operation: Corsica History B&H was founded in 1987 in the UK as a music promotion network, aimed at spreading Nazist propaganda through music (http://www.bloodandhonourworldwide.co.uk/mags1.html, accessed October 27, 2008). Initially, it was not involved in any form of terrorism, but this changed when the organization erected its own armed wing: Combat18 (or C18), the numbers referring to the position in the alphabet of the initials of Adolf Hitler’s first name and surname, respectively. Although B&H has sections in several 146 European states (especially in Germanic and Slavic countries), C18 operates exclusively in the UK. Attacks were typically aimed at immigrants. In 1999, three people were killed and 139 injured when nail bombs were set off in multicultural neighborhoods in London and Brixton (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/mar/02/ukcrime.thefarright, accessed 21 May 2008). Although more attacks have not occurred yet, Europol labels B&H as one of the most aggressive right-wing organizations and constantly monitors its activities (Europol, 2007: 35). RNU was founded in 1990 by Alexandr Barkashov. Its aim is to create a ‘pure’ Russia, which only consists of Russians and related peoples, whereas Turkic and Caucasian minorities, as well as Jews, should be expelled. It combines the principle of racial purity with a strong adherence to the Russian-Orthodox Church, although this does not imply a particularly strong religious connotation. Rather, Russian Orthodoxy is used as a tool to designate a genuinely Russian identity (http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=2, accessed October 27, 2008). By the late 1990s the group consisted of more than 100,000 members (Smith, 2005: 6). Although the group was established as a political party and initially refrained from violent activities, the paramilitary wing of the organization, the ‘Russian Knights’, were involved in a bomb attack on a synagogue in Moscow in 1999. They were also responsible for numerous physical attacks on individuals that belonged to non-Russian ethnicities (http://www.tkb.org/Incident.jsp?incID=11677, accessed October 27, 2008). Ordine Nuovo (New Order, NO) was founded in 1956. This neo-fascist organization also started as a non-violent political party, aimed at evoking wariness of the Left in the Italian public. In 1969 however, members of the party were involved in a bomb attack on a Milanese bank. The bank was deliberately targeted, because the group hoped that the radical Left would be blamed, which could possibly result in a stronger state and increasing influence of the Right (Burleigh, 2008: 189, 190). The group’s most bloody attack occurred in 1980, when a bomb explosion on the Bologna central train station caused 85 deaths and 200 injuries (Ibid.: 218). After 1980 no more attacks were reported. It remains unclear, however, if the party has dissolved or maintains an underground existence (http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3668, accessed October 27, 2008). 147 CR and CC both have their roots in the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica, Corsica’s principal separatist movement. CC can be considered as a continuance of CR, who was dissolved in 2003 (http://www.start.umd.edu/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3668 , accessed October 27, 2008). The main difference with their parental organization is the embrace of extreme racism and xenophobia. Their targets include North-African immigrants, who are associated by the group with drug trafficking. CR has claimed responsibility for 18 attacks (http://www.start.umd.edu/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3668 , accessed October 27,2008). Two sorts of root causes can be distinguished: internal and external causes. Internal causes refer to the psyches of the terrorist individuals. Research shows that right-wing terrorists tend to suffer more from psychotic personalities than their counterparts from the radical left (Crenshaw, 1986: 386). External root causes can be found in the histories and societies of the respective countries where the right-wing terrorists operate. Important political events that rapidly cause significant change within a society (e.g. the collapse of the Soviet Union and the GDR) can contribute considerably to the emergence or rise of violent right-wing activism (Post, Ruby and Shaw, 2002: 80). This factor is quite applicable to the emergence of the RNU, which was founded when the process of disintegration of the Soviet Union was still going on. Another root cause is the rapid societal change as a result of mass immigration. This has fueled a deep xenophobia among certain individuals, who feared that their own position in society was contested by immigrants (Pedazhur, 2001: 341). This may have influenced the emergence of Blood and Honour in the UK. In Italy, the lack of trust in the parliamentary system can be considered as a significant root cause for the re-emergence of fascism in general (Crenshaw, 1991: 81). When it comes to a designation of trigger causes, Post, Ruby and Shaw refer to the existence of threatening opposing groups as an important trigger factor (Post, Ruby and Shaw, 2002:81). This is especially true in the Italian case, where left-wing organizations did not eschew violence against their opponents. Causes of decline are, in this case, strongly interrelated with the importance of leadership. If a strong leader is arrested or if his position is debated within the 148 group, this often leads to internal strife and, subsequently, a decline of the group’s activities. This becomes especially clear in the RNU case, where internal conflicts resulted in an immediate decline of terrorist attacks (Smith, 2005: 7). Another, more trivial, cause of decline is the wave of arrests after a particular attack. This has deterred many right-wing groups to such an extent that they refrained from any terrorist attack afterwards (Hoffman, 1984: 7, . Databases The table below enumerates all terrorist incidents in Europe from 1949 to 2004 that can be attributed to the extreme-right. The four organizations mentioned above are included, but not exclusively. Contrary to previous tables, we have only included TWEED data, since ITERATE has not included right-wing ideology into its list of variables. The abundance of terrorist attacks in 1961 and 1962 reflects a series of attacks carried out by the French Organisation de l’armée secrète, a group that opposed Algerian independence and killed numerous civilians and soldiers, both in Algeria and France (http://ldh-toulon.net/spip.php?article609#nh1, accessed October 27, 2008). The exceptionally high number of deaths in 1980 can be traced back to the peak of right-wing violence in Italy. The bomb attack on the train station in Bologna alone caused 85 deaths (Burleigh, 2008: 218). After 1980 a decline sets in, but the first half of the 1990s show a clear re-emergence. This is due to the rapid increase of neo-Nazi violence in the former German Democratic Republic. Hahan, Rippl and Boenke mention a number of 30,000 ex-GDR citizens involved in right-wing militant politics (Hagan, Rippl & Boenke, 1999: 165). The sharp rise of violent incidents was due to the youth’s susceptibility to ideologies that emphasize racial superiority. This susceptibility can be traced back to the bad economic and social situation in the eastern Länder in general and the rapid transition to a market economy (Ibid.: 162). The second half of the 1990s and the first years of the new millennium show a second decline, only occasionally indicating attacks. The considerably high number of injuries mentioned in the 1999-row include the attack carried out by B&H in multicultural neighborhoods in London and Brixton 149 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/mar/02/ukcrime.thefarright, accessed 21 May 2008). The conclusion we can draw from the graphs, however, is that the current trend is decline. Year Number of Attacks Number of deaths Number of Injuries 1949 0 0 0 1950 5 1 0 1951 0 0 0 1952 1 1 4 1953 0 0 0 1954 0 0 0 1955 0 0 0 1956 0 0 0 1957 5 1 3 1958 1 0 0 1959 4 3 0 1960 6 2 0 1961 89 30 152 1962 150 33 66 1963 1 0 0 1964 4 0 3 1965 0 0 0 1966 1 1 0 1967 0 0 0 1968 1 0 1 1969 3 16 87 1970 5 1 0 1971 2 1 30 1972 10 0 5 1973 14 9 113 1974 27 22 152 1975 21 5 19 150 1976 8 3 1 1977 9 11 20 1978 66 3 2 1979 5 1 9 1980 21 114 440 1981 12 4 8 1982 6 12 3 1983 1 0 2 1984 3 17 123 1985 12 0 98 1986 2 4 0 1987 0 0 0 1988 1 0 5 1989 0 0 0 1990 0 0 0 1991 65 2 33 1992 36 20 22 1993 13 12 91 1994 6 0 0 1995 9 7 5 1996 0 0 0 1997 3 0 0 1998 0 0 0 1999 8 2 117 2000 2 1 0 2001 1 1 0 2002 2 0 0 2003 7 0 0 2004 0 0 0 2005 x x x 2006 x x x Total 648 340 1614 151 Number of Attacks Right Wing Organizations 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 1949 1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 Year Number of Attacks TWEED Number of Deaths Caused by Right Wing Terrorist Attacks 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1949 1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 Year Number of Deaths TWEED 152 Number of Injuries Caused by Right Wing Terrorist Attacks 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 1949 1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 Year Number of Injuries TWEED 153 1.4 Religious groups43 The most conspicuous current terrorist groups or organizations are formed by those that have embraced Islamism as their main ideological motivation. This type of terrorism is aimed at Western society in general, which is considered to be thoroughly depraved and decadent. Their targets include all individuals who are not designated as genuine Muslims. Their most notable acts hitherto were, of course, the attacks of 9/11 in New York City and Washington DC. The two organizations that are discussed below both belong to the Islamist current, but differ considerably in size. Whereas Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami has more than a million members, the Dutch Hofstadgroep does not exceed the number of fourteen, of whom many are imprisoned. Hizb ut-Tahrir denies to have any link with terrorism, but is nevertheless suspected to be involved in several attacks carried out by other Islamist groups (AIVD, 2004: 46). It is therefore, and because of its size, that the group is included in this deliverable. The Hofstadgroep is discussed, since it was the only Islamist terrorist group that operated solely on Dutch soil. The absence of al-Qaeda in this chapter may seem awkward, but the opaque nature of this organization can be indicated as the most important reason for this choice. The term ‘al-Qaeda’ can be used in several ways. The first way is to describe it as an organization, currently led by Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. This is the view used, for example, by Rohan Gunaratna. (See among others: Gunaratna 2004, 91-100). The second way is to describe it as a loosely linked network of cells, groups, and individuals, or even as an ideology more than an organization, like Jason Burke. (See for this, for instance: Burke, 2004, 18-26). Burke even coins the term “Al Qaedism” to describe the ideology. Due to these ambiguities, we do not discuss al-Qaeda below, although we evidently acknowledge the relevance of this organization. 43 In the Europol TESAT 2008 report, ‘Religious Terrorism’ is termed ‘Islamist Terrorism’. The reason for the use of the term ‘Religious Terrorism’ in TTSRL is due to the fact that in deliverable 5b and other parts of the research project, a variety of religiously inspired terrorist groups are assessed for which the definition ‘Islamist Terrorism’ would be to narrow a description. 154 Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami Hizb ut-Tahrir Fact Sheet Name: Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami Alternative Names: Hizb ut-Tahrir Directly Liaised Organizations: - Cause: Interaction with the Ummah so that she adopts Islam as her cause and is led to restore the Khilafah and the ruling by what Allah revealed Members: Approx. 1.000.00044 Operative Since: 1953 Operative Until: Present Split off Organizations: Al-Muhajiroun Areas of Operation: Global with London regarded as the most important center of Hizb ut-Tahrir worldwide. History Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation) presents itself as “a political party whose ideology is Islam. It works within the Ummah (the community of believers, TTSRL) and together with her, so that she adopts Islam as her cause and is led to restore the Khilafah (Caliphate, TTSRL) and the ruling by what Allah revealed” (www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org, Accessed 10 April 2007). In its own eyes, Hizb ut-Tahrir (for short) is a political group and not a religious one (www.hizbut- tahrir.org, Accessed 10 April 2007). It is a transnational party or movement that claims to try to achieve its political goals without the use of violence and has branches in about forty countries, including both Islamic and Western countries. In the Islamic world they are, for instance, active not only in the Middle East, but 44 Support is estimated to be even higher (New Statesman, 13 September 2004[0]) 155 also in Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. In almost all of these countries, Hizb ut-Tahrir is perceived as a threat to the state or even as a terrorist organization. In the Western world, Hizb ut-Tahrir has a presence in, among others, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Australia, the United States and Canada. To these countries, Hizb ut-Tahrir presents a particularly difficult challenge since it holds radical Islamist views, but openly only advocates peaceful change. Nonetheless, in a number of EU member states, the party is regarded as one that secretly does support the idea of a violent jihad and/or has been involved in anti-Semitic incidents (AIVD, 2004:46). The governments of some countries, among them Germany, have taken restrictive actions against Hizb ut-Tahrir. In this study, we primarily focus on Hizb ut-Tahrir branches in EU member states. Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by the Palestinian Islamic scholar, political thinker and judge, Muhammed Taqiuddin al-Nabhani. After its establishment, the party began carrying the da’wah (the act of preaching Islam) to Arab countries. The party rapidly established branches in The Muslim world since ‘these countries are inhabited by people who speak the Arabic language, which is the language of the Qur’an and Hadith, and is an essential part of Islam and a basic element of the Islamic culture.’ (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 1996: 17). However, due to the repressive political systems in the region and competition from other political ideas (Arab nationalism), as well as from other Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, its membership remained limited. Especially in Arab countries, the party was heavily prosecuted and many of its members jailed (Central Asia Caucasus Institute, 2003; Eurasia insight, 2007; Jamestown, 2007). The organizational structure of Hizb ut-Tahrir is rather complex. Until his death in 1977, the leadership was maintained in the hands of the founding father Muhammed Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, who was succeeded by Sheikh Abdul Qadim Zallum, another Palestinian cleric and former professor at Al-Azhar University. Zallum’s leadership ended with his death in 2003. (Baran, Z., 2004:16-17). The identities of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s current leader and senior officers have not been mentioned in reliable open sources. A general distinction can be made between countries in which the party is permitted to operate freely, and countries in which Hizb ut-Tahrir is prosecuted. 156 In Uzbekistan, for instance, Hizb ut-Tahrir is organized in a secretive and hierarchical pyramid structure whereas, in EU member states, the branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir are organized like most political parties and have a hierarchical structure with a national leader, local groups and the possibility of membership for anyone who supports the party’s ideas. In addition, the European branches of the party also consist of study groups, which are called ‘halkas’. From the beginning, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s leadership decreed that members should not participate in terrorist activities. This message has been continuously reverberated. There are, nonetheless, possible indirect links between Hizb ut- Tahrir and terrorist groups and individuals. In Britain, three men, who in 1995 were arrested and charged with conspiring to assassinate the Israeli ambassador, were reported to have been in possession of Hizb ut-Tahrir literature and to have helped organize Hizb ut-Tahrir meetings in Manchester (Whine, M., 2006:5). Another man, Muhammad Babar - who is linked to the seven men trialed in London on charges of planning terrorist attacks between January 2003 and April 2004 - has stated that he became a member of Hizb ut- Tahrir and another radical group, Al-Muhajiroun, while at the university, when he became angered by the Gulf War (The Times, 24 March 2006 and BBC, 2008). In the above mentioned cases, as well as in most cases, those behind the allegations only point at involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir activities while studying, the possession of Hizb ut-Tahrir materials, and other rather indirect relations between suspects of terrorism and the party. More serious are the allegations that connect the party to the other radical group mentioned above, Al-Muhajiroun, established in 1995 as a splinter group that broke off from Hizb ut-Tahrir. According to leader Omar Bakri Muhammad, the two groups initially split because Hizb ut-Tahrir was “too soft” (Siddiqui, M., 2004:6) In January of 2003, the German Federal Minister of the Interior, put a socalled Betätigungsverbot on Hizb ut-Tahrir, prohibiting all of the party’s activities in Germany. Given the relative insignificance of the party in Germany, this restriction came as a surprise to many. According to the Minister of the Interior, the party was banned because its members could be classified as “fundamentalist Islamists preaching hate” and were conducting “massive anti- Jewish propaganda” (RFE/RL, 26 October 2005). Afterwards, the Minister admitted that the Betätigungsverbot has a symbolic function first, stating it is 157 meant to warn every person or group that wants to violate the German constitution. (Het Parool, 20 January 2003). Some of the activities on the basis of which Hizb ut-Tahrir was banned in Germany also occurred in the United Kingdom. In fact, the party faced a lot of criticism from NGOs and political organizations in relation to its Islamist and alleged anti-Semitic ideas. Nonetheless, despite the fact that the party has a far larger following in Britain than in Germany, the authorities in London never took concrete steps against Hizb ut-Tahrir. After the London bombings in July 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced the British government’s intention to ban the organization under new anti-terrorism legislation that prohibits the glorification of terrorism (Guardian, 21 November 2005). This intention, however, was never implemented. In Denmark, the party came under fire on the personal level when the head of the Danish Hizb ut-Tahrir branch, Fadi Abdul-Latif, was found guilty of distributing anti-Semitic propaganda and given a sixty-day suspended prison sentence in 2003 (BBC, 27 August 2003). Moreover, the Danish Minister of Justice began searching for a legally-based means to ban the organization (BBC Europe, 18 August 2005). According to the Minister, the anti-Semitic remarks “have no place in the Danish society” (BBC Europe, 18 August 2005). In the Netherlands, a number of Members of Parliament also expressed their concerns about Hizb ut-Tahrir’s presence and its influence among Muslim immigrant groups perceiving the party as a threat to democracy and the rule of law (BZK, 8 September 2005). Several right-wing politicians have asked for a ban on Hizb ut-Tahrir’s activities in the Netherlands, but have not received significant political support. (AIVD, 2005) A case-study on an organization such as Hizb ut-Tahrir as part of an overall large research project on counter-terrorism might suggest prematurely that Hizb ut-Tahrir falls in the category of labeled terrorist organizations, or at least belongs to a group of organizations that pose a serious threat to our democratic society. However, such qualifications cannot be given to Hizb ut- Tahrir without serious reservations. The question can even be raised whether such a qualification is fit for this organization at all. Although in its philosophy Hizb ut-Tahrir has anti-democratic tendencies, it also rejects the idea of violent jihad to achieve their goal of a caliphate. Most allegations on the terrorist connection of the organization or some of its members point at rather indirect 158 links, are not based on solid sources, or should by their numbers be assessed as mere coincidences. The fact sheet therefore does not contain any information on deaths or injuries caused by terrorist attacks of Hizb ut-Tahrir but is limited to general information on the organization. On the other hand, experience shows that organizations such as Hizb ut- Tahrir are “very smart in walking the very fine line between propaganda and incitement to terrorism”, according to Paul Wilkinson, director of the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews (RFE/RL, 26 October 2004). However, outlawing this organization without a proper cause might have the opposite effect. It is therefore important to monitor with prudence and to act on facts instead of allegations. 159 The Hofstadgroep Hofstadgroep Fact sheet Name: Hofstadgroep Alternative Names: Hofstadnetwerk, Polder Mujahedin, Lions of Tawheed. Directly Liaised Organizations: None, although inspired by Takfir wal-Hijra Cause: Overthrow of Western democracy and its replacement by a ‘pure’ form of Islam Members: 14 active members Operative Since: 2002 Operative Until: Present Split off Organizations: None Areas of Operation: Netherlands History The Hofstadgroep is an Islamist terrorist organization of nine young Muslims in the Netherlands. The name "Hofstad" was originally the codename the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, hereafter: AIVD) used for the group, which leaked to the media in 2003. The name refers to a popular name for the city of The Hague, where some members had been active. The group was influenced by the ideology of Takfir wal Hijra, a violent Islamist organization.45 45 This group finds its origins in Egypt during the 1960s. Its intent was to infiltrate a target society (Islamic or Western) in order to re-Islamize it. Takfir wal Hijra is Sunni based and fundamentalist in nature, borrowing on the Salafist ideology, which resembles the Saudi version of Wahhabism. It justifies the use of violence against unbelievers and against perceived renegade Muslims (AIVD, 2006:39). The Takfir wal Hijra ideology also condones un-Islamic behavior by its members in order to carryout an armed struggle against Jews and Christians. (Volkskrant, 26 November 2005). 160 One of the Hofstadgroep’s key members is Mohammed Bouyeri, the man responsible for the murder of the controversial Dutch writer and filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004. On the morning of Tuesday November 2, 2004, he was brutally assassinated while biking to work unsuspectingly. Bouyeri was convicted in July 2005 for planning and carrying out the attack. Thirteen other suspects were taken into custody on various charges in connection with the murder. Nine of the fourteen suspects were convicted for membership of a terrorist organization and are currently serving various sentences ranging from one year to life imprisonment. As a diffuse and self generated autonomous network, the Hofstadgroep was not organized in a ‘top down’ command structure although they did have spiritual support and guidance from outside the country. It did, however, not appear to come from any international groups. (AIVD, 2005:19) The methods and tactics of the Hofstadgroep are difficult to distinguish because the ‘group’ lacked a coherent strategy and most of the crimes were committed by individual members. The murder of Van Gogh was deliberately aimed at one specific individual whom the perpetrator – but also his sympathizing friends – regarded as an ‘enemy of Islam’ (AIVD, 2006:40). Samir Azzouz, who had participated in the network of the Hofstadgroep but who himself was never convicted for membership, is believed to have made plans to attack several institutions. (Benschop, 2004). Nonetheless, in general one could argue that the main aim was that of a classical terrorist organization: to take lives, or threaten to do so, with the aim of bringing about social change or influencing political decision making.46 Despite its rowdy operations and inability to gather the right ingredients for making explosives, the Hofstadgroep was initially always regarded as a terrorist organization. It was also labeled as such by the court that convicted nine individuals for their membership. However, these persons where cleared of these charges in 2008 when the high court (Dutch: Derechtshof) argued that the Hofstadgroep could not be regarded as a terrorist organization. (high court verdict, 2008) In february 2008, the public prosecutor appealed to the supreme court (Dutch: Hoge Raad) to revoke this verdict (Elsevier, 2008). Due to the more or less loose character of the Hofstadgroep and the fact that it included nine personalities, it is difficult to distinguish the root and trigger causes 161 of terrorist activities for the entire group. Therefore the focus here is placed on Bouyeri, the killer of Theo van Gogh and the only one who actually used violence to achieve his goals. His biography and (political) ideas are well documented and can also be derived from his writings, including the letter he pinned to the body of Theo van Gogh (Bouyeri 2004). The root causes of his radicalization process and the subsequent murder can be found in two areas: in his personal life and in politics. In his personal life he encountered problems that are typical for many immigrant Muslims in The Netherlands, including (perceived) discrimination, problems between generations, and difficulties with personal identity. (AIVD, 2004:33-35; AIVD, 2005:36) In addition, the radicalization process of the Hofstadgroep was influenced by conflicts affecting the Muslim world (e.g. Iraq and Chechnya). With regard to politics, Bouyeri seemed to have been particularly upset about (perceived) critique of Islam by politicians and public opinion makers and the foreign policies of Western countries with regard to the Muslim world. Experience of discrimination based on ethnic or religious origins seems to have been the most prominent root cause for the Hofstadgroep and Bouyeri in particular. This root cause for terrorism that is presented in deliverable 5a seems to be a relevant factor once again. As this root cause could also be discerned in the cases of both the IRA and the ETA, its relevance for explaining underlying reasons for terrorism seems once again to be confirmed. As we shall see, the trigger causes for killing van Gogh also seem to emanate from this root cause. These main trigger causes can also be divided into those related to his personal life and those related to politics. The former include possible events that lack hard proof, such as disappointment over the failure to receive support for his ideas for establishing a youth centre, but also include his arrests and his time in prison, during which his spirituality and devoutness moved even further down a radical interpretation of Islam. These personal trigger causes are difficult to translate to a general overview like the one presented in deliverable 5a discerning multiple main causes which can act a catalysts. The set of trigger causes of a political nature include the US-led intervention in Iraq as well as the polarized debate on Islam in the Netherlands. One of the most striking trigger event seems to have been van Gogh’s film called 46 see definition of terrorism as used by the predecessor of the AIVD, the Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD, 2001:9) or various definitions of terrorism as described in TTSRL’s study on 162 Submission, in which Islam was heavily criticized. In a way, Bouyeri acted out of revenge for the insults of the Islam by Western societies. This means all political trigger causes can in this case be categorized as ‘events that call for revenge or action.’ As mentioned in deliverable 5a, some terrorism experts discern the ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ method in the field of counterterrorism. The ‘carrot’ method refers to soft line approaches like negotiations and the ‘stick’ method meaning hard line measures like arrests and suppression. The factors of decline with regard to the Hofstadgroep are all in the sphere of the ‘stick’ method. The foremost factor that can be distinguished is the investigation of the group that started more than two years prior to the van Gogh murder and the subsequent arrests. In fact many individuals that participated in the Hofstadgroep were known to the authorities by early 2004, more than half a year before the murder of Theo van Gogh. Although the police and the AIVD did not prevent the terrorist killing, as a result of the previous investigations, they were able to react swiftly in arresting suspects and providing the necessary evidence to the courts that led to the conviction of nine members of the Hofstadgroep. The second important factor that played a role in the decline of the Hofstadgroep is the previously mentioned wave of arrests that took place following the van Gogh murder. It should be stressed that the long and medium term impact of the arrests and convictions remains to be seen. Some of the convicted members of the Hofstadgroep have been released in 2007 and others will be released in 2008. They may continue to constitute a threat to society. A third factor that played a role in the decline of the Hofstadgroep is the set of new laws on terrorism that had been in place since August 2004. Eight of the core members - excluding Bouyeri – were convicted of various charges ranging from attempted murder, violation of the Weapons and Munitions Act and participation in a criminal organization with terrorist intent. The latter verdict was made possible by a new law and allowed the judge to give higher sentences to the individuals that were convicted of being members of the Hofstadgroep. As a result of the investigations, the arrests and the convictions, it seems that the Hofstadgroep as defined in this study has ceased to exist. However, networks similar or close to the Hofstadgroep still exist and still pose a threat to Dutch society. Although, according to the 2006 Annual Report of the Dutch academic definitions of terrorism. 163 General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), they lack leadership and are divided among themselves (AIVD, 2007:33). Much can be learned from these studies, especially because the phenomenon of home-grown terrorism by young immigrant Muslims is relatively new. As many Western countries face similar problems, comparison of cases could bring insight into this particular phenomenon to a higher level. However, drawing lessons from the past can lead to oversimplification and wrong parallels being drawn between past events and recent developments. The Hofstadgroep is a good example of this. There has not been a precedent of a singular hard line approach being able to defeat a terrorist organization. Internal group dynamics, timing of government measures against the group and other aspects all play their part in the demise of a terrorist organization. Nonetheless, in the case of the Hofstadgroep, the ‘stick’ method has been the main factor for the decline of the organization. Of course, the Hofstadgroep was only a small network of radicalized persons which made this approach more viable. The group was not firmly anchored in society resulting in only a marginal social impact when the members were arrested and persecuted. 164 Part D 1. General Bibliography 1.1 Bibliography part A Alexander, Y. (2002) Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press Alonso, R. (2004) “Pathways Out of Terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country: The Misrepresentation of the Irish Model” In Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 695-713 Alterman, J.B. (1999) How Terrorism Ends, Special Report, No. 48, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Andersen, L.E. (2002) “Asymmetrisk krig, ny terrorisme og den postmoderne verdens (u)orden – historien om et bebudet terrorangreb” (Asymmetrical war, new terrorism and the post-modern World (dis)Order – the story of an announced terror attack), Militært Tidsskrift, Vol. 131, No 1, pp. 48-66 Art, R.J. and L. Richardson (2006) Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Benjamin, D. and S. Simon (2003) The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against America, New York Random House Bjørgo, T. ed. (2005) Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Way Forward, London: Routledge Borum, R. (2003) Psychology of Terrorism, University of South Florida, available online